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Abstract: 
 
Why is there no post-Westphalian world polity today, despite the globalism of recent decades? Is 
the construction of a world polity an impossible utopia? If it is possible, under what conditions, 
by what processes, and in what necessary social form? Available visions of a world polity form a 
debate and world polity formation theories offer limited explanations. In response, this study 
argues the emergence of a world polity is possible, but is an unlikely and fragile outcome in a 
late modern context. Two contributions are made to support this argument. First, a new world 
polity formation theory is developed that explains how systems of polities become single 
polities. A second contribution advances an account of the historically specific trans-
civilizational and planetary social form a world polity must necessarily attain if it were to be 
practically constructed in a late modern context. 
 
Keywords: World Polity, World Order, Modernity, Globalization, Cosmopolitanism. 
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Prefatory Acknowledgements: 
 
 
The idea for this thesis came to mind when visiting Trinity College and the Munk School of 
Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, whilst writing up my Master’s thesis for my 
programme at Aberystwyth University. I had long felt the intuition that the international system 
(international society, if you like) is a broken and inadequate political system. The idea I had in 
response was unoriginal. The idea was about realizing a world polity, one united beyond 
hegemony and anarchy, one realizing a system designed to meet the needs and interests of all the 
groups and peoples of humankind, not just its great and powerful nations. What does that mean? 
Why has it not already happened? To what extent would it make the world a better place? I was 
confused about the answers. I was also confused about the intellectual resources needed to get to 
an answer, although I knew what texts were relevant when I saw them and I had a sense of the 
literatures that were pertinent: World History, International Law, Sociology, theoretical 
Anthropology, Political Philosophy, International Political Economy, and International 
Relations. I was confused about how they fit together and why they were relevant. 
The writings of R.J. Vincent were pointing in the correct direction, I felt, starting in his 
early essay, ‘Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order’, and more clearly in his work on 
human rights, especially his posthumously published essay, ‘Modernity and Universal Human 
Rights’. The connection between modernity and the issues of the world beyond the states system, 
I believe, helps us understand the nature of the problem as well as the paths out of it. If Vincent 
had continued to develop this theme, I believe my PhD thesis would be superfluous, its questions 
being already answered. Vincent’s PhD supervisor, Hedley Bull, was pushing in a different 
direction, defending the society of states, although conceding the need for a new cosmopolitan 
political culture more accommodating of non-Western cultures. If Bull had also not passed away 
early, there would have likely been an important discussion, perhaps a debate, between him and 
Vincent on the idea and possibility of a world society in a modern and increasingly post-Western 
world. When looking into the topic, I found Barry Buzan had attempted to clear up this 
substantial “gap”, but I also found that his contribution, From International to World Society? 
was more of a first step, putting the topic back on the agenda, but not entirely pointing the way, 
at least not pointing in the direction I felt the topic needs to be taken, or in the direction which 
Vincent would likely have taken it. 
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The final push towards taking up this idea as a PhD thesis came at the International 
Studies Association conference, San Francisco. I attended a panel convened to present Richard 
Falk with an award for his work. R.B.J. Walker was the discussant, and, as one might expect, 
they discussed the World Order Models Project and their debates on world order reform. Falk 
appeared depressed about the state of world affairs. The world has not gone in the direction his 
life’s work has urged and he expressed concern for the survival of humankind. Still, he provided 
advice for the next generation. He said a PhD is a rare opportunity to study what one wants and 
to make a significant contribution, it should not be wasted on modish topics that please others; it 
should be about something that feels important and ambitious. In this study, I have attempted to 
follow this advice, by carrying on, in my own way, Vincent’s emphasis on the problems of the 
political world beyond the society of states, the question of world order reform, and importance 
of modernity, proceeding not exactly how Vincent might have, but in the same direction, with, I 
feel, similar intuitions about the nature of the problem and the shape of a satisfactory answer. 
I wish to thank my supervisor Peter Wilson and advisor Mark Hoffman, who helped me 
find my way through this project. I also wish to thank Kirsten Ainley and Cova Mesueger for 
their guidance in my research panel process. I am indebted to Iver B. Neumann and Margot Light 
for their comments and feedback in our post-graduate seminars. I wish to thank Tarak Barkawi, 
Michael Banks, Christopher Coker, Mick Cox, Christopher Hughes, William Callahan, Cornelia 
Navari, Martin Bayly, Nick Kitchens, James Morrison, Craig Calhoun, R.B.J. Walker, Giorgio 
Shani, and Oliver Kessler for generous and intellectually expanding conversations about the big 
ideas. I need to acknowledge the benefits gained from the theoretical exchanges my peers gave 
me along the way, especially from Andreas Aagaard Nohr, and particularly from Annissa 
Haddadi, Dimitrios Stroikos, Gustav Meibauer, Marian Feist, Joanne Yao, Scott Hamilton, Ida 
Danewid, Ilaria Carrozza, Bjornar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Maggy Ainley, David Brenner, Sidharth 
Kaushal, Asad Zaidi, Alireza Shams-Lahijani, Adrian Rogstad, Sarah Bertrand, Christopher 
Murray, Kerry Goettlich, Mark Kersten, Emma Saint, and Liane Hartnett. Close friends, Roisin 
Dunnet and Arran Shearing, helped me with this project’s frame of mind. Most importantly, I am 
grateful for my family’s love and support. 
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‘Discussion of a global polity is very speculative. Whether it will become a reality, 
with each one of us its citizens, is something that we may know only when we have 
achieved it. If that happens, then the era of international relations will be described 
in the history books as having intervened between the decline of empires and the 
formation of the planetary polis.’ 
 
 
-R.J. Vincent, 
‘Modernity and Universal Human Rights’, in Anthony G. McGrew and Paul G. Lewis (eds.) 
Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) p. 289. 
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Introduction. 
Beyond Babel? World Disorder, World Polity 
 
 
0.1 Ancient Questions, Modern World 
 
This thesis searches for the image of a realizable world polity. What social form must a world 
polity necessarily attain if it were to emerge in practice? What are its conditions and contributing 
processes? This search comes from the intuition that the organization of humankind into many 
independent polities is detrimental to humankind, perhaps even that it is wrong, morally 
speaking. Cosmopolitans, ancient and modern, have not felt “at home in the world”, as “citizens 
of the world”, without first feeling that the world is in disarray, that the world of separate 
loyalties and governments is not the world humankind needs or deserves. Zeno of Citium did not 
envision his world Republic with a universal law before he had the sense that many laws were 
misleading many lives. Nor did Confucius imagine his universal order, or Dante his world 
monarchy, or Kant and Marx their universalist futures, until they first felt the wars and injustices 
around them were wrought by the divisions of humankind, be it in the warring states period of 
ancient China, the instabilities of Medieval Italy, or the warring and imperial nation-states of 
modern Europe. Today, this sense of cosmopolitan estrangement from the world is not an 
uncommon feeling, the more engrossed the ills of human division have become in an age of 
planetary scales. 
In recent years, cosmopolitans were, for a time, somewhat hopeful that a more united 
world was attainable. Many saw globalization as the impetus of a post-Westphalian world, where 
the “global village” was busy constructing the “global anthill” of the world polity.1 In 2006, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan insisted before the UN General Assembly that ‘human beings 
throughout the world form a single society,’ as he used the globalist vision to underwrite his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J.G. Ruggie Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation (London: Routledge, 
1998); David Held and Anthony McGrew, ‘The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects of World 
Order’, Review of International Studies, 24:5 (1998), pp. 219-245; Martin Shaw, ‘Global Society and Global 
Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of ‘International Society’ in Rick Fawn and Jeremy 
Larkins (eds.), International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: MacMillan, 
1996), pp.47-62. 
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peace and development agenda.2 As late as 2013, Managing Director of the IMF Christine 
Lagarde asserted to the World Economic Forum that, ‘this generation is a global generation and 
an open generation. Open to the world, and to the idea of a common global community.’3 Yet, 
today, this vision is proving chimerical.4 The genuine steps made towards a world polity have 
been a halfway effort at best.5 They are proving largely inconsequential for the persistent power 
political ills of a world ordered into multiple but disproportionate and ultimately rival states. The 
modern world order of multiple nation-states has constructed a world where the great powers 
mutually undermine one another’s security and stability, whilst practicing imperialistic policies 
towards the small powers. Expansions of international law have had raised no effective restraints 
on the great powers. In this divided world order, the UN Global Goals for Sustainable 
Development and deepening ecological crisis have roused minimal and uncoordinated action by 
the international community. War spreads and arms sales soar. Neo-imperial wars and inequities 
persist. Geopolitical power balancing carries on and vast thermonuclear arsenals have been refit 
with updated systems. Amidst this world order malaise, the disillusioned idealist Richard Falk 
has been brought to ask, ‘Does the human species wish to survive?’6 So alienated have 
cosmopolitans become today. 
In this study, I advance the argument that a world polity beyond hegemony and anarchy 
is not impossible, but that it is highly unlikely, and that it must necessarily attain a trans-
civilizational and ecological character to be realizable in the context of a late modern age. The 
Kantian vision of a pacific federation of republics and the Marxist-Leninist vision of universal 
revolution are equally unrealizable in so far as they do not incorporate a trans-civilizational and 
ecological character. They could not be realized in practice, in any durable and practical way, 
under any circumstances, if they did not come to embrace these features. Even if, in an 
alternative history, the revolutions of 1848 triumphed and took-up the idea of a world republic, 
or even if the Leninist export of revolution had accomplished a universal revolution, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kofi Annan, ‘Address to the General Assembly’, New York (19 Sept., 2006); Kofi Annan We the Peoples: A UN 
for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Paradigm, 2014). 
3 Christine Lagarde, ‘A New Global Economy for a New Generation’, (International Monetary Fund, 2013), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/012313.htm. 
4 Jennifer Welsh The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: 
Anansi Press, 2016). 
5 Chris Brown International Society, Global Polity: An Introduction to International Political Theory (London: 
Sage, 2015), p. 1-11. 
6 Richard Falk Power Shift: On the New Global Order (London: Zed, 2016), p. 253. 
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hypothetically successful world revolutions would have still struggled to achieve a world polity 
if they failed to imagine and realize it in a trans-civilizational form, and, eventually, with an 
ecological dimension as well. If a world polity were to be practically realized, in a durable and 
sustainable sense, it would necessarily attain a trans-civilizational and ecological character, 
however it was imagined, and however much material and economic power it wielded. The 
world polity is unlikely not simply because thermonuclear deterrents and modern guerrilla 
warfare have virtually ruled out world conquest, or because revolution is virtually always met by 
counter-revolution. A world polity is unlikely chiefly because we moderns struggle to imagine 
the meaningful and practical bases of a world unity in a modern age. In this context, all 
humankind demands their own freedoms and equalities, to pursue their own modern and 
culturally diverse ways of life, independently, regardless of their interdependence. Even if a 
world empire brought the world under a final leviathan, it would suffer multiple simultaneous 
rebellions and likely careen into world civil war and collapse if it did not embrace a trans-
civilizational and ecological vision. The conditions of a world polity are not only the 
establishment of the hierarchical political apparatus of a united world order, but also their 
legitimation through a new trans-civilizational and ecological cosmopolitan culture and 
collective identity. 
This need for a new trans-civilizational and ecological form of legitimation and collective 
identity is largely due to the modern political disposition of humankind, which, in modern times, 
has formed a global international system of multiple national polities.7 In modern times, trying to 
construct a world polity is like building a pyramid out of billiard balls or marbles. Everything 
wants to roll away. The cosmologically central and unshakeable empires of antiquity and the 
middle ages, the Egyptian and Babylonian, Roman and Byzantine, Persian and Chinese, the Holy 
Roman Empire and the Caliphates, these universalist empires that cohered and ordered the 
polities of humankind for most of recorded history have lost their cosmological sources of 
legitimacy in a modern age and their practicality is sapped in an age of modern revolutions, 
where everyone demands independent rights and freedoms. Modern secular liberal 
cosmopolitans, who never persuasively claim a monopoly on the word cosmopolitan, are no less 
de-legitimated and limited in the context of multiple universalisms and modern post-colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit The Globalization of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
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polities that have been galvanized towards nationalism and independence. The dissolution of the 
modern European empires was inevitable in the upheavals of modern demands for rights and 
freedoms.8 Building a world polity out of the modern world encounters the forces of what Ralf 
Dahrendorf once called, “globoskepticism”, the forces in world affairs that issue from the 
modern moral purposes of freedom and independence that the modern nation-state has been built 
to achieve.9 It is not human nature, but the deep historical structure of the modern states system, 
its underlying modern ambitions, that prevent a world polity. As Raymond Aron suggested about 
a world state, 
 
A world state is not in contradiction with the biological or social nature of man, as 
it has been revealed across the centuries. If Rome was able to spread out to the 
British Isles and to Byzantium at time when legions traveled by foot, modern 
techniques for movement on land, on sea, and in air make a planetary empire 
materially possible. What excludes such an empire and for the foreseeable future of 
the next decades are the historic actors.10 
 
The world polity is unlikely in a large measure because its meaningful and feasible image is 
difficult to imagine in a modern context, where everyone demands and defends modern freedoms 
and independence, imagining themselves as distinct and discreet societies and nations.  
Yet, a difficult and unlikely outcome does not quite amount to an impossible outcome. 
The answer follows Marx’s insight that human beings, ‘make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.’11 The question is 
how can all the polities of the world be brought together, into a larger world polity, under the 
conditions of modernity? Because of the global demand for modern freedoms, the global demand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Christian Reus-Smit Individual Rights and the Making of the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
9 Quoted in, Luis Cabrera, ‘Global Government and the Sources of Globoscepticism’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, 43:2 (2015), pp. 471-491; Christian Reus-Smit The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, 
Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
10 Raymond Aron, ‘The Anarchical Order of Power’, Daedalus, 95:2 (1966), p. 484. 
11 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works 
in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), Vol. I, p. 225. 
	   13 
to be modernly civilized in multiple cultural forms, a world polity must necessarily attain a trans-
civilizational character that can cohere the multiple modern ways of life that these freedoms are 
demanded for. But, a world polity must also attain an ecological character if it is to be practically 
realizable in a sustainable sense. If the world polity were not realized with a trans-civilizational 
character, it would not get off the ground, because it would face too many detractors who would 
find it unacceptable to their modern self-conceptions and ambitions as distinctly modern 
civilizations, with distinct, meaningful, and embodied cultural forms of being modernly civilized 
in the plurality of modern civilizations. But, if the world polity were not also realized with an 
ecological component on a planetary level, then it would become overwhelmed by the practical 
consequences of uncontrolled climate change. 
Why must a world polity be “civilizational”? In a modern context, civilization, in its 
modern usage as the idea of the mastery of technological power and “civilized” practices and 
worldviews, is imagined as the achievement of modernity. As such, it became the source of 
legitimacy in the modern discourse of world order, as the language for the modern standards and 
hallmarks of human excellence and exemplariness.12 While late modern civilization is global, it 
is also plural, not universal.13 The concept of civilization historically used to legitimize European 
empire in the modern era, has been appropriated by post-colonial peoples, in their ‘systematic 
defense of the non-European civilizations.’14 Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis of an impending 
“clash of civilizations” has been much critiqued, but it contained the insight that in a modern 
world, everyone wants ‘to modernize but not to Westernize.’15 Because “civilization” was the 
historical criterion of legitimacy in the modern discourse of world order, and so became a 
systematically appropriated concept by post-colonial peoples, legitimate standing as a world 
power is connected in contemporary late modern times not only to global democratic, human 
rights, and market standards of modernity, but also to civilizational distinctiveness and integrity, 
distinct ways of being modernly “civilized”, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, Russian, Iranian, and so 
on.16 In late modern times, for there to be a world polity to support a unified world order, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Gerrit W. Gong The Standards of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).  
13 Peter J. Katzenstein Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2009). 
14 Aimé Cesairé Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 7. 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (1993), p. 41. 
16 David P. Fidler, ‘The Return of the Standard of Civilization’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2:1 (2001), 
pp. 137-157; Dimitrios Stroikos, ‘Introduction: Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilization(s) in International 
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 42:3 (2014), pp. 546-556; Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif 
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“higher” trans-civilizational narrative is needed to legitimize it as a shared project for all 
humankind and all its civilizations. 
A trans-civilizational eco-planetary polity is a complicated vision and its realization in 
practice is not out of the realm of possibility, although it is highly unlikely. This argument forms 
my two contributions in this thesis: first, the development of a new world polity formation theory 
that explains how systems of polities become single polities, and second, the clarification of why 
a world polity does not exist today, the conditions for its realization, and that it must attain a 
trans-civilizational but planetary form to be practically realized in a modern context. The vision 
of a trans-civilizational but ecological world polity is not so singular and simple a vision as one 
might wish. But that is what it must be, if it were to be realized in a modern context, in any 
practical sense. Not only are universalisms and singular definitions of civilization treated with 
suspicion today, there are also multiple universalisms and multiple cosmologies, all mixing and 
colliding in a globalizing social environment where everyone is demanding their own modern 
freedoms in innumerable cultural forms.17 In a late modern and post-colonial age vast numbers 
of peoples and cultures have been mobilized and marshaled to defend their independence and 
distinct identities against universal ideas and hierarchies.18 Yet, humankind is nonetheless 
entangled in a globalizing modernity and still faces the practical collective challenges of 
interdependence in a global context, be it nuclear, biological, and cyber arms control, globalized 
terrorism, planetary ecological crisis, or sustainable and equitable development in a fragile global 
economy. In a late modern era, where everyone demands their identity based freedoms and 
independence, but is nonetheless interrelated in global systems, how can this contradiction be 
addressed? There is an old passage from Clifford Geertz that still expresses a good deal of the 
troubles facing our late modern world. He said the ‘primary question’, 
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now that nobody is leaving anybody else alone and isn’t ever again going to, is not 
whether everything is going to come seamlessly together or whether, contrariwise, 
we are all going to persist sequestered in our separate prejudices. It is whether 
human beings are going to continue to be able … to imagine principled lives they 
can practically lead.19 
 
Imagining the trans-civilizational eco-planetary polity is a vision of a more practically livable 
world, one that imagines a better modernity than our troubled late modern times. On the world 
polity, I am an “idealist”, in so far as I believe a world polity is possible and can represent a 
potentially better world. But, I am also a pessimist about the possibility of a world polity in a 
modern setting, where it is difficult to imagine a world polity that has meaningful and practical 
congruence with modern beliefs and ideals. There is more appetite for division and disaster than 
unity and stability in the modern world. Yet, that does not mean the image of a possible world 
polity should not be clarified. The slim likelihood of a world polity makes clarifying its possible 
image more important. After all, it is the difficulty of imagining a meaningful and workable 
world polity in a modern age that is one of the reasons why it eludes humankind.  
 
0.2 Paradoxes 
 
How are we to understand these questions I am raising? To begin to come to grips with these 
questions about a realizable world polity, we need to appreciate how the idea is steeped in 
paradox today. How can the ancient idea of a universal community, a cosmopolis, that predates 
the modern world, be its future? Why are visions of a world polity championed by imperialists 
and revolutionaries alike? Why is the positively utopian and emancipatory idea of human unity 
so suspicious and politically dubious? If the idea means to embrace all humankind, why does it 
need all humankind to embrace it? The paradoxes surrounding this idea of a world polity suggest 
there is something amiss in theory, as well as in practice. For instance, Richard Falk argues 
humankind needs to reimagine its ‘horizons of desire’ from those of the nation-state to those all 
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humankind.20 But, this begs the question, what are such horizons and how can they be practically 
realized? Rival traditions of thought offer distinct world polity visions. Yet, be they Kantian or 
Marxist, techno-scientific, anarchistic, or ecological, the vision of a united humankind oscillates 
in our contemporary discourse between utopia, dystopia, and retrotopia, future and past, real or 
invented, always as an anachronism to the present, always succumbing to paradox. Either the 
vision exists in future, and in an unobtainable way, or, if attainable, in a nightmarish way. Or, it 
occupies the past, but always in an irretrievable way, like the unity of Christendom, disrupted in 
the Reformation, beyond the realm of possibility in a modern secularized world. 
To understand these paradoxes surrounding the question of the world polity, I am 
suggesting that we need to appreciate the importance of modernity, how it has shaped visions of 
a world polity and effectively drowned them in paradox, forcing them into realms of utopia, 
dystopia, and retrotopia. I am emphasizing modernity, because it is this that is the immediate 
explanation for why the world polity does not exist, despite the not so long ago predictions to the 
contrary. By modernity, I mean the cultural transformation of worldviews and practices, 
transformations of basic beliefs, ideals and principal ordering practices, coupled with the use of 
new technologies according to those new beliefs, ideals, and practices, together creating cultural 
contrasts between medieval and modern worlds, in Europe, China, Japan, India, and so on.21 As 
such, to place an emphasis on modernity, this study makes instrumental use of the rise of modern 
social imaginaries approaches, particularly Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries and A 
Secular Age, as well as the social theory underlying them, that I find quite helpful. To understand 
the world polity questions I am raising in this study is to grasp how they arise against the 
“background” of modernity and modern social imaginaries. I am using “social imaginary” in its 
social-scientific sense in this study, not as a fashionable trifling term. Following the sociological 
usage of social imaginary by Taylor, I use the concept to mean the shared and common but deep-
seated taken-for-granted “background” conceptions of what a social world involves, the most 
basic pictures and expectations people have about what sorts of things make up social 
institutions, what it means to have a “society”, “nation”, “law”, “order”, “justice”, etc.22 
Amongst these modern pictures, is the modern international imaginary, the basic picture of 	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   17 
political life as composed of multiple nations and nation-states potentially collaborating in an 
“international society”.23 The modern international imaginary is in significant respects a secular 
phenomenon, separating sovereignty from religion and the transcendent, connecting it to the 
immanent order of the people. These shifts are traceable to the ideas of Grotius and events of the 
Peace of Westphalia. Grotius and Westphalia are not the seminal or singular births of 
international modernity, but early expressions, local precursors we might say, cultural weather 
veins pointing to the global realization of modernity in the revolutions and upheavals of the 19th 
Century.24 The modern secular age is not universal or uniform but it has been ascendant, shaping 
both the powers of the liberal West and communist East. This cultural shift displaced the idea of 
a universal divinely mandated order, forcing it into the past, whilst also enabling variety of 
secular cosmopolitan visions, of the sort that were imagined to emerge in the future.25 Modern 
secular visions of a world polity, Kantian inspired, Marxist-Leninist, or otherwise, are imagined 
as being realized in future profane time, humanly created, as modern forms of social order. In 
this context, the modernity of the world polity questions I am raising should not be mystified in 
paradox, but instead appreciated as both enabled and constrained by modern worldviews. 
For instance, a significant aspect of modernity is a modern conception of what a political 
community is, what counts as one. The primacy of the nation and nation-state as the prevailing 
image of the political community in the modern imagination makes the idea of a world polity 
difficult to imagine in a meaningful and practical way. Why, for instance, is the world polity 
imagined as potentially being built “above” the nations, rather than the nations being built “on 
top” of it? The image of humankind as many national polities is naturalized in the modern 
imagination. Jens Bartelson’s Visions of World Community has made the important insight that 
the modern conception of the bounded national community came out of the historical rubble of 
the medieval and ancient conception of the boundless universal community. He has shown how 
the national community could not be conceived without the prior conception of the universal 
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community.26 The aim of Bartelson’s genealogy of the world community is to denaturalize the 
national community, to make the world community imaginable again, to get beyond thinking of 
the world polity as needing to be bounded and built “above” the “bases” of nations and nation-
states that are imagined as real, even primordial. The importance of his work is how it shows that 
the diachronic emergence of a world polity today would be built out of what preceded it, out of 
the context of modernity. It would not be a return to the retrotopia of a divinely ordained 
universal order, nor would it be a triumph of modern cosmopolitanism, liberal or Marxist, or 
otherwise. It would be something historically new and different from these, but cobbled out of 
them and the materials of late modern worldviews nonetheless. Bartelson’s work shows how 
visions of a world community always fit into the cosmologies and worldview of their age, 
ancient, medieval, or early modern. The visionaries of a world community always strive to attain 
coherence with basic beliefs and ascendant ideals, with prevailing understandings of the cosmos 
and humankind. On this basis, Bartelson argues the image of a coherent and realizable world 
community in our contemporary context might best be conceived against an ecological 
background, the planetary habitat of humankind. 
This is a helpful suggestion, indicating a potential avenue for thought, but Bartelson has 
not explored this ecological vision himself; he only gestures towards it in the final passages of 
his conclusion.27 Somewhat more importantly, Bartelson’s analysis does not fully recognize the 
extent to which the realization of world polity today is challenged by modern outlooks. He does 
not adequately concede how challenging modern outlooks are to universal visions of human 
order, because he does not acknowledge the extent to which modern self-conceptions matter to 
people, giving their lives meaning and shaping their aspirations and affinities.28 We might 
imagine a world polity along Bartelson’s ecological lines, but how many would want to make 
use of it if it conflicted with their intimately felt ambitions and sentiments? In this respect, 
Bartelson does not fully acknowledge the question of practical conditions. Not everything that is 
imaginable is practically possible. Bartelson has shown the problem of modernity for imagining 
the world polity and the insight of its pre-modern preconditions, but his gestures towards the way 
forward remain incomplete and face challenges. 
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R.B.J. Walker has more fully acknowledged the challenge of modernity for cosmopolitan 
visions, and yet while he has made helpful suggestions, he has not explored the question of a 
realizable world polity itself. Walker’s helpful suggestion is that the realization of one world 
polity must also be the realization of many worlds. He does not mean many worlds in the sense 
of many nations, but that the world contains many cultural-civilizational worldviews, and so one 
world must be many worlds.29 This is helpful because it is empirically valid. There are multiple 
civilizational cultures, variety of indigenous cultures too, and multiple cultural forms of 
modernity. No universal order has ever been a monolith in practice; the universal orders of 
ancient Rome, Egypt, and China, amongst others, contained many worlds, although they cohered 
them into a larger dominion. Due to its planetary size and cultural diversity, a world polity would 
inherently contain more worldviews and cultural horizons than any other. As the possible 
number of relations increases in a globalizing world, so grows the possible combinations (and 
thereby the diversity) of identities, cultural practices, and worldviews.30 Walker also suggests the 
search for a world polity is folly, because it will only reproduce modern problems on new larger 
scales.31 The reproduction of modern problems by a modern world polity is not a necessarily 
inaccurate point, but to suggest it is not worth searching for because of its imperfections, modern 
or otherwise, belies the practical problems that follow from a system of multiple polities, modern 
or otherwise. Difficulties with war and insecurity are the most ancient, and are amplified in a 
modern thermonuclear context.32 Maintaining the thermonuclear balance of terror secures the 
interests of the US and Russia, terrorizing all humankind by effect. A host of further problems, 
of moral corruption and social estrangement to foreign nations and human beings, and the 
warping of science around military application, for instance, are serious problems attributable to 
the political organization of humankind into multiple polities. There is a seriousness about these 
problems that Walker belies in his mystification of their modern form. Modernity has multiple 
potential forms, not all equally problematic. Just because world order problems have a modern 
form does not mean a response of a different modern form cannot have positive benefits. I 
concede that Walker raises the challenge of dystopia in the search for a world polity, but the 	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normative evaluation of the image of a world polity cannot be made until its image is first 
explored and clarified. 
The concept of a world polity attracts several rival visions in the contemporary discourse 
of world order and the question represents an ongoing debate.33 Kantian inspired visions are 
advanced by moral and political philosophers. Marx inspired visions are advanced by Critical 
and emancipatory theorists alongside post-colonial visions. The idea of a global civil society 
takes inspiration from several sources, including sociological and neo-liberal sources. Ecological 
and space ship earth visions contain distinct ideas too, with new ecological outlooks, often 
problematizing but also being incorporated by rival visions. All of these visions, however, and 
their debate in general, have been shaped by the condition of modernity. 
 
0.3 Visions, Universal to Global 
 
Before I set-out how I plan to address this debate, let me clarify its background a little further, 
with a brief conceptual history. The question of what it means for humankind to form a world 
polity is, in a fundamental way, a search for human unity. This search is dependent on the vision 
of a divided humankind, so, is, in this sense, quite ancient, reaching to the Tower of Babel 
narratives that explain human division and all the human troubles and limitations that follow 
from it.34 A letter, purportedly from Aristotle to Alexander, conveys the ancient dream of a world 
polity, 
 
Happy is he who sees the resplendence of that day when men will agree to 
constitute one rule and one kingdom. They will cease from wars and strife, and 
devote themselves to that which promotes their welfare and the welfare of their 
cities and countries.35 
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Aristotle seems to mean a world empire, not a single community of humankind per se, but he 
does envision the practical fruits of a united world, one beyond the problem of war and liberated 
from preparations for it. During periods of the Roman Empire and for periods in Chinese history, 
this vision was felt to be a practical achievement, when entire regions, virtually the known world, 
were brought into universal orders. Medieval Europe, by contrast, achieved a quasi-unity, with 
the unity and belonging of Christendom across a complicated political disunity, with the Holy 
Roman Empire and Papacy amidst multiple authorities and powers falling into countless wars.36 
Dante made the case for a return to a maximal unity in his De Monarchia, to overcome the ills of 
division and to realize the full potential of humankind.37 Today, the search for human unity holds 
out the promise of a world able to overcome not only the threat of thermonuclear war, but also 
vast inequalities, climate change, and various other injustices and problems of global scope. 
Yet, like so many things, this search needs to be understood in respect to its profound 
transformations in a modern context. Early modern legal theorists, Vitoria and Grotius accepted 
the principle of human unity, universalis civitas humani generis, but not the principles of 
political unity. In modern times, Kant rightly argued this unity in legal philosophical principle is 
“cold comfort” for those made vulnerable by the political disunity of humankind.38 The idea that 
the society of states issues from and is beholden to an underlying civitas maxima is a legal 
fiction, not the reality of an actual world polity.39 A united world polity proper is still sought by 
great thinkers in modern times. Over the past several decades, the modern search for a world 
polity has been given its most consistent and eloquent expression by the international lawyer 
Richard Falk. His argument, that I noted above, has been that to address global problems, the 
moral and political horizons of a world society need to be represented in world order 
institutions.40 Falk follows in a long line of modern thinkers who envision a better world order, 
with various degrees of unity. That is, he gives expression to the modern form of the search for a 
world polity. Because world order is, basically, the modern post-Grotian idea that the political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Peter H. Wilson The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (London: Penguin, 2016). 
37 Dante Alighieri Monarchy Prue Shaw trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book I. 
38 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, Ted Humphrey trans. (Cambridge: Indianapolis, 1983); Ian Clark The 
Vulnerable in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
39 Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 3rd Edition (New York: Palgrave, 2002 [1977]), 
p. 269. 
40 Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz Strategy of World Order, Vol.I (New York: World Law Fund, 1966); Richard 
Falk This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival (New York: Random House, 1971); 
Richard Falk The End of World Order (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983); Richard Falk (Re)Imagining Humane 
Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2014). 
	   22 
affairs of humankind can be collaboratively organized or arranged so to make the world a better 
place, it has long been debated how well-ordered humankind is as a system of states.41 The 
classic world peace proposals of L’Abbe de St. Pierre, Kant, Bentham, and so on, all sought to be 
realistically achievable. In the breadth of the modern political imagination, the strongest image 
of a better world is a world polity, the idea that humankind is or can become, in some way some 
how, “one”, and so able to achieve a better world through greater collaboration. 
Yet, today, states collaborate less than we moderns would hope and international 
organization has struggled to address longstanding international problems. Reflection on the 
potential for the environmental or thermonuclear decimation of the earth, immense inequities, 
injustices, and moral corruptions eventually turns thought to the contemplation of an alternative 
and better world order.42 Falk, working with his colleagues in the World Order Models Project 
(WOMP), sought to clarify the image and pathways towards a realizable and better world order. 
Starting with the problem that the anarchical state-centric world order was not working, WOMP 
was a sustained attempt to consider humankind, on a global scale, as a single unit, requiring a 
world order to match. For Saul Mendlovitz, ‘To think, feel, and act as a global citizen is the 
essence of world order inquiry.’43 By considering humankind as a single unit, as a matter of 
principle, WOMP begged the question of the sociological and moral bases of that unity, whilst 
raising the question of achieving a unity. WOMP, nevertheless, was perhaps the most significant 
world order study in the 20th Century, spanning across several decades and involving a trans-
national body of eminent academics, Mendlovitz, Ranji Kathari, Johan Galtung, Ali Mazrui, 
Yoshikazu Sakamoto, amongst many others. The trans-national membership of WOMP matched 
this methodological perspective and political aspiration of humankind as a single unit. It 
provided an added credibility to WOMP’s ability to speak to and address the global problems of 
humankind, as an emerging global community. Perhaps the most significant exploration WOMP 	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conducted was into core global values, values around which the unity of humankind might be 
based: peace, economic wellbeing, social justice, ecological stability, and species identity, 
sometimes referred to as participation.44 WOMP also advanced several institutional-structural 
models of a more united world order, including Falk’s early visions, designed to institutionally 
realize the values of humankind as a single unit. WOMP, to an extent, begged the question of the 
unity of humankind, although it raised the important question of what humankind might strive to 
achieve as a single unit. 
Still, it is crucial to highlight how this whole approach to the world polity as an 
achievable collaborative order comes out of the contexts in which modernity arose. In the 
Western context of modernity, for instance, the disunity of Christendom and rise of nationalist 
and secular outlooks on time and space displaced the once ascendant vision of a world 
community, the universal world with no outside.45 Today, the vision of a world community is 
still sometimes thought of in counter-reformation terms, as a retrieval of an ethical 
universalism,46 but this vision has become “unrealistic” in a modern secular age. The vision is 
often characterized today by what we might call the modern theory of a world society, the 
modern notion of what a political society is, as a shared culture, morality, and political structure, 
but applied to the space of the globe and population of humankind as a whole. However, this 
particularly nominalist way the world polity is imagined in a modern Western context, as a 
potentially global, but not universal, unity, is a cultural continuation of cultural shifts begun in 
the late Middle Ages, which makes its modern conception contingent on Medieval cultural 
preconditions.47 The secular conception of the world polity, as a modern society on a world 
scale, makes its existence unrealistic to the modern imagination, not only practically but 
politically, because the modern notion of collaboration for shared ideals and goals is empirically 
difficult to achieve on a worldwide scale. Yet, this vision of the world polity as an unrealistic 
future world society is a cultural production, a working through, as it were, of cultural shifts 
reaching to the Middle Ages. This conceptual legacy in the modern discourse of world order, its 	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modern resolutions of what is universal and what is particular, has befuddled thinking 
concerning a world polity, constraining its image to modern notions of a community and society 
on a worldwide scale.48 Unity, uniformity, and universality are not the same things. Nor are 
diversity and division. Nor is inside and outside the same distinction as closed and open, together 
and apart, or same and different. It is against the conceptual legacies of such reality blurring and 
imagination confining binary homologies that contemporary theorists of a world polity have 
struggled to overcome. 
This modern cultural form of world polity visions is not the entirety of the conceptual 
baggage, however. In league with these conceptual challenges is the baggage of the concept’s 
imperial uses. It is important to recognize how visions of a world polity, so often used as the 
justifying ambition of expansionist empires, have developed an imperialist reputation and 
connotation. A world empire and a world polity are not the same things, but visions of a world 
polity, in various forms, have often served empires. This tendency poses a challenge for the 
concept’s relevance in an anti-imperial age. The strongest image of a better world is also the 
most morally dubious and the most politically suspect. For example, while Diogenes coined the 
idea of a citizen of the world, a cosmopolite, and Zeno’s Republic developed the Stoic political 
theory of the world city, the cosmopolis, the vision was not institutionalized until the Stoicism of 
the Roman Empire imposed it on the Mediterranean world.49 Western conceptions of a world 
society or world community, I am suggesting, have the conceptual baggage of a Western version 
of a more general tendency of suzerain legitimating discourses. Suzerain powers in world 
history, ancient and modern, have relied on ideas of a universal “supra-polity” to legitimate their 
rule and civilizing missions. The Cyrus cylinder records the oldest extant text expressing this 
kind of idea, “I am Cyrus, king of the universe, the great king, the powerful king, king of 
Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters of the world, …”50 Underwriting 
the universal order of Cyrus the Great’s Achaemenid Empire was the claim that the Achaemenid 
kings were the agents of truth and order in the cosmos, as their deity Ahuramazda willed it.51 In 	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this world imaginary, those who opposed them, like the Greeks, were seen as liars and 
manifestations of chaos. The Mongol Empire claimed suzerainty over “everything under the blue 
sky”, and the idea of Tianxia underwrote Chinese imperial order.52 The ideas of the ummah and 
caliph came to be associated with the Ottoman Empire. The Mughal Empire developed the 
concept of sulh i kul, “peace for all, or universal reconciliation”.53 The Incan Empire had the idea 
of the “children of the sun”. Such ideas were used to constitute the universal dominion of what 
Arnold Toynbee called ‘would-be world states’ and ‘would-be world religions’. 54  These 
examples are distinct ideas with distinct cosmologies from different contexts promoting differing 
moral purposes, but they share a similar connection between universalist ideas and universalist 
empires. This use of universal ideas by imperial powers makes the application of world polity 
vision to world order problematic in a modern anti-imperial age. 
The search for a world polity struggles to be meaningful in anti-imperial times, and 
struggles to be imagined as existing in modern horizons. With the rise of modern secular and 
national horizons, visions of an existing world polity declined in the discourse of world order. So 
humankind was divided into supposedly primordial nations and the question of a realistic 
historical vision of human unity emerged. The idea gradually sunk into the past, but it also, 
importantly, found a new presence in the future, as a critical counter-concept in the discourse of 
world order, used to urge a future unification of humankind. Classic modern critics of 
international society include, most prominently, Kant and Marx. Both envisioned the rise of 
some form of cosmopolitan world order. 55  Since a society of states was conceived, its 
cosmopolitan critics have championed various conceptions of a world society. Thomas Paine’s 
Rights of Man and the revolutionary cosmopolitans of the modern Atlantic world developed 
modern conceptions of universal rights and liberty, spreading new revolutionary cosmopolitan 
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visions for an increasingly global context.56 In the modern discourse of world order, the vision of 
a future world society became the co-constitutive counter-concept to the present international. 
Like day and night, the intellectual comprehension of one depends on the other; they are co-
constitutive. However, the presence or dominance of one in this discourse is dependent on the 
absence or suppression of the other; they are also counter-concepts. As Martin Wight classically 
put it, ‘by proclaiming a world society … It rejects the idea of a society of states.’57 The two are 
not absolutely irreconcilable, just as day and night have their mixed senses of dawn and twilight. 
Yet, they are in conflict, since they offer rival accounts of who is involved and what is at stake in 
world order, be it the shared values of humankind as a whole or those of its nations.58  
Modern interest in the idea of a world polity seems to follow the fortunes of international 
order. The deeper international order sinks into crisis and the higher it ascends into stability and 
prosperity, the more popular the idea seems to become. It wanders in the extremes of modern 
international politics. The specter of communist cosmopolitanism almost always gains support in 
times of crisis.59 Shortly after the Second World War, when the idea of an international order lost 
much of its credibility, visions of a world polity and world government enjoyed increased 
interest and discussion.60 The rise of the Cold War seems to have stymied its popularity amongst 
statespersons, but the prospect of nuclear winter supported new space ship earth visions, and also 
brought many realist political thinkers to imagine one world community with no need for nuclear 
weapons.61 Cosmopolitan visions also arose in the context of decolonization as well, in the 
search for alternative orders.62 The modern heyday of the idea was the triumphalist progressive 	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post-Cold War moment that came to a head around the turn of the last millennium. Martin 
Albrow declared the dawn of a “global age”63 and thinkers like Martin Shaw and David Held 
saw the empirical emergence of a “global society”.64 Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested the 
globalizing world order, ‘must somehow be accountable to the global community as a whole, 
comprising both states and individuals whose collective interests stem from a common 
humanity.’65 Today, the concept of a world polity has increasingly come to be thought of as an 
aspect of globalization, as a sociological world society, conceived as a diffusing set of norms.66 
As Brett Bowden suggests, the contemporary conception is ‘more uniform than universal.’67 The 
idea has transformed from Utopia, a perfect harmony of humankind, into a global historical 
condition.68 Marshall McLuhan’s popular concept of a global village involves this conceptual 
shift. Its Oxford English Dictionary definition conveys the contemporary conception as, ‘the 
world considered as a single community brought together by high technology and international 
communications.’69 Another recently popular expression is global civil society, which connotes 
transnational social bonds, rather than moral obligations as such.70 
There is some intuitive plausibility to the notion of a world polity as the emerging 
imaginary of a global social colossus. Some suggest, in an era of globalization, a shared global 
space has created a global social imaginary, where the modern market, public sphere, and 
governance of the people, are taking on global dimensions.71 In the vein of George Herbert Mead 
or Erving Goffman, the cognizance of this global society arises in situations where we sense the 
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world generally approves or disapproves of our conduct.72 In the example of a demonstration, 
riot, or revolt, with media exposure the feeling that “the world is watching” may arise, and this 
feeling is accompanied by a sense of global approval or disapproval of one’s actions as a 
participant in the event. In the vein of C. Wright Mills, the sense of a world society emanates 
from the global interrelatedness of our contemporary histories and biographies.73 A global 
imagination arises quickly when we reflect on our consumption of products manufactured in a 
global economy. It is not hard to see how common political and economic troubles and concerns 
confer a worldwide significance to events in disparate metropolises and obscure locales. A post-
colonial humankind, engrossed in capitalist exchange, conversing through a global media, and 
mixing through global migrations has some awareness of forming a not altogether unproblematic 
global society, with global socio-economic hierarchies across the contours of a global division of 
labour and emerging practices of global governance. 
This may be correct, but despite the widespread recognition that globalization has 
fostered a global consciousness of a global social system, as well as the contours of a global 
polity in incipiently post-Westphalian international law, these changes have not been 
accompanied by a sense of global social unity or belonging. The realization of the world polity is 
a halfway effort at best, lacking shared moral purposes and a “weness” feeling.74 A variety of 
sociological inspired “world society” theories of John Burton, John Meyers, and Niklas 
Luhmann, amongst others confuse the existence of a worldwide social system with the self-
consciousness of a world society. A worldwide system of international and transnational 
relations is qualitatively distinct from a world society as a modern collaborative effort with a 
shared sense of common ideals, goals, and solidarity.75 Other Hume and Weber inspired 
constructivist and “English School” theorists have emphasized the importance of a shared 
cosmopolitan culture connected to a collective identity in the realization of a world polity, but 
they have struggled to articulate the contents of that cosmopolitan culture and collective 	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identity.76 Sensing the importance of reconceiving the world polity, to give it an additional sense 
of solidarity, critical theorists push the concept towards emancipatory horizons that aim to 
‘invent humanity’, but they have struggled to clearly conceive or articulate what it would be.77 
Here, the search comes again to its core puzzle: What does it mean for humankind to form a 
world polity? How can it be imagined? Can it be practically achieved? Under what conditions, 
through what contributing processes, and in what necessary social form? 
 
0.4 Roadmap 
 
Is a world polity practically realizable? In an era of persistent world disorder, the present study 
hopes to clarify this important part of what humankind might strive to be. As such, this study 
scrutinizes the family of conceptions that, in dissimilar but relatable ways, all provide 
explanations of humankind being or becoming “one”, be it as a global community, world society, 
space ship earth, the human family, or civitas maxima. I use the language of a world polity as a 
catch-all for this family of concepts only because it is the most general, intentionally fuzzy, 
offering the highest level of abstraction but still retaining a basic meaning. By polity, I just mean 
a human political unit or entity, in the most general sense, be it a nation-state, empire, clan, or, 
indeed, a “world” polity.78 
This study proceeds in three parts. In Part I, Preparations, I organize my theoretical 
toolbox and prepare my angle of approach for analyzing the world polity question. I develop a 
theory of world polity formation that clarifies the causes, conditions, and processes of world 
polity formation, so to come to grips with the question of a world polity’s possibility, which I 
take to be basic for proceeding further. If a world polity is impossible, why seek it? This theory 
development requires a fairly heavy dosage of theoretical discussion, because I have found 
available theories to suffer from a number of limitations. Following this groundwork, I develop a 
discursive pragmatist approach to conceptual analysis, which helps me establish criteria to 
systematically explore and evaluate the rival visions in the world polity debate. In Part II, 	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Conceptual Investigations, I analyze the most prominent and predominant conceptions of a 
world polity in the discourse of world order: Kantian inspired conceptions of a universal moral 
code, the Kant-Marx critical-emancipatory variety of conceptions, the more recent “anti-
foundationalist” and sociological global civil society conceptions, and, lastly, the variety of 
ecological-planetary and space ship earth conceptions. In my analysis, I order these currents of 
world polity thought according to the Socratic method of starting the investigation with the most 
commonly acknowledged conception, then moving towards the increasingly enlarged, 
innovative, and complex conceptions.79 This order establishes the supports of basic distinctions 
before the novel and complex ideas are taken on, but also makes for a better story, arcing up, 
intellectually. In Part III, Implications, I integrate this analysis and advance the trans-
civilizational but ecological vision of a world polity, reflexively applying my criteria to it, and 
assessing its implications for my core questions stated above. My conclusion retraces the steps 
made in Parts I, II, and III, considers their contributions, and assesses their findings for world 
order in theory and practice. 
A few words on the scope of this study are needed. First, due to the significance of the 
concept of a world polity for contemporary world order problems and questions, and with the 
benefit of the above conceptual history, particularly Jens Bartelson’s genealogy of the concept of 
“world community”, from the ancients to Kant, I restrict the scope of this study to predominant 
conceptions in the contemporary discourse of world order, which, Bartelson’s genealogy did not 
explore. Bartelson’s Visions of World Community is a diachronic analysis of Western 
conceptions, from the ancients to Kant. By contrast, my study is a synchronic analysis of 
contemporary conceptions. I will draw in the ancients and early moderns where relevant and 
helpful, but focus my analysis on the leading conceptions present in the contemporary discourse 
of world order because these are still in need of systematic study, and it is these that are the most 
relevant to contemporary world order problems, being devised in response to them. I also hope to 
“provincialize” the studied predominant conceptions, along the way, so to enlarge our awareness 
of the ways a world polity has been and can be imagined, because a realizable vision of a world 
polity, acceptable to all humankind, must not suffer from Euro-centricity.80 I also wanted, in my 	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early planning, to go into “the field”, to sites of world polity discourse and practice in practice, to 
the life-worlds of cosmopolitan cities, crossings, and events. But, because textual sources reflect 
and are also deliberately clearer than the concept’s use in practice, and moreover, because I face 
human, time, and word length limitations, I restrict the scope of this study to the prominent 
textual sources of contemporary world polity visions in the discourse of world order. 
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Chapter One. 
World Polity Formation Theory 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Visions of a world polity have principally been the province of either moral philosophy or the 
philosophy of history. Either a world polity is envisioned as a timeless moral and divine order, be 
it Zeno’s cosmopolis or Confucius’s ever wider and ever finer tiers of authority and obligations, 
or it is envisioned as the culmination of history, chiliastic or secular, be it Zoroaster’s belief in a 
final triumph of universal truth, or Marx’s vague vision of a worldwide communist future. Has 
the world polity always existed, morally, or is it yet to be, historically? Contemporary theory of a 
world polity cleaves in a similar way. Its literature is either the terrain of the moral and legal 
philosophy of cosmopolitan rights and duties, or it is the subject of the social sciences applied to 
profane history, a history often theorized to lead through globalization to a united world. I want 
to suggest that of the two questions, the moral and the temporal, the latter takes intellectual 
priority, for practical reasons. Regardless of what universal morals may or may not exist, 
independently or otherwise, they have little practical effect if they cannot be realized in practice. 
The primary question, then, is if and how a system of multiple independent polities can come to 
realize a world polity. By contrast, Dante’s questions in his De Monarchia were normative: 
whether a universal monarchy is necessary for human wellbeing, whether its rule can be 
rightfully claimed, and from what source does its authority legitimately derive.81 These questions 
matter, morally, and they can have an effect on the beliefs and actions of people, but because 
they are inconsequential if their answers are unrealizable in practice, regardless of how many 
people are moved by them, the primary questions that I take up in this chapter are about the 
possibility of a world polity’s realization in practice: Can the system of states form a unified 
world polity beyond hegemony and anarchy? What are the conditions and processes of such an 
outcome? Can, how, and why do international systems unify into single polities? 
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Dante assumed the answer to these questions was ‘empire’, with the Roman Empire’s 
imperialism being his inspiration.82 Yet, the possibility, conditions, and contributing processes of 
world polity formation are debated today.83 A number of insights have been developed in the 
theoretical debate but this debate has been conducted with reference to the contemporary system 
of states and available theories encounter difficulties and struggle with contradictory evidence 
when viewed at a general level across world historical cases of international systems.84 This 
chapter suggests that explaining world polity formation, at this more general level, means raising 
the level of abstraction of the puzzle, to the question of world polity formation as an instance of 
systemic unification. This is to say that there has never been a polity of all the world, but if a 
world polity were to form out of the contemporary system of states, it would be an instance of 
systemic unification, for which there is some evidence of in past international systems, 
particularly the unification of ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire.  
The aims of this chapter are to assess the limitations of available theories and to advance 
the outlines of an alternative theory of systemic unification that can be applied across cases. As 
such, this chapter does not address the questions of the practical need or normative desirability of 
a unified world polity, but seeks to clarify the theoretical world polity formation debate, by 
raising the debate’s level of abstraction from the contemporary system to consider international 
systems in general. The argument is ordered in five parts. First, a conceptual framework is 
established. Second, the limitations of available theories are identified. Third, the outlines of an 
alternative theory of systemic unification is advanced, which draws eclectically from available 
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theories and contemporary sociological theory. Fourth, this theory is supported by two 
illustrative cases of historical international systems evincing a unifying process: the unification 
of ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire. Lastly, the implications of this alternative theory are 
analyzed for the question of world polity formation in the contemporary system. The possibility 
of systemic unification in the contemporary system is found to be highly unlikely due to the 
diffusion of power through nuclear deterrence and the nationalist and anti-hierarchical political 
culture of a late modern context. 
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
A core concept is an international system, defined as a number of polities in regular relations, 
meaning relations of constant frequency.85 Regular relations, as a rule, dissipate and become 
irregular at a distance. Units are considered to form a “secondary system”, and not an 
international system proper, when their interactions are irregular or absent to the extent that units 
do not constitute security threats to one another.86 By “systemic unification”, I mean the process 
by which an international system unifies into a single polity, which a “world polity” would be an 
instance of. I am adopting the language of a “polity” because it offers the highest level of 
abstraction amongst the various available expressions. For instance, I use the language of a world 
“polity”, rather than a world “state”, because polity is less likely to be confused with the modern 
Weberian nation-state, even though the concept of “state” has been defined with reasonable 
abstraction in the literature.87 By polity, I mean a human political unit or entity, be it a nation-
state, clan, empire, or, indeed, a “world” polity. Following Ferguson and Mansbach, polities, 
analytically speaking, are marked by the features of an ability to mobilize resources, internal 
hierarchies, and a “weness” feeling, meaning a collective identity with a sense of belonging and 
solidarity.88 Because collective identities are nested, meaning that multiple collective identities 	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are overlapping and not mutually exclusive,89 the collective identity of a system-wide polity is, 
analytically speaking, the most expansive, nesting all others into its “supra-polity” collective 
identity. The expression “world polity” enables me to get to the more general question of if, how, 
and why systems of polities, e.g. the modern system of states, become a single polity, which I 
take to be the maximal unity of a system. The concept of a world polity, as I conceive it here, 
represents the maximal unity of an international system. 
 By unity, I mean the legitimated joining of units into degrees of political solidarity, from 
the disunity of purely anarchical systems, to the quasi-unity of a legitimated hegemonic 
hierarchy, and the maximal unity of the formation of a single unitary polity out of a system of 
polities.90 By unification, I do not mean the concentration of power in the system.91 I mean the 
legitimation of hierarchy via the constitution of political unity. Hierarchical systems lacking 
legitimation are, in principle, suppressed anarchies. As such, analytically speaking, a unified 
world polity is distinct from a world empire, although a world empire might unify into a world 
polity through a unifying process. To allow for variability across cases, I define hierarchy 
broadly, as ‘any system through which actors are organized into vertical relations of super –and 
subordination’.92 In a spectrum of unity amongst polities, ranging from hierarchy legitimated by 
the unity of self-interested exchange,93 and hierarchy legitimated by the unity of articulated 
common goals and purposes,94 the unification of a single world polity, is analytically speaking 
the most united. Conceptually, a world polity is an instance of the formation of a single polity 
out of a system of polities, and so entails, analytically speaking, the establishment of legitimated 
hierarchical authorities, an ability to mobilize resources, and the development of solidarities. 
 
1.3 The Limitations of Available Theories 
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How has world polity formation been theorized? In this section, I aim to demonstrate how 
available world polity formation theories suffer from presentism, and can benefit from theorizing 
the question at a higher level of abstraction from a world historical perspective. As such, I focus 
my discussion on the critical assessment of available world polity formation theories here, and 
address the question of what is offered by additional literatures in section 4. 
IR’s early literature contains several underdeveloped discussions. Arnold Toynbee, for 
instance, argued the modern international system would either destroy itself in nuclear war, or it 
would form a world state.95 He speculated that the emergence of a ‘world society’ requires the 
conciliation of the world religions, although he made little use of social theory.96 E.H. Carr’s 
Nationalism and After developed a socialist inspired proposal for state-planned systemic 
integration.97 This proposal is comparable to functionalism.98 Both, however, focused on the 
theory of the integration of governments, overlooking the cultural and social components of the 
legitimation of integration. Several classical realists and early English School thinkers rightly 
emphasized the importance of collective identity formation for the solidarities of a post-national 
world society and world state.99 The formation of a single polity out of a system necessarily 
entails these features. Yet, classical realist and early English School thinkers were concerned 
with the presentist question of unifying the modern international system, rather than the general 
question of systemic unification. Furthermore, the dated Weberian and Humean social theory of 
these thinkers limits their contributions to the world polity puzzle. For instance, their conceptions 
of the world culture and common values of a world society and world state consistently and often 
explicitly suffer from methodological nationalism, which mars their insights into the importance 
of collective identity and solidarities in systemic unification. Classical realist and early English 
School theory require supplement from contemporary sociological theory of collective identity 
formation processes, cultural complexity, and social construction.100 The contemporary literature 	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of a hypothetical world state is more sophisticated and has observed the imperial domination of 
historical international systems, but the majority of the contemporary world state literature is 
devoted to the uniquely modern problem of nuclear weapons and the federal or centralized 
constitution a world state would require for stability in a modern context.101  
Kenneth Waltz’s structural neorealist theory suggests that a world polity is impossible 
because his theory takes power balancing to be an endless and a-historical process of 
international systems. This theory holds that any systemic consolidation and attempted 
unification of the system by a single power will eventually produce counter-balancing powers.102 
In a telling passage, Waltz argued that,  
 
As hierarchical systems, governments nationally or globally are disrupted by the 
defection of major parts. In a society of states with little coherence, attempts at 
world government would founder on the inability of an emerging central authority 
to mobilize the resources needed to create and maintain the unity of the system by 
regulating and managing the parts. The prospect of a world government would be 
an invitation to prepare for world civil war.103  
 
Waltz makes the important contribution of systemic analysis, but his theory is limited by its 
assertion of a regular balancing pattern, which has been contradicted by empirical evidence from 
world historical cases.104 Where Waltz is theoretically mistaken is in the assumption that 
international systems behave in recurrent patterns. As Charles Tilly put it, explaining social 
change and process is more like explaining a flood than a tide.105 International systems, that is, 
experience events and processes that have consistent conditions, but irregular occurrences. In at 
least one passage, Waltz, however, also leaves the theoretical door open to the possibility of 
unification. ‘States, like people,’ he claimed, ‘are insecure in proportion to the extent of their 
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freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted’.106 The caveat, if freedom is wanted, 
allows for situations where unity is wanted more than freedom. The question is: Can, how, and 
why would such situations of desired unity arise? 
In this respect, regime theory might be mistakenly interpreted as suggestive of how a 
world polity could emerge from a complex of international regimes.107 The difficulty, however, 
is the limited transformative potential of regimes. As Keohane explained, 
 
International regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international 
order “beyond the nation-state.” They should be comprehended chiefly as 
arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of systems in which 
sovereignty remains a constitutive principle.108  
 
The idea of cross-stitching the international system with a complex of regime complexes, like the 
solidifying stitches of a baseball skin, does not follow from regime theory because such a 
unifying regime complex is not within the converging interests of states. Because state interests 
remain prime, regime are not feasible for all international issue areas, and established regimes 
are subject to changes of state interests.109 Why, for instance, has regime construction not 
produced such a world polity today? Why neither is there evidence of such a unifying regime 
complex in past international systems? As such, regime theory is better fit to explain cooperation 
under conditions of anarchy and hegemony, rather than the unification of systems beyond 
anarchy and hegemony. 
J.G. Ruggie’s constructivism theorized that Durkheimian dynamic densities (increased 
interaction capacity) can lead to the organic solidarities of functional differentiation.110 Yet, 
additional sociological theory of discourse and practice is needed to explain the leap from 
organic solidarities of functional interdependence amongst polities in an anarchical system to the 
unification of a single polity beyond interdependent anarchy and hegemony. In this respect, 	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Alexander Wendt’s constructivism is important for the puzzle of world polity formation in its 
emphasis on diachronic changes of systemic international cultures and collective identities.111 
His constructivist theory holds that the ‘logic of anarchy’ generates struggles for recognition of 
subjectivities, which can produce progressive cultures of anarchy, and eventually a Weberian 
world state with a corresponding shared collective identity.112 Connected to this is his argument 
that with the emergence of nuclear weapons in an anarchic system, ‘the struggle for recognition 
among states undermines their self-sufficiency and makes a world state inevitable. Via the 
struggle for recognition, in short, the systemic logic of anarchy leads to its own demise.’113 For 
Wendt, because nuclear proliferation makes struggles for recognition intolerable, states will be 
forced to recognize all others, including non-state actors, producing a world society, followed by 
a world state.114 The mechanism of unification, for Wendt, is the socialization of recognitions.115 
Wendt’s theory is limited by an over-emphasis on systemic logics, at the expense of the 
domestic and agentic sources of change.116 A further difficulty Wendt’s theory encounters, is that 
it is purely hypothetical, since there are no world historical cases of systemic unification along 
the progressive path of socialization Wendt proposes.117 A related difficulty is Wendt’s presentist 
emphasis on recognition struggles as a driving mechanism of socialization.118 Firstly, Wendt’s 
conception of recognition is a thoroughly modern phenomenon, only applicable to the modern 
system of states. Wendt conceives recognition as the social validation of one’s individual or 
collective identity by an other, most clearly, where he says, ‘recognition is about being respected 
for what makes a person special or unique.’119 This search for recognition of the self could not 
exist until there was the modern belief in the special and unique authentic self.120 Secondly, it is 
unpersuasive to say that recognition struggles can lead to systemic unities, because they have 	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contributed to a process of systemic dis-unification in the emergence of the modern international 
system. As individuals and peoples demanded recognition and rights from empires and nation-
states, they established independent states when demands became frustrated.121 Lastly, Wendt’s 
theory reifies his state units of analysis, by suggesting the units themselves socialize, rather than 
the individual participants with collective identities made via discursive action and relational 
practices.122 
With inspiration from Wendt’s constructivism, Barry Buzan has also theorized the social 
construction of a ‘world society’ involving cosmopolitan identities and shared values connected 
to a transformed structure where state and non-state actors ‘are in play together’, with no clear 
hierarchy amongst them, only agreements on functional differentiation.123 Buzan argues the 
‘world society’ outcome represents the working through of specifically modern liberal logics on 
the structure of the system.124 He theorizes that as the rights of more and more units are mutually 
recognized in the system, so its structure will transform towards a world society. Theoretically, it 
suffers from the presentist focus on the modern and liberal aspects of the contemporary 
international system. This presentism also results in conceptual difficulties. Buzan’s concept of a 
world society structure as multiple units “in play together”, without hierarchical authorities, is 
closer to an image of an expansion of state-centric anarchy to include non-state actors, rather 
than their unification into a larger systemic polity. In a related theoretical vein, Michael Barnett 
and Kathryn Sikkink theorize a “global society” as the emergence of authorities above the states 
system, produced by the diffusion of restraining rules and norms of appropriate behavior across 
state and non-state actors. They explain, 
 
Our notion of a global society parallels the arguments of the English School and its 
notion of world society, particularly the identification of an increasingly dense 
fabric of international law, norms, and rules that promote forms of association and 
solidarity, the growing role of an increasingly dense network of state and non-state 
actors that are involved in the production and revision of multilayered governance 
structures, and the movement toward forms of dialogue that are designed to help 
identify shared values of ‘humankind’.125  	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This theory is problematic partly because no historical systems are evident of unification via a 
diffusion of restraining rules and norms that did not also involve the domination of the system by 
a concentration of material power. The mixed empirical evidence of limited human rights norms 
diffusion and compliance within the contemporary international system also troubles this theory. 
The US, for instance, often a proponent of human rights rules and norms also resists and opposes 
their application to it’s own actions through hierarchical authorities.126 
“Thick” constructivists have developed promising but still incomplete theories. The 
difference, between the thin and thick constructivists on this world polity question, is the 
qualitative “all-the-way-down” depth of the change in collective identities a world polity 
entails.127 Thick constructivist theorists have made important but still incomplete contributions to 
the theory of systemic unification, by drawing together the role of discourse and practice 
connected to power in cultural as well as structural dynamics. Friedrich Kratochwil has gestured 
towards the “thick” social construction of a world polity, but has not developed its theory as 
such. 128  Similarly, Iver Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, rightly make the important 
contribution of emphasizing the role of power in shaping constitutive discourses and practices.129 
They argue the construction of a global polity “above” the contemporary international system is 
a discursive process following from to the extension of liberal state powers to the global level. 
However, the extent of this discursive process unclear, raising crucial empirical and theoretical 
questions. Empirically, how extensive is the discourse across the system? Empirically, to what 
extent does this discourse constitute a global polity at a global level, for whom? For instance, to 
what extent does it extend to non-elite populations? Theoretically, to what extent does the 
discursive process need to extend to constitute a global polity in which all others are nested? 
And, how much concentration of state power in the system is needed to extend the discursive 
process to a sufficient degree? Furthermore, Neumann and Sending do not examine whether 
historical systems have involved similar extensions of state powers through discursive processes. 
For instance, it is not clear whether this discursive process is unique to a liberal dominated 	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system with advanced communications, or whether the discursive process is merely enhanced by 
modern interaction capacities. 
Lastly, Olaf Corry has theorized ‘global polity’ formation as a structural shift beyond 
hierarchy and anarchy based on the discursive emergence of a ‘global governance object’.130 
Corry’s theory rightly highlights the involvement of structural change and discursive action, but 
struggles to explain why this change and action would arise and fails to explain why it would 
take on the form Corry outlines. From a world historical perspective, Corry’s proposed neither 
hierarchical nor anarchical structure of a global polity is historically unprecedented, because 
identifiable instances of past systemic unifications have involved hierarchies. Additionally, there 
is theoretical inconsistency in how Corry presents what he describes as a ‘model’ of a global 
polity (whose emergence is theorized in thick constructivist terms of discourse) and the absence 
from this model of the historically contingent and deep-seated constitutive identities that a thick 
constructivist theory would entail.  Without a theory of these features, it is not clear why the 
emergence of a global polity from the contemporary international system would take on the 
neither hierarchical nor entirely anarchical structure that Corry suggests. While the world polity 
debate has generated several insights, no single theory of world polity formation points the way 
and the debate in general suffers from a presentist focus on unifying the contemporary 
international system, rather than international systems in general. 
 
1.4 Towards an Alternative Theory 
 
How can these theoretical limitations be overcome? The theory I want to propose draws support 
from a world historical perspective and eclectically draws upon contributions from available 
theories while being supplemented by sociological theory. 131  The aim is to make better 
explanatory sense of the world polity formation puzzle by theorizing it at a more general level 
applicable across cases.  
Contrary to Neorealist theory, I argue that international systems can form a single unified 
polity. But, contrary to several constructivist theories, I argue that unification does not arise 
through a process of recognition socialization or from the diffusion of rules and norms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Corry Constructing a Global Polity, p. 1-17. 
131 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics 
(London: Palgrave, 2010). 
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appropriate behavior. Instead, the unification of international systems into single polities is 
theorized to occur from a combination of power concentrations and cultural preconditions. That 
is, a process of systemic unification emerges in contexts of extreme concentrations of power that 
create security interests of systemic scope, which, in turn incentivizes a process of systemic-
unification via the circulation of collective identity constitutive collective-self-narratives. In 
other words, systemic unification occurs from a mutually supporting combination of structurally 
conditioned system-wide security incentives and culturally conditioned discursive action. Like 
state formation processes, systemic unification occurs in contexts of a military dominance over 
populations, where subordinated units are unable to effectively balance against a dominating 
power. However, due to the system-wide scale of systemic domination (the elimination of major 
internal and external threats), the process of systemic unification involves the qualitatively 
distinct feature and conditions of “supra-polity” collective identity formation. As such, there is a 
cultural hurdle for systemic unification, which explains why cases of systemic unification are 
rare relative to the cases of systemic domination in world history. This is to say that the step 
from systemic domination to a unification process only occurs under the circumstances of the 
cultural reception and discursive circulation of a unifying “supra-polity” collective-self-narrative. 
The discursive use of a collective-self-narrative in contexts lacking power concentrations do not 
produce a unifying effect, because units lack an incentive to unify in contexts of diffuse power 
and would counter-act narratives of unity with narratives of independence. The proposed theory 
is still densely stated, but its main eclectic point is that systemic unification emerges from the 
combination of structurally conditioned material interests with cultural preconditions. By 
combining structural and cultural conditions of collective identity formation in this specific way, 
this proposed theory concurs with Kaufman et. al.’s conclusion that, in contexts of hegemonic 
powers, 
 
Peoples that cling to their local identity often suffer a sad fate: they are inclined to 
balance, but not to trust their neighbors, so balancing tends to fail. They then tend 
to rebel frequently against their hegemonic master, and so face the hegemon’s 
wrath – but not before weakening the hegemon itself, sometimes significantly.132 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Kaufman et. al., The Balance of Power in World History, p. 229. 
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Clinging to local identities is costly, both for ruled and ruling polities. Because of these costs, 
power concentration incentivizes unification via collective identity construction. The ruled 
polities benefit from avoiding coercion and gaining benefits from hegemons and the ruling 
polities have an incentive to reduce rebellions and optimize administrative costs. It is this 
relational tension between ruling and ruled units that generates the incentive to unification. 
Systemically dominant empires often pursue a strategy of divide and rule, and dominated units 
often rebel, but in cases of the cultural reception of a unifying collective-self-narrative, a 
unifying process emerges from the tension. To optimize their rule, ruling polities project the 
unifying narrative whilst ruled polities circulate the unifying narrative to avoid coercion and 
improve their standing in the hierarchical order. To give this theory a bumper sticker statement: 
Universal unification emerges when universal powers are met by a universally acceptable 
unifying narrative. 
Because the cultural-discursive aspect of the theorized unification process is crucial, but 
also complex and involves the importation of sociological theory, it is helpful to unpack this 
component of the theory first. Systemic unification is theorized to be socially constructed, in a 
process of the cultural reception and discursive circulation of transformative collective-self-
narratives. This is a sociological explanation of unification, in that through the discursive use of 
collective-self-narratives, collective identities refer to relational social networks.133 Collective-
self-narratives are the discursive contents of collective identities. It is helpful to adopt the theory 
of the collective-self-narrative from contemporary sociological theory to specify constructivist 
aspects of the proposed theory. It is, for instance, one of the missing components in Ruggie’s 
Durkhiemian account of the diachronic movement from organic solidarities of multiple units to 
the formation of a single unit via dynamic densities. Interaction alone does not explain 
unification. The sociological process of circulating narrative use increases with dynamic 
densities (increasing volumes of interaction between units), intensifying the unification of a 
system of polities into a single “supra-polity” by intensifying the volume of the narrative’s social 
use. Collective identities have a “narrative structure”, as they are composed of stories about the 
past, present, and future of systems of relations. The process of the relational use of a collective-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Charles Tilly, ‘Ties That Bind … and Bound’ in, Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties. Boulder: Paradigm, 
2005), pp. 3-12; Margaret R. Somers, ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach’ 
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self-narrative by both ruled and ruling units is theorized to socially construct a larger shared 
collective identity that provides legitimating reasons for the unified structure.134 
 The cultural reception of a unifying narrative, in contexts of systemic domination, is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition of systemic unification. By reception, I mean the cultural 
inheritance, development, or adoption of the narrative. The narrative must be first received 
before it can be used. The narrative use can issue first from dominated populations, wishing to 
avoid coercion and to establish status with the hierarchical system, or it can issue from the ruling 
population, wishing to legitimize and optimize their rule. As Griffiths has observed, classical 
international systems, like the Roman Empire, tended to follow a path from mechanical 
anarchies, to mechanical hierarchies under empires, that later developed organic hierarchies.135 
The jump from the hierarchies of imperial units over an organic system, to the hierarchies of a 
single unit out of an organic system requires an additional discursive narrative.136 Not all 
hierarchical powers in world history have received and used such narratives. The majority of 
suzerain empires were legitimated with doctrines of supremacy without narratives of unity, 
employing strategies of divide and rule, and manipulation via intermediaries. Narratives of unity 
are rarely received in political cultures, but their use provides the added benefits of optimizing 
hierarchical orders, by supplementing them with solidarities, which systems divide and rule are 
not afforded. In the rare cases where a collective-self-narrative is received and used by dominant 
powers, the process of discursive projection and performance by ruling and ruled relationally 
circulates the collective-self-narrative, uniting them into a larger supra-polity. This is to say it 
involves discursive action from ruling elites to ruled people, and discursive action of ruled 
people to ruling elites, so establishing a discursive circulation of a (relationally contested but 
shared) collective-self-narrative between them. As such, a condition of the circulation of a 
narrative is its acceptability by both ruled people and ruling elites. This is why cultural reception 
is a necessary but also insufficient variable. The narrative must be accepted to be able to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power. London: Palgrave, 1991), p. 64-97. 
135 Griffiths, ‘The Waltzian Ordering Principle and International Change’, p. 14. 
136 Worth noting here, is how Michael Mann’s history of power in his multiple volumes, The Sources of Social 
Power, offers insights into the crucial role of power concentrations for the unification of polities, particularly where 
he discusses the case of ancient Egypt. Following conquest of the Nile Valley by Upper Egypt, Mann observes how 
a ‘veritable unitary society resulted.’: Michael Mann The Sources of Social Power: Volume I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 111. However, as a model of power and not a theory of unification, Mann’s 
analysis (particularly in the case of Egyptian unification), emphasizes conquest and domination, often overlooking 
the role of significant ideas and discourse, even though his “IEMP” model of power includes ideological factors. 
See, Mann The Sources of Social Power: Volume I, p. 108-115. 
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circulated. By acceptability, I mean its congruence within a cultural context. The narrative must 
be able to be coherently integrated into cultural discourses, or those cultural discourses need to 
be sufficiently invalidated to be replaced by a new discourse, for the narrative to be acceptable, 
and thereby able to be discursively circulated. As such, the cultural conditions of a unifying 
collective-self-narrative’s use are its reception and acceptance, via congruence with basic beliefs, 
or the collapse, crisis and invalidation of those beliefs. By the congruence of a discursive 
narrative with a cultural context, I do not mean the syncretic fusion of narratives and underlying 
beliefs. Cultural fusion might be conducive, but it is not necessary for a narrative to be 
acceptable, which only implies a minimally shared cultural horizon of basic beliefs, not a 
maximal cultural consistency. The sources of these received narratives are also variable, being 
either the discourse of one part of the system, or, in contexts of shared culture across a system of 
polities, the discourse of a system-wide use. As such, because unification is a relational process, 
if there is a shift in cultural beliefs within a unified system, the unifying narrative will also need 
to shift for it to maintain congruence and acceptability. 
Let me unpack the security instigation of this process of unification with reference to 
historical evidence. In extreme cases of systemic domination, where all the units of a system fail 
to balance, the domination of a system by one unit incentivizes the use of unifying collective-
self-narrative, because hierarchical structures require legitimation, but also provide benefits of 
unity. That is, once systemic domination is established, both ruling and ruled units have 
incentives towards unification. The more unified the system, the more secure the interests of the 
rulers and the more optimal their rule. Likewise, the more unified the system, the less likely 
ruled units will be coerced by ruling units, and the more benefits ruled units will received by 
improving their status in the established hierarchy. This is evident in ancient international 
systems. For instance, the ruling Roman elite in the Roman Empire had an interest in diffusing 
the Stoic narrative of the communis patria of the civitas maxima, so to legitimate and optimize 
their rule, but the ruled polities also had an interest in circulating that narrative, not only to avoid 
violent oppression, but also to improve their status in the hierarchical structure of the empire. 
The more such narratives discursively circulate, across generational periods, in a relational 
process between ruling elites and ruled elites and non-elites, the more the system is unified, 
increasingly legitimating its hierarchical and unitary structure. 
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Combining these two components of the theory: The discursive circulation of collective 
identity constitutive collective-self-narratives amongst the units in the system is theorized to 
follow from security interests and benefits of rule optimization, in circumstances of systemic 
domination created by extreme concentrations of power. This is supported by evidence from 
world historical systems, where historical cases suggestive of unification are only found in 
contexts of systemic domination. These situations of concentrated material power create security 
interests that incentivize the relational circulation of unifying collective-self-narratives, which 
intervenes between domination and unification.137 Fig. 1 illustrates how the emergence of 
systemic domination creates a system-wide security interest in unification, which instigates the 
intervening variable of a unifying collective-self-narrative. 
 
 
 Fig. 1, Intervening variable of a received and circulated narrative. 
 
The intervening variable of narrative circulation is the historical substance or discursive contents 
of unifications, socially constructing a collective identity across international systems, so 
legitimating and optimizing hierarchical orders through discursive action. 
Contrasting the theorized process of unification with the opposite process of dis-
unification that has occurred in the formation of the modern states system can help convey the 
workings of the proposed theory. As Christian Reus-Smit has argued, the globalization of the 
modern international system is explained by the decline of imperial powers and the discursive 	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socially constructed and historically variable, but I also take the position that material threats, connected to relative 
imbalances of material power, are consistently a significant problem across historical contexts of human behavior 
nonetheless, despite the variability in how material threats “count” as material interests. In this respect, the proposed 
theory is theoretically eclectic, but it is also internally consistent. For discussion of these issue, see, Wendt Social 
Theory of International Politics, chp.3, ‘Ideas all the way down?’, pp. 92-135. 
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reception of modern ideas of individual rights by ruled peoples, which created fatal legitimacy 
crises for ruling empires.138 When empires failed to accommodate rights claims, ruled peoples 
moved for exacting independence from ruling empires, via sovereign nation-state formation. 
Cases of modern nation-state formation are too easily thought of as micro-cases of unification. 
From a systems level perspective, these cases of modern state formation are better understood as 
instances of how a system becomes a plurality of polities, against our inverse question of 
whether and how a system becomes a single polity. If the modern experience is one of struggles 
for recognition of independent liberties, the unification process I am advancing is one of 
struggles for the legitimation and membership in hierarchies. They are categorically opposite 
processes, working in opposite systemically centripetal and centrifugal directions.  
Four points of clarification arise. First, like systemic domination, we might expect the 
introduction of a systemic threat to produce a unifying effect on a systemic scale, as a grand 
alliance would unite to balance against it.139 Yet, in cases of systemic threats, the use of 
collective-self-narratives only temporarily unites international systems, and collective balancing 
often fails to occur at all.140 For instance, historical evidence that (to an extent) is suggestive of a 
unifying process, is the narrative use of Greece and Greek as well as the language of Hellas and 
Hellene, used in the unification of the Greek city-states system against a common Persian threat. 
With knowledge of the advancing Persian invasion force, wrote Herodotus, 
 
All the Greeks who had the best interests of Greece at heart held a meeting … they 
decided to lay aside all mutual antagonism … The idea was to try to find a way to 
unite the whole of the Greek world –to get everyone to think and act in concert –on the 
grounds that all Greeks were equally threatened by the imminent danger.141 
 
Discursive action of Greek and Hellene unification legitimated the Delian League, the alliance of 
Greek city-states, with its Athenian hegemonic leadership, as well as the Hellenic League, 
further Greek city-states under Spartan hegemonic leadership.142 The coordinated efforts that 
Greek city-states eventually made against the invading Persians dissipated after threat removal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Reus-Smit Individual Rights and the Making of the International System. 
139 Joseph M. Parent, Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
140 Kauman et. al., The Balance of Power in World History. 
141 Herodotus, The Histories Robin Waterfield (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 145 [Book VII].   
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gradually giving way to the polarized disunity of the Peloponnesian war.143 To a degree, 
following threat removal, the initial systemic threat that legitimated the hierarchy of Athens 
began to translate into a potential systemic domination by Athens after the Persian threat was 
removed, which would be a case of an emergent systemic domination, not the introduction of a 
systemic threat. A second example of ephemeral unity in response to a systemic threat is the 19th 
Century Concert of Europe, formed out of the grand alliance of European powers against 
Napoleonic France. This case evinces a narrative of European collective identity, in the 
“Commonwealth of Europe”, under the dominance of the concert powers, but the concert 
devolved into mutual rivalry and warfare. The ephemerality of unity via systemic threats is 
explained by how systemic threat removal reorients security interests, creating mutual insecurity 
and uncertainty whilst removing the incentives to unification that extreme concentrations of 
power create.144 
Second, to what extent are unifying narratives merely imperial ideologies? The crucial 
difference is the unifying character of the narrative combined with its circulation by ruled and 
ruling alike across generational time-scales. While nearly all empires have projected civilizing 
missions and imperial principles of suzerainty, only a few rare cases also evince a unifying 
“supra-polity” narrative circulated amongst ruled and ruling peoples alike on approximately 
system-wide scales. As a process, unification is a matter of degree, where the depth and breadth 
of unification increases over time. While identifiable historical cases are imperial in nature, they 
are also cases of imperially dominated systems undergoing a gradual unifying process. 
Third, this raises the question of the role of “othering” in the formation of a single polity 
out of a system of polities. Othering, it is widely agreed, plays a significant role in collective 
identity formation, but its importance should not obscure the relations of units “within” a unified 
supra-polity as well.145 As I detail below, all historical cases evincing a unifying process on a 
systemic-scale involved “othered” out-groups, “uncivilized” or “barbarian” peoples, but these 
cases also involved the mutual recognitions of a shared collective identity amongst units 
“within” the unifying system. A world polity would be the first systemic unification to not later 
connect to a further regional “secondary” system, and so the location of the “other” in its case 	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would be on the inside, barring evidence of an “other” extraterrestrial civilization, be it 
established on Mars or of alien origin. Furthermore, the form or quality of othering should not be 
conceived as consistently exclusionary or implacable across cases.146 
Lastly, to what extent are pre-modern and modern international systems comparable in 
respect to theorizing a unifying process? The differences between ancient and modern contexts 
are primarily the scale of the system via industrialized interaction capacities, the types of units 
from empires to nation-states, and the cultural context of modernity.147 As such, a modern mode 
of power changes the means and discursive contents of a potential systemic domination and 
collective-self-narrative. It does not transform the conditions of systemic domination and 
collective-self-narrative circulation. 
 With these clarifications in mind, let me summarize the proposed theory of systemic 
unification: security interests concerning all the units in an international system, arising in cases 
of systemic domination, create system-wide incentives for the discursive use of unifying 
collective-self-narratives, which, if culturally received and discursively circulated, unify systems 
of polities into a single polity via the construction of a hierarchy legitimating “supra-polity” 
collective identity. In short, unification is theorized to emerge from a mutually supporting 
combination of structurally conditioned security incentives and culturally conditioned discursive 
action. 
 
1.5 World Historical Cases 
 
Does world history contain cases of systemic unification? How have the dynamics of unification 
unfolded in these cases? There are no cases of system-wide unity in world history, only cases 
that contain evidence suggestive of a unifying process on approximately system-wide scales. 
When considering world historical cases, it is helpful to recall Hedley Bull’s suggestion that, 
‘there has never been a government of the world, but there has often been a government supreme 
over much of what for those subjected to it was the known world’.148 These past systems, like 
imperial Rome for instance, were not “world polities”, but they do evince a process of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Neumann Uses of the Other, p. 35-7. 
147 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity, and the Making of 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
148 Bull The Anarchical Society, 2002 [1977], p. 244. 
	   52 
unification on system-wide scales, which can be abstracted in support of the theory advanced 
above. 
Cases selected here are cases evincing a unifying process, not a maximal unity, as there 
are no cases of a maximally unified system in world history. Historical cases evince a range of 
degrees of unification. The vital evidence of a process of systemic unification in world historical 
cases is not the laws and offices of a single system-wide political apparatus. Nor is it the artifacts 
and practices of a single system-wide culture. Although these things are suggestive, they are not 
conclusive or sufficient. The vital evidence of a unifying process is the circulated use of a 
collective-self-narrative legitimating hierarchical orders across a system of polities. It is the a 
relational tension between systemically dominant units and dominated units combined with 
evidence of a unifying narrative relationally circulated amongst ruling and ruled units that 
evinces a unifying process. The presence of a narrative is not sufficient, because its relational 
circulation, that is, its use by ruling elites and everyday ruled people alike, is the key evidence of 
a unification process. The shared use of a common narrative amongst elites and everyday 
peoples, across multiple polities, is evidence of a shared “weness” feeling, the sense of belonging 
and solidarity constructing the shared collective identity that distinguishes an empire imperially 
dominating a system of polities, from the unification of a system into a single polity. 
Furthermore, stability is a correlate of legitimacy, but stability is not vital evidence of legitimated 
unification. Instability is suggestive of illegitimacy, and selected cases that evince unification 
correspond with long periods of relative stability, but stability has several contributing factors 
beyond legitimacy, including economics, demographics, ecology, technology, and good 
government.149 Again, the vital evidence of systemic unification is the circulated use of a 
collective-self-narrative by elites and everyday people alike. Historical instances of systemic 
unification differ in specific social form and historical substance, depending on the principles of 
the historically specific collective-self-narrative received, discursively projected, and performed 
in the system. 
In world history, evidence of a systemic unifying process is rare. This paucity of 
instances of systemic unification is consistent with the difficulty of meeting both the conditions 
of extreme concentrations of power and the cultural reception and circulation of unifying 	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narratives. The majority of system-wide empires do not correspond to evidence of unifying 
processes. Cases containing systemic domination but lacking unification are explained by the 
cultural preconditions of unification, the need for the reception, use, and acceptance of unifying 
narratives. Not every empire receives a unifying narrative to use and not every used narrative is 
acceptable in the cultural contexts of ruled polities. Across international systems in world 
history, two cases provide substantial evince of a unifying process on approximately systemic 
scales, the unification of upper and lower Egypt and the Roman Empire. Neither of these cases 
unified the entirety of their systems, but they contain substantial evidence of a unifying process 
on approximately system-wide scales. The case of the European Union has been an important 
case for constructivist theorists of a post-Westphalian polity.150 This case evinces the use of a 
collective-self-narrative of European collective identity, but while this case evinces a regional 
unification, it also evinces the unification of the region apart from the rest of the global system. 
The EU is a sub-systemic unification, a potential state formation, with no evident world polity 
aspirations. In the context of the increased interaction capacity of the contemporary worldwide 
system, the EU case would need to connect to more expansive narratives of world unity for it to 
be qualify as a involving systemic unification process. 
Discussion of each illustrative case is highly stylized, to focus on the vital evidence of a 
unifying process, in the limited space available. Exploring illustrative cases in world history 
clarifies and provides supportive evidence of the proposed theory. The cases of the unification of 
Upper and Lower ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire are selected because they provide 
substantive evidence of a unifying process and can be covered in the limited space available.  
 
Ancient Egypt 
 
The ancient Nile Valley and surrounding territories, prior to its unification, formed an 
international system in its own right, with evidence of regular trade, diplomatic relations, and 
warfare, but limited relations beyond it.151 The relations of units within the ancient Nile Valley 
and nearby territories were regular, while relations beyond the ancient Nile Valley before the rise 
of imperial Egypt, were irregular, dissipated at a distance, and were reinforced by the structural 	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modifiers of natural barriers of water and deserts, isolating the Nile Valley system from foreign 
powers.152 The precise events leading to the domination of Egypt by Upper Egypt are not entirely 
settled from the archeological record. Yet, the war of Upper Egypt against the Lower Egyptian 
polities appears to be a decisive event, establishing a ruling polity over the entire Nile Valley 
system, roughly in 3100 B.C.E.153 With irregular and structurally modified relations with polities 
beyond the Nile Valley, the system became dominated by a single power. During its Early 
Dynastic Period, Old Kingdom, and Middle Kingdom, the extreme concentration of power in the 
system under Pharaonic rule saw the emergence of a virtually unitary polity. The condition of 
systemic domination persisted for 1450 years during these periods, starting roughly with rise of 
the Early Dynastic Period in 3100 and ending with the Hyksos invasion of Egypt in 1650 B.C.E.. 
Only two relatively brief periods of civil war and disunity occurred in this 1450 years. The first 
and second intermediate periods, marked the brief transitions between the Early Dynastic Period, 
the Old Kingdom, and the Middle Kingom, the first intermediate period being roughly 100 years, 
and the second being roughly 50 years. 
In relative isolation and dominated by a succession of single ruling powers for 1450 
years, the Egyptian system underwent a marked degree of unification, virtually unparalleled in 
world history, both in its depth and longevity.154 However, across its vast history, Egypt became 
increasingly connected to regional powers by diplomacy, trade, and war. The end of the relative 
discreetness of the Egyptian system can be roughly set around the Hyksos invasion of Egypt 
1650-1523 B.C.E., after which Egypt engaged in imperial relations beyond the Nile Valley 
during the Eighteenth to Twentieth Dynasties, and increasingly became incorporated into the 
regional Amarna system, with major engagements with the Hittite Empire over control of the 
buffer territory of Canaan and Syria. Prior to Egypt’s incorporation into the regional system of 
multiple Empires, Pharaonic Egypt existed in relative isolation for a relatively significant period 
of 1450 years. When incorporated into a larger international system, the case of Egypt shifted, 
from the unification of a unit out of a system, to state formation in a system. As such, the 	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Egyptian case of systemic domination under consideration here only occurs between 3100-1650 
B.C.E.. 
During this period, a unifying process is most evident in the Old and Middle Kingdoms, 
2686-1650 B.C.E. Evidence of a unifying process is found in the narrative of Maat, which 
pervaded the political culture and daily life of Pharaonic Egypt. There is evidence suggesting the 
Nile Valley system had a common culture before its political unification,155 from which the 
unifying discursive narrative, to legitimate and optimize Pharaonic rule, was received. Materially 
dominating the system, the ruling Upper Egyptian polity became incentivized to secure and 
optimize its rule. The Pharaonic hierarchy gradually came to project the Pharaonic unifying 
religion based on the concept of Maat, which the record suggests predated, but was modified to 
legitimate, Pharaonic rule. This narrative, circulated through daily rituals and ceremonies in 
temples established across the system, constituted both ruling and ruled Egyptians as upholders 
of Maat in the cosmos. The formative period of this narrative and its institutionalization is 
considered to be the Old Kingdom, 2686-2125 B.C.E, which suggests the Early Dynastic Period 
relied more heavily on legitimating principles of divine suzerainty, rather than principles of 
unity. Maat was the belief system of a divine order of the world and cosmos, the numinous and 
connected nature of all things, connected to belief in and ambition of immortality in the afterlife. 
The extent of these beliefs across the system before the rise of the Pharaohs is unclear, but the 
unifying process in the case of ancient Egypt reached a high degree of diffusion through the 
circulation of these beliefs. Gradually they came to be ‘embedded in Phaoronic society and 
affected life for all Egyptians, from the poorest to the divine king himself’.156 This belief in Maat 
constituted a Pharaonic civilizing mission, but also, through the process of projection and 
performance in daily rituals became deeply and pervasively held by ancient Egyptians in general, 
common and elite, constituting the moral purpose and unifying collective-self-narrative of the 
Egyptian imperial order. 
The suzerainty of the Pharaoh’s was predominantly legitimated in Egyptian history 
through claiming familial connection to the god Ra, but the principle of Egyptian unity was 
deeply connected to Maat. The established Pharaonic suzerainty in the Early Dynastic Period 
created an incentive for Pharaohs to unify and optimize their dominated system. Yet, the ruled 	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peoples also had incentives, to avoid coercive oppression by the ruling powers and to improve 
their status and deriving benefits from the hierarchical order. With these incentives, the Pharaohs 
developed and discussively projected the narrative of Maat, establishing themselves as the 
proper maintainers of Maat, the menekh, which they performed in daily ritual offerings to Maat, 
in person and by designated proxy priests in temples across the kingdom.157 The ruled peoples, in 
this narrative, were understood to be contributors to Maat. Together, ruled and ruling shared the 
collective-self-narrative of the maintainers and contributors to Maat, the people upholding Maat. 
The performance of daily rituals by ruled and ruling people circulated the discursive narrative, 
on a daily basis across generations. This discursive circulation, amongst ruling to ruled 
constituted the collective identity of the Egyptian polity, uniting a former system of polities into 
a single polity. Belief in Maat came to inform public and private law as the subjects and rulers of 
ancient Egypt came, across generations, to performatively conceive themselves as belonging to 
this maintenance of Maat, as contributors to Maat, by observing Maat and circulating its 
narrative in their participation in ritual offerings to Maat.158 
Within Egypt, arising in the Old Kingdom, the growing institutionalization of the daily 
discursive use and ritual practice of the narrative of Maat, across the system for generations, 
evinces a unifying process on a scale that was, for a time, of a systemic-scale. The circulation of 
the collective-self-narrative of maintainers and contributors to Maat contributed to the 
constitution of the collective identity of the Egyptian polity, contributing to the social 
construction of a single polity, out of a system of independent polities. 
 
The Roman Empire 
 
The rise of the Roman Empire brought one polity to dominate the entirety of the Mediterranean 
system for nearly 700 years. Roman hegemonic dominance in the Mediterranean system emerges 
after Rome’s defeat of its Carthaginian rival in the Third Punic War, 149-146 B.C.E., which 
coincided with dominance of Greece by Rome, though a mix of invitation and imposition, 
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including the military defeat of the Macedonian Empire.159 Full Roman dominance of the entire 
Mediterranean system was established roughly by the time of the battle of Actium, 31 B.C.E., 
with the incorporation of Egypt into the Empire. Asia Minor and Gaul had already been brought 
under Roman domination by that time. Roman dominance of the Mediterranean system was 
maintained until roughly 476 C.E., with the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. 
An interesting aspect of the Roman case is its connection and contrast to the Hellenic 
system, which illustrates the mutually supporting factors of structural and cultural conditions of 
unification. Zeno’s Stoic cosmopolitan philosophy was present and became widely diffused 
across the Hellenistic system. However, Greek Stoicism was a personal ethic, not the public 
doctrine that the Romans later made it.160 The Stoic narrative was not used by the Hellenistic 
monarchies and the Macedonian kingdoms practically had and in principle recognized no 
superior amongst them. Hellenistic monarchies widely practiced legitimation based on the right 
of “spear won” conquest and the military authority and excellence of the Macedonian kings. 
Antigonus attempted to claim the suzerainty of the system claimed by Alexander the Great, but 
his forces were defeated in a grand alliance of Macedonian rivals that dissolved the system’s 
tradition of suzerainty and established the Hellenistic order of multiple monarchical empires.161 
Across the Hellenistic system of rival Macedonian kingdoms, the narrative of the cosmopolis 
diffused as a personal ethical philosophy, but not a public doctrine of systemic political unity. 
However, in its reception by imperial Roman elites, a Stoic narrative was put to political 
use, in its projection through public temples across the Empire.162 The hierarchy of the Roman 
Empire was legitimated by this Romanized Stoic narrative, which conceived all humankind as 
one polity, the cosmopolis.163 As the Roman elites received this narrative in their exposure to the 
Hellenistic world, it suited their interests in legitimating and optimizing their imperial 
dominance, and projected it across the system through networks of public temples. Roman 
subjects also had the ability to become priests themselves. Temple priests conducted public 	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ceremonies and rituals that Roman subjects were required to participate in. Performance of 
public ceremonies and rituals, in the ancient Roman worldview, maintained the favour of the 
gods, and so sustained the Empire. As such, participation in public ceremonies and rituals, 
through performance of prayers, oaths, and offerings, demonstrated membership in and support 
for the Empire. Roman Emperors, following Augustus, held the role of chief priest of the 
Empire. Roman Stoicism predated the imperial constitution of Rome and famous Roman Stoa, 
Cicero and Cato, were Republicans. Yet, the Stoic narrative of cosmic unity was later connected 
by Roman elites to concepts of unity and hierarchy: orbis Romanum, approximately meaning the 
Roman command of the world, and the communis patria, the paternal community of all 
humankind. Several generations into the Empire, Emperor Aurelius philosophized that if, ‘the 
universe is a kind of city; in what other common constitution will anyone say that the whole 
human race shares’?164 Ovid wrote, ‘at once a city (urbis) and a world (orbis)’.165 The Stoic 
narrative of unity was also diffused via symbolic ensigns and discursively circulated through 
public practices including acclamations, that ‘invoked imagined visions of the empire as a 
unified community’.166 With degrees and variation across the empire, this narrative, received and 
projected by the Roman elite, was circulated amongst ruled and ruling people, via regular 
practices of public religion and acclamations across generational timescales, gradually unifying 
the Empire into a larger imagined polity. Unification was not universal, but is evident to an 
extent. A major exception, for instance, is the Roman Jewish War. The recognition and 
admissibility of images of deified Caesar in Jerusalem, amongst other religious practices, were 
seen as contributing tensions of the conflict.167 
The case of the Roman Empire can also be seen as formally institutionalizing the 
narrative of a single system-wide polity, in the eventual establishment of classes across the 
empire’s provinces and territories. There was a structural unification of the Empire beyond the 
intermediaries that realized the discursive expression of the world city. By the late Empire, 
irrespective of one’s polity of origin, a family could improve its standing in the six levels of 
imperial citizenship, generation by generation, as each generation could ascend one level, given 	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certain conditions. Different peoples across the Empire could, to an extent, practically as well as 
discursively transcend their local loyalties, to imagine and practice a single polity of the world. 
This narrative legitimated the series of patron client relations between Rome and its ruled 
polities, giving their bargain based unity a cultural and moral basis, optimizing their rule in 
reducing incentives of revolt, so easing the governance of provinces, and eventually justifying 
the expansion of citizenship across the late Empire. The rise of the Empire was partly due to the 
lack of a grand alliance or balancing power to prevent it.168 But, the endurance of the Empire is 
partly attributable to its unifying process that legitimated and optimized its rule and mitigated the 
development of counter-hegemonic alliances from within the empire, contributing to long 
periods of stability amidst thinly spread forces vulnerable to multiple simultaneous rebellions 
across a vast territory. 
The unifying process was not absolute, as the Roman Jewish War illustrates, but neither 
was it final. A further significant aspect of the Roman case is the rise of Christianity and eventual 
transition of the Empire’s public religion from Stoic paganism to Christianity. The spread of 
Christian beliefs across the Empire limited the acceptability of Stoic rituals amongst ruled 
populations. Increasing numbers of Christians, including imperial soldiers, refused to sacrifice 
for the deified Emperors and gods in public rituals. The beliefs of soldiers was particularly 
significant, because they played a key role in supporting rival would-be Emperors aiming to 
concentrate power in the system. The tension between Christian beliefs and public religion 
eventually resulted in a transition, through the combination Christian beliefs and Roman power 
in the military victories of Constantine. By 324 C.E., Constantine had militarily defeated all his 
rivals and again brought the domination of the system under a single Emperor. In power, 
Constantine legalized Christianity and enthusiastically supported it with the spread of Churches 
across the Empire. Christianity became the official public religion of the Empire in the 4th 
Century C.E.. Although pagan worship declined, it persisted across the Empire for several 
centuries, whist Christianity continued to spread. The transition of public unifying narratives 
from Stoicism to Christianity in the Roman world illustrates the relational bottom-up and top-
down tension between ruling and ruled in the unifying process. Unification requires unifying 
narratives, but a narrative acceptable to both ruling and ruled is required for it to be circulated. 
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The conquest of the Western Roman Empire by Germanic tribes in 476 C.E. effectively 
terminated a Roman unifying process on a systemic scale, even though Christianity continued to 
spread across the system, despite the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The conquering 
Germanic tribes were themselves Christians, although there were multiple sects of Christianity. 
A unified polity of all Christendom remained an ambition and ideal but was never a reality. The 
Roman Empire persisted in the East (retroactively described by historians as the Byzantine 
Empire), centered on the capital city of Constantinople. Lacking sufficient military power, the 
domination of the entirety of the system by the Eastern Roman Empire was not re-established, 
despite several attempts. The history of the Eastern Roman Empire is one of a hegemonic 
imperial power, which eventually declined and collapsed. Much of Northern Africa and the 
Italian peninsula were re-conquered under Emperor Justinian I, in the 550s C.E., but these 
territories were eventually lost again. The Eastern Roman Empire, although enduring for nearly a 
thousand years, faced significant rival powers North, East, and West of it, and was eventually 
conquered by rising Ottoman power in 1453 C.E. Despite the continued spread of a potentially 
unifying narrative of Christendom, a unifying process had subsided from the system lacking a 
dominant power. 
The Egyptian and Roman cases evince a process of unification of multiple polities 
through the theorized process on approximately system-wide scales in their respective 
international systems. In both cases, a power established material dominance over an 
international system, whist receiving, modifying, and projecting a unifying narrative that was 
circulated amongst ruling and ruled people across the system over generational time-scales. 
These cases evince the interests of hierarchical powers in sustaining and optimizing their rule as 
well as the interest of ruled peoples in avoiding violent oppression and improving their status in 
unified hierarchical structures. Both these cases also provide degrees of evidence of the 
sociological circulation of collective-self-narratives that provided normative reasons for unity, so 
creating legitimated hierarchies, rather than merely materially dominant hierarchies. In each 
case, a collective-self-narrative was received by an imperial power, projected by that power, to 
different degrees accepted, and circulated back by ruled populations across multiple generations, 
evincing the process of a system unifying into a single vast polity with a collective identity, 
legitimated hierarchy, and ability to mobilize resources. In the Roman case, the dominating 
power ruled a larger international system, with a higher degree of cultural diversity, which made 
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the articulation of an acceptable unifying difficult across the entire system. At a theoretical level, 
Kaufman et. al. are correct in their assessment that the success of would-be suzerain powers 
depends on a combination of factors, including good administrative governance and prevailing 
principles of unit identity.169 The proposed theory supported by the above illustrative cases 
makes the additional claim that cases of extreme imbalances also create systemic security 
interests and benefits of unification that incentivize the circulation of collective-self-narratives 
amongst ruled and ruling peoples, forming a shared collective identity of all the units in the 
system. 
From a world historical perspective, we can see that the conditions of systemic 
unification are becoming increasingly difficult to meet. The increasing interaction capacities of 
units (with the wheel, sail, camel and horse, in ancient times, and industrial transportation and 
communication in modern times) have made systems ever wider, drawing multiple systems 
together. The ancient Egyptian system of the Nile valley, for instance, later became connected to 
the secondary Amarna system.170 The Roman system came to form a system with the Germanic 
polities as well as Persia. This steady enlargement of international systems across world history 
increases the number of units in systems and thereby decreases the likelihood of systemic 
concentrations of power that instigate systemic unification. Furthermore, the historical expansion 
of systemic scales via increasing interaction capacities of units involves increasing cultural 
contexts in the system, which decreases the likelihood of a narrative being congruent and 
acceptable across units. In the rare circumstances where power concentrations combined with the 
cultural reception of a unifying narrative, the system eventually expanded, reframing the cultural 
context and relative distributions of power. Increasing interaction capacity partly explains why 
cases evincing systemic unification diminish in frequency across history and are only found in 
pre-modern contexts. 
 
1.6 Implications for the Contemporary System 
 
How does the proposed theory clarify the question of a possible world polity formation in the 
contemporary international system? The proposed theory, supported by illustrative cases, 	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suggests a world polity is highly unlikely in the near future, due to the diffusing of power in the 
system and the difficulty of articulating a unifying narrative in a late modern nationalist political 
culture. The proposed theory also clarifies the changes in the concentration of power and 
articulation of unifying narratives needed for the unlikely, but nonetheless possible, unification 
of the contemporary international system. 
First, the proposed theory highlights how the structural and cultural ingredients of 
systemic unification are absent from the contemporary international system. For instance, power 
is insufficiently concentrated to initiate a unifying process. The unipolarity of US hegemony, 
after the Cold War, while pronounced, is still insufficiently dominant in the system to initiate a 
unifying process and lacks a unifying narrative acceptable in a late modern context. The US, is 
balanced against by the nuclear deterrents and security capabilities of a resurgent Russia and 
rising China. 171  Furthermore, the cultural conditions of unification are unmet in the 
contemporary system. The potential contents of a unifying collective-self-narrative for all 
humankind are limited by the nationalist and anti-imperial discursive context of late modern 
political culture.172 Yet, while the proliferation of nuclear deterrence has significantly diminished 
the prospects for the domination of the system by a single power, Deudney and Wendt are 
nonetheless right to suggest that nuclear proliferation has generated unique systemic security 
threats.173 The arsenals of the super powers threaten every unit in the system, which creates an 
incentive to unify. As Deudney argues, ‘The main impetus to create a world government comes 
not from a desire to embody consensual principles of mutual restraint, but rather from the brute 
facts of rising interdependence in anarchy and the acute insecurity it produces’.174 Ecological 
crisis is potentially approaching this level of systemic security threat as well. Yet, in both the 
case of nuclear weapons and ecological crisis, this has produced a reliance on regime complexes, 
of mutually assured destruction in the case of nuclear weapons, and a more incipient and diffuse 
regime complex in response to ecological crisis. The deterrence regime, in particular, has 
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reoriented the security threat posed by nuclear weapons, making strategic deterrence the 
guarantee of systemic security, rather than insecurity.175  
 Second, the advanced theory clarifies the structural and cultural changes necessary for 
systemic unification. Structural and cultural changes are equally necessary to enable the systemic 
unification of world polity formation in the contemporary context. The development of a new 
disruptive technology, invalidating nuclear weapons, may redistribute material power in 
sufficient degrees to enable systemic domination. A technology with the capability to disarm or 
destroy an entire nuclear arsenal’s first and second strike capacities would be such a technology 
potentially enabling an extreme unipolar domination of the system. However, it seems equally if 
not more plausible that the development of new weapons technologies will only compound 
systemic insecurity, by arraigning additional systems of deterrence. The contemporary use of 
international regimes to manage weapons of mass destruction is persistent, although it is 
unsatisfactory to some intellectuals and statespersons. 176  If there were a limited nuclear 
exchange, however, the perception of the systemic security threat would likely be revised and 
instigate alternative policy. As Deudney suggests, ‘More likely … is the scenario of “after the 
deluge, the covenant”’.177 Such an event might invalidate prevailing beliefs that underpin the 
deep structure of the international system. New policies might involve the revision of the 
contemporary regime towards disarmament, in a concert of great powers, or the ascension of a 
world government or federation with a centralized security system, or perhaps in a world union 
of some sorts, with a radically reformed and expanded United Nations governance and security 
system. If large-scale calamities were produced by climate change, perhaps the inhabitability of 
parts and major centers of multiple great powers, then geo-engineering systems of planetary 
climate control may be opted for, potentially involving a unifying effect. The extent of that 
potential unification is unclear, however, because an international regime complex would likely 
suffice for the management of planetary climate control systems.178 In any case, if a global crisis 
initiated the establishment of a world state or world union, or if a hypothetical global revolution 
captured multiple great powers, of if a world empire emerged, thus concentrating power and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Daniel Deudney, ‘The Great Decent: Global Governance in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, in Amitav 
Acharya (ed.) Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), pp. 31-54. 
176 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviatha, p. 172-3. 
177 Deudney, Bounding Power, p. 264. 
178 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change. Perspectives on Politics 
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dominating the system, a world polity formation process would still require the cultural reception 
of a collective-self-narrative acceptable to the majority of humankind. Lacking such a narrative, 
a world revolutionary power would be a case of systemic domination without systemic 
unification. 
The prevailing anti-hierarchical and nationalist political culture of late modernity 
constitutes a significant challenge to the formulation of a unifying collective-self-narrative to 
legitimate the hierarchies of a world polity. Yet, just as the ancient Egyptian and Roman cases 
involved the modification of received narratives, perhaps available cultural resources could be 
similarly modified. To reformulate Ruggie’s popularized phrase, the question is: what narrative 
could hang the world polity together?179 Daniel Deudney, amongst others, has suggested a 
‘terra-politan’ narrative, where the planet is conceived as the common homeland and habitat for 
a new collective identity of humankind.180 This narrative is still vague however, and encounters 
rival cosmopolitan narratives of unity in the contemporary political discourse of world order. The 
emergence of a unifying process is only possible if both these conditions are met: the 
concentration of power threatening all units in the system and the cultural reception of a unifying 
narrative acceptable to the majority of units in the system. Due to the diffusion of power via 
nuclear deterrents as well as the nationalist and anti-hierarchical political culture of the 
contemporary international system, the combination of an overwhelming concentration of power 
and a unifying narrative acceptable to the majority of humankind is highly unlikely, if not 
entirely impossible, in the foreseeable future. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
I have argued the world polity debate has been too presentist in its focus on the contemporary 
system of states and can benefit from an exploration of world historical cases of international 
systems with the more abstract and general question of how international systems unify into 
single polities. Available world polity formation theories encounter difficulties and struggle with 
contradictory evidence when viewed across world historical cases of international systems. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, p. 1. 
180 Daniel Deudney, ‘Global Village Sovereignty: Intergenerational Sovereign Publics, Federal-Republican Earth 
Constitutions, and Planetary Identities’, in Karen T. Litfin (ed.) The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics. 
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response, I have suggested the emergence of a world polity would be an instance of “systemic 
unification” and advanced the outlines of a theory that eclectically combines insights from 
available theories, so emphasizing a combination of structural and cultural conditions of 
unification. The unification of international systems into single polities is theorized to occur in 
contexts of systemic concentrations of power, via the relational tensions produced in contexts of 
systemic domination, that create security interests of systemic scope, which, in turn incentivize a 
collective identity formation process via the discursive circulation of collective-self-narratives. I 
supported this proposed theory in two illustrative cases. I argued further that this proposed theory 
indicates that the conditions of systemic unification have become increasingly unlikely to occur 
across world history, due to the increasing interaction capacity of units that has expanded 
international systems, eventually to the worldwide scale of the modern international system, 
creating new relative distributions of power and diversifying cultural contexts. Lastly, I 
suggested this theory contributes to the explanation of why there is no world polity today, by 
identifying its absent structural and cultural conditions. 
The ancient idea of “one” unified world is still debated amongst intellectuals today, both 
in terms of its possibility and normative desirability. In this chapter, I have not sought to address 
the normative or pragmatic desirability of world unity. I have sought to clarify the theoretical 
debate about the possibility, conditions, and contributing processes of world polity formation 
beyond anarchy and hegemony in international relations. By bringing in a world historical 
perspective to the world polity debate, this chapter has clarified how a world polity would be an 
instance of “systemic unification”, which, in the contemporary system, is highly unlikely due to 
the diffusion of power through nuclear deterrents and the nationalist and anti-hierarchical 
political culture of a late modern context.  
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Chapter Two. 
The World Polity Debate: Establishing Criteria 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Every vision of a world polity is idiosyncratic to some proponent, some class or nation, great 
thinker or leader, be it bourgeois or socialist cosmopolitans, Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism or 
Mencius’s Confucianism. Yet, all such visions are also idiosyncratic to their age and epoch, 
special to the background worldviews that define all the ideas of the age, those most primary 
age-defining worldviews that mold both the ascendant ideas and their rivals into the form of the 
age. In the previous chapter, I argued that the realization of a world polity is not ruled out of 
possibility today, theoretically speaking, although it is highly unlikely, and that its emergence 
has an important discursive and conceptual component, centered on the use of collective-self-
conceptions in the constitution of collective identities. The question that came out of that 
argument is whether there is a collective-self-conception that can constitute a world polity today. 
This question of a unifying narrative is all the more crucial because any potential concentration 
of power in the system would also require the reception of a unifying narrative for a unifying 
process to emerge. Trans-civilizational and ecological narratives were taken as likely candidates, 
although there are contenders besides these, forming a debate about the proper conception of a 
realizable world polity.181 
Yet, before I wade into the world polity debate, I need to first propose some criteria that I 
can use to evaluate competing conceptions. I also need to suggest criteria of a general kind, 
criteria applicable to the conception of any practice or collection of practices, be it democracy, 
capitalism, secularism, diplomacy, the state, war, world order, the society of states, or a world 
polity. If I instead advanced criteria specific to the conception of a world polity, rather than 
practices in general, it would overly predetermine the question, damaging the ideal of a 
systematic and even handed evaluation, so undermining its ability to persuade participants in the 
world polity debate, regardless of their predispositions. If, for example, I were to claim a world 	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polity must meet a tailor-made criteria like universal comity or hospitality, rather than a general 
criteria like practicality, I would predetermine the features of the concept, making the process of 
evaluation unduly biased to a certain conception. As such, I advance three general criteria that I 
argue can be used to evaluate the conception of any practice, or collection of practices, including 
a world polity. 
To give a sense of my position upfront, the criteria I advance are: comprehensibility, 
coherence, and practicality. These criteria are needed for a conception to be acceptable to 
participants, but also realizable by participants in practice. I explain and defend these proposed 
criteria below, but let me clarify three points presently. First, it is helpful to explain upfront how 
the process of applying these criteria in my conceptual analysis involves eliminating conceptions 
that fail to meet criteria, but also how it narrows the debate down to those few conceptions that 
most successfully meet the criteria. No conception of a practice is perfectly coherent, for 
example, or perfectly practicable under any circumstances. Instead, there are nearly always a 
small number of conceptions that, to an extent, are comprehensible, more or less coherent, and 
practical, etc.. This is why ultimately there are rival conceptions and no single true answer. The 
point of evaluating rivals via the application of criteria is to narrow down the debate to which 
conceptions are successful, and ultimately, which is most successful in meeting my criteria. Yet, 
second, as a conceptual investigation this process of applying criteria, properly conducted, is not 
like screening job applications against criteria. It is not a test-like examination. It is more like 
conceptual design, where available conceptual models are sifted for conceptual features that 
combine into a new more successful conception. In this respect, I am framing my proposed 
criteria in a “discursive pragmatist” approach to conceptual analysis, with inspiration from 
Friedrich Kratochwil’s oeuvre.182 Third, I ground this approach and my proposed criteria in the 
claim that concepts, and self-conceptions in particular, are all contingent on worldviews or 
images, viz. more fundamental conceptions of what “selves” are and conceptions of the cosmos 
more generally.183 Because worldviews are multiple and historical, I am not interested in ‘Truth’ 	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criteria. Concepts have no single immutable meaning. I am interested in tenable and useful 
concepts, ones justifiable by argument and practically applicable to practice. 
I make my case in three steps. First, I ground the argument in the suggestion that 
concepts, and self-conceptions in particular, derive from historically contingent worldviews. 
With this background premise, I assess the need and possibility of establishing criteria with 
which to critically assess rival conceptions of practices in general. Second, I develop discursive 
pragmatism as an approach to conceptual analysis. Third, I propose three criteria and defend 
them against alternatives. This last step takes up the majority of my discussion. 
 
2.2 The Sources of Concepts and Need for Criteria 
 
By a “conception” of a world polity, I mean a position on what features the concept contains and 
how they combine. In other words, the conceptual aspect of the world polity debate, or any 
conceptual debate about practices in general, concerns what features this concept combines and 
what their relations are.184 A practice like democracy, for instance, has several conceptual 
features, including the concatenation of positions, via votes perhaps, and deliberations, with the 
aim of collective decisions. Different conceptions of democracy will emphasize different 
features, and take contrasting positions on how and why they combine to form the concept. This 
is the kind of conceptual debate at the heart of the world polity debate about what collective-self-
conception of all humankind could discursively and practically constitute a world polity of all 
humankind. World polity thinkers generally assert the concept contains the feature of all 
humankind, as well as some kind of political unity of all humankind, but liberal cosmopolitan 
thinkers, for example, also attribute a certain universal morality to the concept, whilst historicist 
cosmopolitans emphasize the feature of a new cosmopolitan world culture, and others emphasize 
a shared planetary habitat. These different positions, in this way, involve disagreement on how 
and why the features of all humankind and a political unity of all humankind combine. 
How can these complicated conceptual debates be evaluated and made sense of? I want to 
suggest establishing criteria is helpful. Without reference to common criteria, differing positions 	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on what a world polity means would be incommensurable, talking past one another. The debate 
would be futile, intractable. The contemporary world polity debate has no established criteria. 
Criteria are needed to establish grounds for critically comparing conceptions as better and worse. 
Establishing criteria is itself not a straightforward question, however, because the general 
question of how to analyze concepts is debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Argument 
about better and worse conceptions, argument about the meaning of concepts, is a significant part 
of Philosophy, but is often referred to as conceptual analysis in the sciences.185 An aspect of 
conceptual analysis is conceptual history, such as conceptual archeology and genealogy, 
developed by Quentin Skinner, Reinhart Koselleck, and Michel Foucault, for example.186 But, in 
this study, I am more interested in what can be done with the concept of a world polity than what 
has been done with it. This is not to say that conceptual histories are not beneficial. Conceptual 
histories divulge the sources of conceptual debates and enlarge our awareness of the various 
ways in which concepts can be used, by supplying a stock of historical examples. Jens 
Bartelson’s conceptual history of ‘world community’, for instance, has demonstrated how 
historical world pictures have shaped the history of the concept, from the ancients and medievals 
to the moderns.187 Different conceptions have their sources in historical worldviews that entail 
different moral purposes, self-conceptions, and cosmologies more generally. Isaiah Berlin once 
made this point in clearer prose in an early essay,  
 
Men’s beliefs in the sphere of conduct are part of their conception of themselves 
and others as human beings; and this conception in its turn, whether conscious or 
not, is intrinsic to their picture of the world… This model or paradigm determines 
the content as well as the form of beliefs and behavior.188 
 
Historically, concepts are made sense of in different ways, for different ends relating to different 
embodied practices that respond to different historical problems, in different ways depending on 
the historical context of worldviews. We can also see how while concepts change, their meanings 
grow, as more and more historical conceptions pile up. Exploring conceptual histories gives a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
186 Mark Bevir The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
187 Jens Bartelson Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
188 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’ in Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays Henry 
Hardy (ed.), (London: Pimlico, 1978), p. 154. 
	   70 
sense of diachronicity that a purely analytical treatment would miss and can benefit from, but the 
point of a conceptual history is to illuminate the background of the contemporary debate. 
Here, one might sense a problem, however. How can common conceptual criteria be 
applied to conceptions that derive from divergent traditions of thought, that articulate different 
strands in a concept’s history? On what Archimedian vantage can overarching criteria reside? I 
am not suggesting there is such a place above or beyond all discourses, but I would draw 
attention to how the predominant positions and their respective cosmologies in the contemporary 
world polity debate are all modern. The conceptions forming the contemporary debate that I am 
scrutinizing in this thesis are shaped by various traditions, but they are all, in one way or another, 
variety of modern traditions, all working within the common discourse of world order.189 This 
common modern frame and common discursive context of world order provides the common 
background on which to establish the criteria needed for critically evaluating competing 
conceptions. 
As such, the discussion here advances a general or methodological understanding of 
social scientific conceptual analysis as itself being a practice.190 The point of the conceptual 
analysis of social concepts, as a practice, is the improvement of practices. Conceptual analysis of 
social concepts helps improve practice by clarifying the features of a practice, the logic by which 
they fit together, and evaluating which forms of a given practice are more and which less 
successful in meeting the aims and ambitions of that practice. The practice under scrutiny, in my 
case, is the aspired practice of a world polity (as vague as that concept and practice presently is), 
itself fitting into the modern discourse and practice of world order. This means the point of a 
conceptual analysis of a world polity, is to improve its practice, by clarifying its meaning. 
 
2.3 Discursive Pragmatism 
 
I need to unpack this further, to specify what it means as an approach. The specific method or 
approach to conceptual analysis I want to use most closely follows Friedrich Kratochwil’s 
oeuvre that combines Wittgenstein’s linguistic contextualism with a pragmatist approach to 	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knowledge.191 To give this approach a name, call it discursive pragmatism. Kratochwil explains, 
his ‘pragmatist approach consists of two elements: the recognition of knowledge generation as a 
social and discursive activity, and the orientation of research toward the generation of useful 
knowledge.’192 In other words, the two principles I am adopting from Kratochwil are: (i) there 
are limits to what a concept can mean, because concepts have meaning only within historically 
contingent discursive contexts, and (ii), the meaning of concepts is always associated with the 
promotion of a ‘use’, good, point, or purpose. In this way, I am interested in what a world polity 
can mean, by illuminating both the limits and the point or purpose of a concept’s meaning in a 
modern context. 
Let me explain further. Kratochwil suggests the point of conceptual analysis as discursive 
pragmatism is to clarify how to “go on”. By clarifying the meaning of social concepts, the 
practices that they are partly constitutive of can be more clearly and pragmatically performed. 
This implies I am not persuaded by or interested in positivist approaches to conceptual analysis 
because, in their ambition to measure and generalize, they negate what makes concepts 
historically specific and meaningful.193 Nor am I interested or persuaded by approaches of 
analytical philosophy that neglect the historical contingency of concepts.194 Neither are my 
criteria designed for deductive arguments, working from first principles, because concepts, as 
historically contingent, have no singular and immutable meanings. Nor is what I am adopting to 
be confused with the methods of dialectics, Arendtian pearl-fishing, or Derrida’s freeplay.195 
What I am suggesting is to be undertaken is not a fusion of ideas, their eclectic assemblage, or 
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free form usage. My proposed approach sets limits to what can be conceptually combined and 
used. It aims to clarity a concept’s meaning by establishing both the point and limits of its use 
within an historically specific discursive context, which, in this case, is the modern discourse of 
world order. At this point, it is worth stating explicitly that I am not primarily and only 
secondarily aiming at attaining an ideal type of a world polity, since that is secondary to the 
principal inquiry of clarifying the concept’s meaning. We need a concept of something before it 
can be ideal-typified. Ideal typification, developed by Max Weber, is a popular approach to 
concept formation in the social sciences. It abstracts an idealized conception of a social 
phenomenon, such as the state or capitalism.196 An idealized abstract conception of a social 
phenomenon is not the same thing as a conception of the phenomenon itself, whose conceptual 
analysis (that determines its features and their relations), is prior to its ideal typification. 
A general point I am making is that conceptual analysis cannot crown a single conception 
as true. There is no true conception to crown. There are only a number of conceptions whose 
defensibility is historically contingent but whose priority in practice has political implications. 
To use W.B. Gallie’s expression, many concepts are ‘essentially contested’ and will remain hotly 
contested so long as the practices that make them significant endure.197 However, to say that 
debate will endure is not the same as saying the debate cannot progress at all. The clarification of 
competing positions, their sources, meaning and the grounds where they converge and diverge, is 
one minimal form of progress, the clarification of the debate’s structure. To establish criteria so 
to clarify which positions are indefensible, to refine defensible ones, and to clarify the 
implications of their application to practice, is another form of progress, an evaluative 
assessment of the debate. Clarifying which conceptions of a world polity provide defensible 
answers, the reasons for favouring one over another, and the implications of doing so, constitutes 
progress in this debate, whose general clarification forms a contribution to the study of world 
order, by clarifying the meaning of one of its major world order proposals, the formation of a 
world polity. This is the kind of contribution that can be made though a conceptual analysis with 
discursive pragmatism. 	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2.4 Three Criteria 
 
From a discursive pragmatist approach to conceptual analysis, the specific criteria I propose for 
appraising and critically comparing social conceptions are three: comprehensibility, coherence, 
and practicality. I unpack and defend these criteria in turn. The presentation of each criterion 
opens with a discussion of its definition, then moves into their defense against alternative 
criteria. 
 
Comprehensibility 
 
By comprehensible, I mean that the concept contains a feature that accounts for how and why a 
concept combines its features and excludes others. Intelligible or meaningful could also be used 
to express what I am getting at here. I use comprehensibility because it conveys what it means to 
grasp a concept, to comprehend what it is and is not about. The meaning of comprehend, as com, 
meaning “together” plus, prehendere, to “grasp”, conveys what I mean as a criteria here, the 
need to be able to grasp or understand how the features of the concept fit together and which 
features do and do not belong to the concept. Crucially, I want to argue that a comprehensible 
concept necessarily involves a feature that when identified provides an account of the concept’s 
point or purpose. What it means to comprehend a concept means not only to grasp what it is and 
is not about, by grasping what the point of using the concept is. 
The features of social concepts are contingent on the point of their use. Their point 
determines the logic of their conceptual combination.198 If a concept has no point to its use, it is 
virtually meaningless, because it is unclear what features it does and does not contain, since there 
is no explanation as to why it includes some features and not others. Overused concepts, 
buzzwords, often become conceptually muddied and confused because they are used for so many 
different purposes. It becomes unclear what features they do and do not contain. To turn to the 
example of chess, what I am arguing is that its features, being the rules and pieces (such as its 
rule that checkmating one’s opponent equals winning the game), are contingent on the point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Connolly The Terms of Political Discourse, ch. 1. 
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playing the game, being the intellectual activity of strategic thinking. 199  Without an 
understanding of the point of playing the game, one would be unable to say for what reasons a 
game lacking kings and the strategic objective of checkmate would or would not count as a game 
of chess. The claim here is that concepts are incomprehensible without a point or purpose. 
This implies two positions on the nature of concepts. It implies the point of the use of 
social concepts is deeply connected to the point of the practice to which they refer because 
people cannot perform a practice well (by fulfilling its point), without grasping its concept. 
Second, these normative aspects of the concept are to be counted amongst the concept’s 
conceptual features and not as conceptual connotations, because the normative point of the 
concept is vital to a comprehensible account of a concept.200 Turning to the concept of a world 
polity, I have been arguing that the point of its use is to legitimate an alternative united world 
order, one befitting a world polity, but there is a debate about what this precisely means because, 
there are rival conceptions of what goods or ends the concept can and should advance. I am not 
suggesting some or all of these conceptions are problematic because they fail to grasp some 
single and a-temporal point to the use of the concept under question. By proposing a criterion of 
comprehensibility, I am suggesting some of the conceptions fail to contain a defensible point, or 
perhaps any point at all. Some might embrace a point that is self-defeating or impossible to attain 
in practice. Others falter in theory, when the point they embrace is shown to be internally 
incoherent and self-contradictory. Others can be shown to have feet of clay when their empirical 
assumptions are invalid. 
The chief alternative criterion to comprehensibility is conceptual completeness, a 
conception that combines the sum total of its conceptual features, a conception lacking no 
conceptual features. I do not adopt this criterion because the pursuit of completeness cannot 
come to fully grasp the meaning of a concept, since the analysis of completeness can seem to go 
on ad infinitum, as each analyzed feature produces more sub-features in turn.  Eventually it 
exhausts itself in aporia, where the meaning of the concept is enlarged but remains elusive. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 For this example, see, Mervyn Frost Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 95. For a further helpful discussion of inquiry into the point of social 
practices in international relations see, Martin Hollis, ‘The Last Post?’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 
301-308. 
200 Connolly The Terms of Political Discourse, p. 22-35. Felix E. Oppenheim held the opposed and mistaken 
position that normative features can be considered connotations whose application to the concept was a matter of 
opinion. See, Oppenheim Political Concepts: A Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981). 
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second alternative to comprehensibility is value-independence, which might be construed as the 
objectivity needed for defensible concepts. A criterion of value-independence misses the point of 
a conceptual analysis, however, which is the clarification of a concept’s features and how they 
relate. Value-independent conceptions fall short of this aim, because they are inherently 
meaningless, lacking a normative point to their use. The exclusion of conceptual features that 
invite normative evaluations, like the attribution of order to society, or class conflict, 
impoverishes the concept, because the point of a given social concept’s use always involves a 
normative aspect. 
A few clarifications need to be made. If competing conceptions are getting at different 
points, are they conceptions of the same thing at all? Is the debate terminological, not 
conceptual? Would it not be easier to dissolve the debate by assigning competing conceptions 
distinct names? This line of thinking forgets that these conceptions conflict when applied to the 
practice that they conceive. Competing conceptions entail divergent versions of a practice, 
promoting distinct and often conflicting goods, with the different conceptions of the point or 
purpose of that practice. Although the visions of a reformed world order that contemporary 
world polity thinkers convey share some common features, a great deal hangs on whether its 
point is conceived as the fulfillment of moral obligations, common values, common interests, 
social justice, and so on. In this regard, a conceptual analysis that clarifies the implications of 
promoting one vision over another informs our understanding of what is at stake in the discourse 
and practice of world order and what role the idea of a world polity can defensibly play 
therein.201 
 
Coherence 
 
By coherence, I mean internal and external consistency of the features that combine to form a 
concept. Internal consistency means the non-contradiction of the features that a concept 
combines. External consistency means non-contradiction between a conception and other 
concepts in its discursive context. For the concept of a world polity, its external consistency 
chiefly concerns the concepts that form the discourse of world order, such as the state, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 I am indebted to Stefano Guzzini’s insight that concepts have roles to perform, in Power, Realism and 
Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013), Part I. 
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international society, and global governance. I adopt the criterion of coherence for two reasons. 
First, the meanings of concepts are not insular, but also depend on how they are distinguished 
from other concepts.202 Seeking external coherence helps clarify the meaning of concepts. 
Second, if a concept is incoherent this often indicates that the concept conflates different things. 
A conception of a world polity that combines the features of say, global social harmony with 
global social conflict, is internally incoherent, since this entails two different contradictory 
things. To give an example of external inconsistency, say, a feature of a world polity is said to be 
the political unity of humankind. This would necessarily mean it must somehow be reconciled 
with the concept of the society of states, because this concept implies a plurality of political 
units. These concepts are often reconciled in different ways, either the society of states is said to 
exist and a world polity does not, the reverse, the two exist in a mutually supporting relation, or 
the two are said to exist side by side. Even though these are two concepts, their coherence is 
interrelated. A tenable conception of a world polity needs to have consistency amongst its 
internal features and between it and its relevant concepts in the discourse of world order. As 
such, coherence cannot be applied trans-historically, because coherence is a moving target across 
historically shifting webs of belief. It depends on the shifting web of discursive meanings that 
form the context of a given concept. As Richard Rorty has argued, the traditional philosophical 
ambition of discerning the ‘true’ trans-historical meaning of concepts is futile because concepts 
are historically contingent human creations, as amenable and prone to change as any other.203 
The point is that because our concepts are contingent on our wider webs of beliefs and discourse, 
they must be coherent, not only internally, but also within their historical discursive context. 
Contained within the criterion of coherence, is the requirement of valid empirical 
assumptions, by which I mean that a concept’s empirical assumptions are widely held to be 
factually correct. By factually correct, I mean propositions that are widely held to be accurate. 
Because of this need for assumptions to be consistent with empirical facts, this criterion is a kind 
of coherence. That is, if the empirical assumptions of a concept’s features are invalid, then so is 
the attribution of those features. However, while I am adopting the criterion of coherence, with 
valid empirical assumptions as a sub-category, but I am not adopting empirical verification. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Kratochwil, ‘Of False Promises and Good Bets’, p. 4. 
203 Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Donald 
Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, 47 (1974), p. 5–20; Chris Brown, ‘Turtles All the Way Down’: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory 
and International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23:2 (1994), pp. 213-236. 
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empirical verification, is meant the correspondence between concepts and confirming empirical 
facts. I do not pursue an empirical verification of the concept of a world polity because that 
would miss the point that the evidence that its verification would assess depends on what it 
means. Correspondence between fact and concept does not confirm the concept’s validity. It only 
confirms that it is not invalid. The question of meaning is primary. 
This discussion raises the alternative criteria of conceptual precision that I do not adopt. 
Conceptual precision is advocated by positivist approaches to conceptual analysis. Giovani 
Sartori, for example, treats concepts instrumentally as dependent or independent ‘variables’ or 
‘data containers’ whose definition aims at their general application across cases and their 
measurable operationalization and coding.204 The more precise the concept, the more amenable 
data is to coding and measuring. With this aim, positivist conceptual analyses attempt to strip 
concepts of their historical baggage and normative point to produce ‘neutral’ or minimal 
definitions. This is a very unhelpful approach to evaluating the application of concepts to 
practice, however.205 A crucial distinction to make is between a concept and a word. Words have 
definitions and specific senses, depending on their contextual use, but concepts have debated 
meanings and the character of being essentially contested, to use Gallie’s classic expression.206 
Concepts potentially encompass all the aspects of their context, because it is debated as to what 
features they do and do not combine. Conceptual debates are about the meaning of concepts 
because there is no agreed definition like a word, since the meaning of concepts has significant 
implications for practice. By treating concepts as variables or data containers, positivist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Guidelines for Concept Analysis’, in Giovani Sartori (ed.), Social Science Concepts: A 
Systematic Analysis (London: Sage, 1984), pp. 15-88. 
205 The Sartori positivist approach is also problematic for its own ambition of measurement. The minimal definitions 
it attempts to fashion are caught in a dilemma of being too abstract to be measurable or too specific to be generally 
applicable. This dilemma usually results in a compromised definition that resides not too far up or down the ladder 
of abstraction. This dilemma is a major limitation of positivist approaches to conceptual analysis because it makes a 
neutral or minimal definition, devoid of historical connotations, only possible at the highest levels of abstraction, 
which makes it so vacuous as to be unfit for coding and measuring. See, Mark Bevir and Asaf Kedar, ‘Concept 
Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology’, Perspectives on Politics 
6:3 (2008), pp. 503-517; This point has also been fruitfully made in the literature of International Relations by 
Stefano Guzinni, ‘The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis’, in Guzinni Power, Realism and 
Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013) p. 221-222. For the ladder of abstraction, see, James N. Rosenau and 
Mary Durfee Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World 2nd Edition (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2000), p. 1-6. 
206 The distinction between a word and a concept is made by Reinhart Koselleck, in, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and Social 
History’, in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 
85; W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-1956), pp. 167-
198. 
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approaches to conceptual analysis are unable to study why and how the social practices, that 
these concepts are constitutive of, are themselves significant and problematic. They cannot study 
the political significance of concepts.207 The primary aims of this thesis are not to measure 
whether and to what degree and extent a world polity exists, either as an explanandum or as an 
explananda of something else. The aims are to clarify the meaning of the concept, to discern and 
evaluate what world order proposals it is potentially constitutive of. 
The reason for the degree of debate surrounding the meaning of concepts is not fuzzy 
thinking. It is not the inability to clearly understand the different conceptions by participants in 
the debate, or the inability to understand the essential “real” meaning of the concept. It is the 
social and political stakes that the use of the concept involves, stakes that only become clearer 
the more the rival conceptions are articulated. When concepts change in popular discourse, there 
is generally a corresponding change in practice. Such are the practical stakes of discursive 
debates. Likewise, when social and political practices change, there is generally a change in their 
conception and surrounding discourse.208 In the case of social and political concepts, the reason 
there is such a relation between concepts and practices is because practices cannot be performed 
without their relevant concept. Without the concept of democracy, for example, could people 
vote and make collective decisions on a regular basis? This is not to say that the concept is the 
same thing as the practice, but the comprehension of the concept is necessary for the 
performance of the practice.209 As I argued in the introduction, what is at stake in the world 
polity debate is the practice of world order, whether and if how and by what means humankind 
can be ordered as a single worldwide polity. 
Here, an objection arises from an anthropological approach to conceptual analysis. The 
charge is that without participatory observation of world order practice, how am I to know how 
the concept is conceived? By only engaging the texts and discourse of the world polity debate, so 
the charge goes, I am blind to the concept’s use in practice and so cannot ascertain its full 
meaning. The anthropological criterion here can be called conceptual accuracy, that is, how 
accurately it conveys the concept’s meaning to participants in practice. The intervention 
overstates the importance of practice in this case however. The textual debate both draws on and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Guzinni, ‘The Concept of Power’, p. 221-222. 
208 See, Quentin Skinner, ‘Language and Political Change’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson 
(eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 6-23. 
209 Morten Skumsrud Andersen and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Practices as Models: A Methodology with an Illustration 
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informs its use in practice because discourse encompasses practice and is not divorced from it. 
Furthermore, this charge of inaccuracy to use in practice forgets that the real action of the world 
polity debate is at the level of discourse, because the concept of an international system 
predominates the practice of world order today. If this connection between discourse and practice 
holds, a benefit of engaging the textual debate is that it articulates the concept’s meaning in a 
deliberately clearer and systematic manner.  
 
Practicality 
 
The third and last criterion I propose, for a conception to be considered tenable and useful, is 
practicality. By practicality, I mean that the point of a concept’s use is attainable in practice. 
Impracticality can arise in two ways. Either the features of the concept defeat its point or the 
point cannot be achieved in practice under any circumstances. 
 For an example of the first form of conceptual impracticality, we can return again to 
chess. If its point is the intellectual stimulation of strategic thinking, then chess cannot contain 
such features as arm wrestling or dice, because strength and luck are not conducive to strategic 
thinking. If chess were to somehow incorporate these features, they would diminish if not 
extirpate strategic thinking from the gameplay and so would diminish and even defeat the point 
of playing the game. This is the way in which the features of a concept contradict one another to 
such a degree that it undermines the practice that the concept furnishes. 
 To clarify the second way conceptions can be impractical, let me bring in Plato’s 
Republic. Plato’s penchant for concepts as ideal forms might suggest a disinterest with their 
practicality, but even Plato was concerned with practicality. In his account of Socrates’s 
conception of a just city, set out in Book IV, the point of the city is justice, taken to mean 
everyone performing the role they are fit to do and not another’s. A state with “the money-
making, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing what’s appropriate, each minding its own business 
in a city –would be justice and would make the city just.”210 In Book V, however, Socrates is 
assailed by Polemarchus, Adiemantus, and Glaucon with the doubt that such a city is possible in 
practice. Socrates is taken aback, momentarily, by the trouble this doubt raises, because, he says,  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Plato The Republic 2nd Edition, Allan Bloom (trans.), (London: Basic Books, 1991), p. 113, Book IV, 434c. 
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For, it could be doubted that the things said are possible; and, even if, in the best 
possible conditions, they could come into being, that they would be what is best 
will also be doubted. So that is why there’s a certain hesitation about getting 
involved in it [the doubts about practicality], for fear that the argument might seem 
to be a prayer, my dear comrade.211 
 
If his interpretation of the point of the city as justice were found to be impractical, Socrates was 
aware, then its validity would be doubtful, since it might seem to be a utopian dream, impossible 
under any circumstances. Even Plato, a philosopher of ideal forms and conceptual abstraction, 
acknowledged the importance of practicality in his dialogue. 
 I draw this criterion of practicality from Kratochwil’s pragmatist writings and the much 
earlier contributions of Charles Taylor to the idea of theory as a practice. Taylor, amongst others, 
argues the conceptual work of social theories involves interpreting the point of social concepts 
and the practices they animate, such as democracy, law, and so on. For this reason, as Taylor and 
others argue, social theories are not verified via correspondence between theory and practice.212 
Rather, they are validated by contributing to the achievement of a practice’s point in practice. In 
his words, 
 
our social theories can be validated, because they can be tested in practice. … What 
makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption 
makes possible what is in some sense a more effective practice.213 
 
Valid social concepts, ones that are tenable and useful, articulate the point of a practice that is 
achievable in practice. I am suggesting a conception is impractical if the point of its use is 
impossible to attain in practice, or if some of its additional features defeat the concept’s point in 
practice. The alternative criterion to practicality is truth, in a non-pragmatist sense. But, as I have 
argued above, there is no ‘True’ conception to discern, because our concepts are historically 
contingent. Conceptual analysis cannot crown a concept as sovereignly true, since there is none 	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to crown, only a number of potential meanings to a concept in a discourse, amongst which some 
are more and some are less comprehensible, coherent, and practical. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I suggested that a concept is needed before it can be ideal-typified and that 
criteria are needed in order to critically evaluate the competing conceptions that make up the 
world polity debate. Ideal-types are made by intensifying the features of a concept, abstracting 
what the extreme instantiation of the concept would be, then asking, retroactively, how such the 
given concept (be it the state, capitalism, or some such thing) became historically conceivable 
and what its preconditions were, e.g. the protestant ethic as a precondition of capitalism. In the 
case of the world polity, I have argued because the world polity’s practical realization is located 
in the future, ideal type analysis does not quite help answer my questions, does not quite work 
for this study. The world polity is a proactive, not a retroactive question. A concept is first 
needed before its ideal type can be defined and analyzed. As such, I developed a distinct 
approach in this chapter. This approach works towards a clarified conception that in its 
abstraction and generality resembles an “ideal type”, but the approach moves towards the 
conception with a different method, making ideal-typification a secondary not primary approach. 
With the suggestion that our conceptions are contingent on our historically contingent world 
image I have developed Kratochwil’s approach of discursive pragmatism and defended three 
criteria whose conditions of satisfaction are historically contingent. Because the meaning of 
concepts is limited by their discursive context, and because the meaning of concepts is tied to the 
point of their use, I have critiqued the alternative criteria of precision, accuracy, empirical 
verification, completeness, and value-independence, all of which fail to recognize the 
significance of context and purpose for the meaning of concepts, social concepts and collective-
self-conceptions in particular. In support, I have suggested conceptual analysis cannot declare a 
True meaning to the concept of a world polity, because there is none to declare, and that debate 
will persist so long as the practice and discourse of world order remains significant. However, I 
have argued that progress can be made by distinguishing and clarifying conceptions, refuting 
indefensible conceptions, and evaluating their implications for practice. 
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 Here ends my preparations, where I established a general theory of world polity 
formation and developed a method of conceptual analysis to analyze competing conceptions that 
articulate rival ways that the collective-self-narrative of a world polity can hang together. What I 
am looking for in this study are visions of how a world polity can be conceived within the limits 
of its discursive horizons, its conceptual boundaries, if you will, how far they can be stretched, 
bent, reimagined, so to speak. Part of the analysis of each current of world polity thinking 
involves the comparison of its sub-currents and specific expressions made by different thinkers. 
This is important because, to avoid straw men, a condition of the application of my criteria 
involves the micro-analysis of establishing the clearest and most charitable expression of each 
position in the debate. In this respect, every text has limitations, but the point is to explore their 
conceptual potentials, to draw out their most profitable expressions and extensions to the vision 
of a world polity, so to sift all these currents of thought for the features of the most successful 
conception of a world polity in the contemporary context. It is also important to clarify upfront 
that the criteria are not applied formulaically or mechanistically like a checklist. The task is not 
an audit. It is a conceptual investigation about uncovering and identifying a new conceptual 
vision that stands up against established criteria, which involves sifting the range of conceptions 
and conceptual features that work and work together, expanding on the ideas on offer, extending 
them as best they might be, even though their principal thinkers have not explicitly done so 
themselves. All the criteria matter in the analysis, even though practicality matters most, most 
often, but the criteria are not applied formulaically. It is not a mechanistic rote activity. This is 
because, in the analysis, I develop charitable readings of different conceptual positions, and 
attempt to fix up and clarify conceptions in their defense, as I search for the conception that most 
successfully meets the stated criteria. It is not a mechanistic process, where available conceptions 
are screened and eliminated or advanced, but rather a critical conceptual investigation, drawing 
out what works and makes sense, from what does not, then seeing how these things match up and 
to what extent they support and hold up a larger vision, like architectural design, thinking the 
question of a world polity through, with a conceptual investigation, focusing on the most tenable 
and useful conception of a world polity above all, by dissecting, comparatively testing, 
cannibalizing, and reformulating the available conceptions towards a new more tenable and 
useful conception. Each chapter, gathering a current of thought, forms an inductive case, 
producing a general concept from critically investigating particular conceptions. What features of 
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the concept can be combined, which not, which aims or uses of the concept are defensible, which 
not? In this way, the question that we identified in Chapter 1, the question of what collective-
self-conception can hang the world polity together, this question has been specified in this 
chapter; its meaning has been defined, with the establishment of three criteria for a tenable and 
useful answer. 
 As noted in the introductory chapter, I have selected four currents of world polity thought 
to address, each prominent in the literature and discourse: the moralist often Kantian inspired 
cosmopolitan tradition of devising universal moral codes, the critical emancipatory tradition that 
seeks maximally emancipated conditions, the more recent anti-foundationalist and sociological 
global civil society literature, and, fourth, ecological and space ship earth conceptions forming a 
planetary polity current of thought. These currents of contemporary world polity thought form 
the most prominent positions in the world polity debate. There are many tributaries and 
unconnected channels beyond these currents, that I strive to recognize and acknowledge along 
the way, but, together, the four broad currents selected form the widest and deepest waterways in 
contemporary world polity thought. Taking these four channels together amounts to a first but 
significant step towards a further wider investigation. It is a significant step, as comprehensive as 
possible within the time and space limitations, and, moreover, the search is for the conceptual 
features that any conception must necessarily attain for a world polity to be realizable in practice. 
In this way, even though there may be conceptions held in remote contexts and unknown texts, 
say an indigenous tale unknown to myself, or an unknown philosopher’s treatise, or indeed 
Zeno’s lost Republic, the method of analysis I am using does not require the evaluation of every 
conception, but suffices with a wide range of conceptions from the contemporary context that 
stimulate the conceptual search for the necessary conceptual features that any thinker working 
within this modern context must necessarily reach according to established criteria. In the 
following chapters, I evaluate the major positions in the contemporary world polity debate, 
starting with the most prominent and developed moral universalist conceptions, working towards 
the increasingly novel and complex conceptions. I tie these investigations together in a chapter 
on implications. 
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Chapter Three. 
The Community of Humankind 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A community of all humankind has always existed, moral thinkers have argued.214 They are not 
wrong. Because there are things that harm and help every human being, because they are human 
beings there are universal human goods and bads. From this exists that universal community, felt 
more intuitively than rationally, more innately than intellectually, by everyone, because they are 
human. But, because it is so intrinsically human, because it is felt in such a taken-for-granted 
way, it is only witnessed or recognized in exceptional circumstances, where we feel something is 
profoundly wrong or profoundly right. When, for example, Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants 
were abandoned to the sea by every state in the region, and standers-by fishermen were moved to 
help, one later explained, 
 
I was very surprised with what I saw on the boat … It was crammed with people ... 
I was speechless and breaking down into tears when watching them screaming, 
waving hands and cloth … I could not have let them die, because they are also 
human beings, just like me. I am grateful to be able to save hundreds of lives.215 
 
This is how the community of humankind becomes visible. It is important to remember the 
response to the holocaust as one of these moments as well, when the community of humankind 
was recognized in the West.216 
I know most of you are unpersuaded, so strong is the intellectual preeminence of moral 
relativism and skepticism in contemporary culture, and there is good reason for this, but my 
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point in this chapter is that even if this moral community of humankind exists, saying what 
should be made of it is another question. Even if a universal human law was universally 
recognized to exist, agreement on its meaning would not follow, since nothing is clear in the law. 
Diverging interpretations and conflicting uses follow even from the law; the most painstakingly 
clarified and refined use of language. It is not always clear what to make of laws, even laws 
rooted in our very human nature, or those given by prophets, or those gifted by the most coherent 
reasoning of the most enlightened and eloquent philosophers.217 The existence of universally 
hazardous and universally needed things does not tell us how to order humankind. That is the 
myth of moralism, the false promise of universal moral codes. The question of how to be, of the 
good order, matters, indeed, but not only because different ends conflict in practice, within single 
lives, whole societies, amongst civilizations, and within the community of all humankind. The 
question matters because the ends for which we live make all the difference for which goods and 
ills we make use of in ordering our lives, individual and collective. To come to grips with how 
the community of humankind is to be best ordered together, I want to argue that a larger story 
about who we are and who we want to be is needed, and to find that kind of collective-self-
narrative, I argue further, a new kind of narrative is needed, a narrative of narratives. The content 
of that meta-narrative remains elusive, but in this chapter I want to begin to clarify how it might 
be articulated. 
 I first explore the cosmopolitan schemes for global democracy, but find they fail to offer 
practical collective narratives. This leads, second, to an exploration of minimalist cosmopolitan 
universalisms and the idea of human dignity as a source of human belonging and as a 
foundational world order principle. I find dignity appealing as ideal, but not up to the job, 
because of the conflict that arises when unavoidable attempts to define dignities are made, when 
it is applied to practice. Third, I consider the more promising cosmopolitan visions that 
emphasize the values of coexistence and dialogue, which leads to an exploration of a meta-
collective-self-narrative for humankind. I conclude by pointing the way towards the horizons of 
critical emancipatory theory as a potential aid in the search for such a world polity narrative. 
 
3.2 Cosmopolitan Democracy and Citizenship 	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Right off, it is important to recognize in what bad shape universal cosmopolitanism is today. The 
idea that everyone has rights is not entirely controversial today, but which rights matter most is 
debated in the context of a post-colonial and globalizing world, where the immense plurality of 
vigorously defended human cultures is an unavoidable fact of life.218 Whose cosmopolitanism 
are we to favour?219 Cosmopolitan politics today is not the perseverance of the cosmopolitan 
universals over the particulars, of the one over the many; it is a battlefield of shifting alliances 
amongst different competing cosmopolitanisms.220 Whether universal moral obligations exist or 
not, there exists a politics and philosophical debate today about which universal rights and duties 
matter most and why.221 
In this context, many cosmopolitans have attempted to clarify and prioritize only the most 
basic and undeniable human properties, the essential features of being human that ground or 
constitute the lives and communities of human beings. Yet, we also need to appreciate how self-
defeating and problematic the agenda of deriving the rules of a cosmopolitan order from basic 
human needs and essential features might be, how self-contradictory the ambition of a 
cosmopolitan moral code is. The cosmopolitan nature of the community of humankind, the 
source of its visibility, is a gut feeling, an undeniable bodily reaction that compels action, even 
and especially in disregard of rules and obstacles. Cosmopolitanism involves a disregarding of 
doxa, because it evokes something gut-wrenchingly felt to be universal. Legislating these 
cosmopolitan acts, making a bureaucratic ministry of cosmopolitan affairs, takes much of wind 
out of the whole thing. If these laws were passed, and their bureaucratic administration was 
established, they would be subject to the same disregard by cosmopolitan acts. This is what 
Derrida was getting at in the contradiction between hospitality as a cosmopolitan act and 
hospitality as a cosmopolitan law.222 The community of humankind is in us, not in rules.223 It is 	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in human beings so intimately, in such a taken-for-granted way, innately, because it derives from 
our human nature, from being human, not a set of rules or moral calculemus. Cosmopolitan rules 
and the cosmopolitan community of humankind are not the same things. When cosmopolitan 
norms becomes the enforceable norm, they potentially become subject to the same guttural 
objections that this or that rule does not apply or is invalid on moral grounds. Moreover, and 
perhaps more damaging to the case for cosmopolitan codes, is the inability of codes of conduct 
to adjudicate conflicts and dilemmas, the inability of rules to themselves produce judgments, 
because of the need for more than the rules to produce a judgment where rules conflict. We also 
need to appreciate how the codification of universal cosmopolitan rules do not in themselves tell 
us the rules of their proper enforcement.224 
Despite these challenges, some unabashedly liberal cosmopolitans like David Held, 
Daniele Archibugi, and Luis Cabrera press for a cosmopolitan world order, as a matter of 
principle, as the demand of a just world order.225 They make use of the doctrines of human rights 
and cosmopolitan obligation and advance democratic world government proposals.226 They push 
forward towards a cosmopolitan world order, despite the empirical absence of a consensus on the 
proper goals and aspirations of humankind as a whole, because they suggest, implicitly, that it is 
better to resolve disagreements as technical problems along the way.227 To grasp the visions of 
these thinkers, imagine a modern liberal democracy on a world scale, a World Union with more 
hierarchical authority and unity than the United Nations and experiments in regional unity 	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practiced today. Their visions entail the full range of modern democratic institutions and 
practices, a world parliament, an expanded International Criminal Court and International Court 
of Justice, a system of wealth redistribution, perhaps a permanent peace keeping force, and a 
world demos with world citizenship.228 
Yet, still, the basis of this world demos is a problematic weak spot in this vision. We might 
say that the old problem of defining the demos can be overstepped if all humankind is taken to be 
the ultimate demos, as Anacharsis Cloots argued.229 But, the existence of conflict and moral 
discord amongst the members of that demographically universal demos is still a practical 
problem.230 Establishing a global democracy and constituting a cohesive world polity are not the 
same things. A demos involves the collective agency and collective identity of a democratic 
people that upholds a common democratic government.231 We can recall Tocqueville, 
 
Bring two men together in society, give to these two men the same interests and in 
part the same opinions; if their character, their enlightenment and their civilization 
differ, there is a great chance that they will not get along. The same remark is 
applicable to a society of nations.232 
 
If all humankind were to hoist up the kind of global democracy and global government and 
citizenship that Held, Archibugi, and Cabrera call for, it would not practically workout, no matter 
how carefully devised, if social cohesion is not also developed to overcome inevitable conflicts, 
to foster the willful acceptance of the democratic majority, to generate the civic mindedness of 
burden-sharing to help fellow citizen strangers. A collective-self-conception constituting a 
collective identity is needed to accept a global tax scheme for instance, to accept the sharing of 
burdens, to legitimate the government of a global democracy. 
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On this score, Held has in places found support in the vision of a global civil society, 
extending solidarities across global scales. Yet, the vision of a global civil society is more of an 
ambition than a reality today. I consider the global civil society vision in more detail in chapter 
5, but the point here is that a support of such a sociological basis is needed for a global 
democracy. Not only is there an empirical lack of consensus on the appropriate goals of a global 
government today, but there is also a lack of the in-it-together feeling of belonging needed to 
shoulder it. By belonging, I mean a sense of “fitting in”, a feeling that one is properly a part of 
the polity, national or cosmopolitan, and, ideally, the mutual feeling of being understood in 
everyday life because of how one “fits in” by sharing common horizons of understanding and 
some basic practices.233 This sense of togetherness, fitting together as a “we”, has innumerable 
forms, but it is vital to have for polities to legitimate hierarchies, by connecting collective ideals 
and ambitions to embodied narratives of belonging, giving authorities a justified purpose and 
role. It is this sense of belonging connected to collective ideals that also legitimates the burden-
sharing of costs and sacrifices that any polity requires to function and which any government 
must legislate to govern effectively. Taxes, the disruptions of major building projects, war 
contributions, etc., all require legitimation. There exists no real sense of cosmopolitan belonging 
or togetherness that a world government would practically need to govern. This is perhaps 
especially the case of democratic governments.234 Today, only privileged elites at times find a 
sense of cosmopolitan togetherness, and even then it is aspirational and inchoate, lacking a 
genuine taken-for-grantedness, being a young and unclear sensibility that elites want to expand 
and realize, but struggle to articulate in a way that is meaningful and practically realizable for 
humankind on a global scale. 
The narrative of cosmopolitan rights and obligations, for instance, is practically 
problematic in a world with multiple interpretations. Forming a world demos needs a different 
larger narrative than one based on the universality of democratic legitimacy. For progressive 
advocates of global democracy, pointing out the need for a moral consensus and greater sense of 
togetherness might seem like stick-in-the-mud stubbornness, but it is not a desire for a perfect 
unity getting in the way of better world. Common goals and a sense of togetherness are 	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necessary requirements for the stability and practical possibility of the cosmopolitan democratic 
world order proposals on offer here. Without a practical sense of belonging, how could a global 
democracy function? 
Held and Archibugi might suggest that these questions about human rights, citizen duties, 
and distributive justice ought to be settled through global democratic processes. Perhaps the 
practice of democracy can itself produce the searched for sense of belonging, over time, across 
generations. For the sake of argument, let us say that, in time, the inculcation of a world 
community feeling and practice of world citizenship could arise, say, perhaps in two generations 
time. But, then, what kind of society would or could arise? What would come to be conceived? 
Because there are multiple and often-times conflicting cosmopolitanisms, because they are not 
mutually supporting, we need to think clearly about the principles, values, goals, and the 
collective-self-conceptions defining the common good that a cosmopolitan government would 
both promote and require.235 These questions need to be answered more clearly to legitimate a 
democratic world government, and agreement on them, to some extent, is vital for its practical 
realization. 
 
3.3 Human Goods, Dignity, and Belonging 
 
A different cosmopolitan route to imagining a world polity is about getting down to the basic 
human goods and moral principles that humankind ought to fulfill because they are meant to 
connect all humankind into a web of obligations, obligations that can be thought to issue from a 
“global community of human beings.”236 This route is philosophical, using logical premises to 
identify basic human goods and needs, so to reveal a moral world of obligations encompassing 
humankind and legitimating a unity of humankind. This variety of visions is lucidly stated, with 
philosophical precision, often producing towering achievements of reasoning. There is a 
potential in this literature, to extend visions of distributive justice to establish the basis of a 
unifying world polity conception. Yet, as a route, it struggles against the practical disagreements 
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and genuine conflicts of ideals and interests that would threaten to cripple a world polity. It has 
yet to articulate a narrative, that is, that all would be able to accept and practically achieve.   
We can examine conceptions of a moral world community developed by Charles Beitz 
and Thomas Pogge, for instance, who applied John Rawl’s Theory of Justice to the question of 
global distributive justice. These visions are carefully conceived. They argue that because 
humankind is in a global condition increasingly like a single polity, where its members have 
equal worth, humankind is bound by the obligations of distributive justice that would apply to 
people living in a single polity. That is, because humankind is increasingly in the condition of a 
single cooperative scheme, moral principles of cooperative schemes thus apply to all humankind. 
Beitz claimed, ‘the international realm is coming more and more to resemble domestic society in 
many of the features usually thought relevant to the justification of (domestic) political 
principles.’237 And Pogge suggested, ‘A global institutional scheme is imposed by all of us on 
each of us.’238 Brian Barry advanced an equivalent outlook, but relied less on Rawlsian thought 
experiment, because he took unity to be a basic starting point not needing undue justification.239 
The kind of conception of a moral world community at play in this literature is also somewhat 
evident if not so clearly conceived in the charity and development world, in movements like 
Oxfam, Band Aid, and the Global Citizen Project, for instance. Even though this outlook does 
not usually advocate a politically united world polity, it is helpful for illuminating unrecognized 
principles and obligations surrounding humankind in a global context, for providing reasons for 
the equitable global distributions of a world polity. Its universal moral principles can be seen to 
have some potential extension to the world polity question. 
Yet, they struggle against genuine conflicts of ideals and interests, and their focus on 
distributive justice raises difficulties for resolving conflicts between competing goods and moral 
dilemmas. Without a more thoroughgoing sense of belonging than the empirical fact of global 
economic interdependence, how are questions beyond distributive justice to be reconciled, how 
can security issues or political and religious doctrines be handled and be balanced against issues 
of just distributions, for instance? Even in a hypothetical world of abundance and equitable 
wealth distribution, the values and goals animating alternative ways of life would still divide 	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humankind in practice. The existence of a global capitalist system might imply certain moral 
obligations, but these are not really enough to unify humankind into a single polity, it only 
creates a condition suggesting the need for and benefits of unity, the interpretation of which will 
have multiple answers. Nearly all humankind is engaged in a single global capitalist system and 
this creates some ground for ethical consideration in its practice, but beyond the condition of 
economic unity, more agreement on common goals and a larger collective-self-narrative is 
required for a practically realizable world polity.240 
Beyond the distributive justice specific visions, we can examine Simon Caney’s more 
wide-ranging application of liberal cosmopolitan principles to world order questions. His Justice 
Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory is an impressive study, outlining a political theory 
based on universal moral principles. His position argues from first principles, chiefly that if it is 
accepted that there are universal morals, the question is which universal morals are there, to 
which he provides the answer of a, ‘liberal brand of cosmopolitanism’.241 Beyond schemes of 
global distributive justice, Caney also argues his approach legitimates supra-polity cosmopolitan 
political institutions. The difficulty here, however, is that even though we might accept the 
premise that there are universal morals, it is unpersuasive to say that modern liberal 
cosmopolitanism (however minimally defined) is the definition of those universal morals. First, 
it is culturally specific, even though it claims to be universal, which at least challenges its 
coherence as universal. There are multiple cosmopolitanisms in practice, liberal cosmopolitanism 
being one amongst many. Second, the universalization of one culture is impossible to achieve in 
practice. Even if it articulates a valid and universal moral system in theory, it is impractical to 
extend it to a vision of world unity in a modern and global context where multiple universalisms 
collide and where populations have been mobilized to defend their independent national and 
cultural ways of life. 
We can also examine the arguments of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, who have 
championed an alternative approach, that struggles when extended to a world polity vision. They 
attempt to legitimate the provision of people with what people need to fully exercise their 
capabilities and meet their full potential in life. This might be thought of as a way to unite 
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humankind, in a narrative about our shared human capabilities and potentials. Nussbaum lists ten 
human capabilities and comes to the conclusion that,  
 
The situation of people (whoever they are, at any given time) whose quality of life 
is especially low, as measured by the capabilities list, should therefore be a 
persistent focus of attention for the world community as a whole: not just for 
institutions but for all individuals who are not themselves unusually burdened.242 
 
So the argument goes that, “if human beings have such entitlements, then we are all under a 
collective obligation to provide the people of the world with what they need.”243 Because all 
human beings share certain capabilities, we might think of humankind as one world community 
responsible for the necessities that human capabilities require. Yet, this argument does not help 
us navigate the conflicts between rival ways of life, rival and conflicting uses of human 
capabilities, individual and collective. What of the conflict amongst different kinds of political 
regimes, for instance, secular and non-secular, democratic and authoritarian? Different ways of 
life, individual and collective, have different conflicting needs in practice. I do not mean to 
exaggerate the conflict that exists in practice, but in the context of a ‘shrinking’ and ‘mixing’ 
world we cannot coherently or practically ignore the existence of conflicts, and important ones, 
across humankind. Some greater agreement or consensus on common goals is needed for 
starters, which might be gathered into a collective identity. 
Peter Singer, particularly in his book One World, offers an alternative, utilitarian, basis 
for the obligations of a cosmopolitan world community. In an increasingly interdependent world, 
he claims, ‘we are beginning to live in a global community.’244 For Singer, the greatest happiness 
is a globally interdependent affair. The utility calculation, for Singer, is global, not local. The 
main conceptual problem here, however, is that the existence of utility interdependence does not 
tell us what goods ought to be prioritized. The utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number must be rejected as the underlying point of the idea of a world polity, 
because there is no consensus on the meaning of happiness, and so no means to calculate it. To 	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reject it, we do not need to rely on Rawls’s liberal criticism that utilitarianism treats whole 
societies as individuals, at the expense of the individual.245 Utilitarianism, broadly conceived, 
contains the insight that goods conflict. Some kind of moral reasoning is needed; choices of 
utility are necessary. But the idea of happiness is debated and does not get out of the problem, 
moreover, because the different goods that are conducive to different conceptions of happiness 
are also incommensurable and incomparable in practice.246 A world polity might be the polity of 
the greatest number but its happiness is incalculable because there are no overarching scales to 
weigh conflicting goods with. 
If the idea of happiness is too debated, we can turn to the idea of human dignity that is 
increasingly thought of as a basic human good around which the world should be ordered, and 
around which a common narrative of humankind could be crafted.247 It is thought that anything 
more definite than this general ideal of dignity would force people to be themselves, according to 
someone else’s definition.248 Its minimalist character is part of its appeal as an attempt at 
identifying a generally held ideal, but its best specific definition is unavoidable and contentious 
nevertheless. The international lawyer Onuma Yasuaki argues the broader idea of material and 
spiritual wellbeing is more appropriate for understanding basic human goods, than the concept of 
dignity, which he finds to be too limited a notion.249 We could go on expanding this notion of 
generally applicable ideals, to include more notions of wellbeing, including ecological and social 
notions of wellbeing, perhaps. But, the precise definition, no matter how defined, does not really 
help us imagine a realizable world polity because it is the pursuit of conflicting specific goals 
and ways of life that divides humankind in practice. Even if we might find a way to express 
goals in the most general of terms, this is not the same thing as shared goals or shared reasons for 
those goals. It is what dignity (or spiritual and material wellbeing) is demanded for that divides 
humankind. It is the pursuit of many conflicting kinds of dignities and indignities and brings 
human beings into conflict. It is not a plausible assumption that every dignity is compatible with 
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every other. A means to bring them towards compatibility in practice is needed, because specific 
definitions of dignity are unavoidable, revealing distinct goals, which inevitably conflict in 
practice. Dignity cannot practically form the basis of a collective-self-narrative, largely because 
it aims to be a general notion but requires more specifically shared ideals and practice that can 
cohere a sense of collective identity and belonging to reconcile conflicting senses of dignity and 
material and spiritual wellbeing. 
Elsewhere in the literature on global justice, Mathias Risse’s idea that humankind holds a 
“common ownership of the earth” could potentially contribute to a world polity vision, although 
Risse’s use of it is limited and misguided.250 Risse argues this idea provides a basis for reasoning 
about the legitimacy of different uses of finite planetary space and resources. Because these are 
finite things, their use can be considered in terms of justice, Risse argues. Yet, this is somewhat 
misguided. Justifying different uses of space and resources struggles to resolve questions of just 
burden-sharing and conflicts of uses between parties with equitable distributions. Again, a larger 
narrative of belonging is needed to work out questions of the reasons for sharing the burdens and 
working through the inevitable conflicts involved in constructing a world polity. This idea of the 
common ownership of the earth could potentially contribute to the narrative of a world polity and 
its collective-self-conception, if extended and deepened, beyond a legalist moral principle, to an 
understanding of a deliberate and embodied principle of the collective ownership of the earth 
constituting a common collective identity. Yet, Risse makes no connection between his idea of a 
common ownership and a common identity. He makes the peculiar argument that we cannot 
imagine a world without multiple nations, because the ideals of a world polity cannot be clearly 
appreciated today, and that their consequences cannot be known until applied to practice.251 This 
argument suffers from exaggeration on both its points. First, the ideals of a world polity are 
difficult to imagine, indeed, but not impossible. Their horizons can be discerned, their basic 
principles, sources, crucial notions, can be clarified in theory today, because they must be 
fashioned out of the materials of today, by reformulation, interrogation, reimagination. Second, it 
is fair to say that the actual consequences of a world polity are impossible to know, but it is an 
exaggeration to say that the potential practicality of world polity visions cannot be reasonably 
evaluated given knowledge of the empirical present, by considering the distance and obstacles 	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between the potential reality and actual present. For instance, other thinkers have attempted to 
work out a world polity vision from an environmental perspective that could connect to Risse’s 
position, by introducing a notion of ‘world environmental citizenship’.252 I consider the potential 
of such planetary and ecological questions in Chapter 6. 
 
3.4 A Cosmopolitan Narrative of Narratives? 
 
A global agreement on some common ends is important, but not enough, since the pocession of 
common aspirations is not always the same thing as forming a unity, as is familiar to every 
athlete and soldier seeking victory against their opponents. The unity of a world polity involves a 
sense of belonging and collective identity as well as common goals. An alternative strand of 
cosmopolitan thought emphasizes the values of coexistence, toleration, and dialogue as the bases 
of a practical world polity. While some of their suggestions are helpful as means to managing 
conflict in practice they do not in themselves offer a consensus on goals, nor do they provide a 
narrative of unity, only a vision of a shared ambition of unity. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, for 
instance, defends an ethic of toleration based on a vague image of minimalist obligations shared 
by humankind as a whole. Appiah’s position suggests the existence of both many culturally 
specific but valid truths as well as a set of minimal universal values enmeshed in local truths.253 
Perhaps unconsciously, he evokes a vision similar to the ancient Greek ecumenical image of the 
plurality of religions as the only superficially distinct expressions of a single cosmos. His vision 
is the image of a world community held together between two bookends, the rejection of 
intolerant universalisms at one end, and, at the other end, an embrace (albeit in culturally diverse 
forms) of basic universal values. Appiah’s emphasis on tolerance runs into typical hard cases of 
conflict like gay marriage, female circumcision, and abortion. However, Appiah reminds us that 
a cosmopolitan world is not necessarily consistently cosmopolitan, as he says, ‘you can’t have 
any respect for human diversity and expect everyone to become cosmopolitan.’254 He also 
readily admits, ‘There is a sense in which cosmopolitanism is the name not of the solution but of 	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the challenge’.255 If the cosmopolitan attitude is there, then the working out of conflict is easier. 
Yet, his vision stumbles over hard cases because, as John Gray has pointed, accepting the 
existence of ‘universal human values … is not the same as having a universal morality.’256 A 
morality, as a specific moral system, would clarify which universal values matter, when, where, 
etc.. Without the existence of such a common morality, Appiah’s vision is more of a 
cosmopolitan attitude than a cosmopolitan vision.257 It is difficult to derive a coherent or 
comprehensible concept of a world polity from his thought. There is no narrative of unity, only a 
cosmopolitan mood and attitude with little practical substance. 
More helpful are the Kantian inspired visions that Jeremy Waldron and Garrett Wallace 
Brown have developed. They both argue that because humankind is culturally diverse but also 
perpetually brushing elbows in a bounded global space, there practically needs to be universally 
recognized cosmopolitan rights to make coexistence possible.258 Both Waldron and Brown 
suggest the recognition of rights requires a civil responsibility of engaging in dialogue with rival 
norms and values that underpin the use of rights.259 Brown takes the position that through 
practices of engagement, dialogue, and reason, a world polity with new ‘higher’ and ever more 
all-embracing forms of coexistence is possible.260 The idea is that conflicts between different 
rights claims and uses can be alleviated through dialogue and engagement. What is interesting 
here is that a commitment to dialogue, on this account, is conceived as a part of a world polity, 
which suggests a world polity is more than a passively pluralist constitutional order for 
coexistence, but a lived way of life, defined and constituted by the value of coexistence itself. 
The vision involves deliberate effort and commitment towards the realization of coexistence in 
every day life, as a way of life for a diverse world, where practices and habitus of coexistence are 
the norm of everyday politics in the world polity. We can imagine a world with practices of 
inter-cultural and inter-communal civil society engagement through councils, panels, projects, 
and similar activities aiming at varieties of multicultural experiments in coexistence. 
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 One problem here is that dialogue must aim for a shared mode of coexistence, which 
inevitably will exclude some ways of life that do not fit into that scheme of coexistence, it is 
questionable how ethically and normatively neutral a political order can ever be.261 A second 
problem, that is more of a challenge than a fatal flaw, is that, to achieve the purpose of 
coexistence, practices of dialogue need to be feasibly able to produce “higher” planes of social 
coexistence, more embracing and accommodating values and practices. The critical issue is that 
engagement, dialogue, and reason are not guaranteed to produce pronouncements on conflicts of 
value, or rival conceptions of the good, and conflicting ways of life, because these things are not 
only conflicting, but also incommensurable, there is no scale to weigh them with, or ruler to 
measure them against, no way to measure the force of better arguments, particularly in a global 
multi-cultural context.262 Dialogue can hope to produce shared “higher” values, but it is not 
guaranteed to do so, and the means of dialogue should not itself be confused with the shared 
values. If we recognize this limitation, then the vision of a thin pluralist global constitution, 
underwriting a world busy in inter-cultural dialogue and experiments of coexistence is not quite 
the needed picture. It is a picture of a world perhaps on its way to a world polity, but not one that 
is quite there yet, nor is it one that is guaranteed to get there. Again, I do not wish to exaggerate 
the existence of conflict amongst humankind today. Engagement and dialogue are worthwhile.263 
No human polity can persist without some use of dialogue. The point is only that engagement 
and dialogue are not the same things as a world polity and that they are not guaranteed to 
produce one. 
They are helpful suggestions for realizing a world polity, however, as means for working 
towards one. Practices of dialogue can potentially produce what Charles Taylor has described as 
transformative Gadamerian ‘fusions of horizons’, enabling new “higher” values and ways of life, 
offering not a synthesis, but something new, unimagined, unforeseen, and in a certain sense, 
emancipating dialogical participants from the dilemmas and conflicts that brought them into 
loggerheads before they engage in dialogue.264 Through this process, participants might find the 	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terms of a larger loyalty, a new “higher” unity.265 We need to be a little careful about the 
meaning of a fusion of horizons. It is not a synthesis of worldviews, but the rallying of various 
cultural outlooks around some common “higher” goals. We also need to recognize the difficulty 
that the scale of a world polity poses for dialogue. Practically, how can all humankind engage in 
dialogue? Perhaps this is becoming less and less an obstacle with the growth of communications. 
Yet, a further important aspect of this supposed process of dialogue that we need to recognize is 
its trans-cultural dimension, where it involves articulating a vast number of non-Western 
cosmopolitanisms, working for a fusion of horizons and searching for “higher” trans-cultural 
values.266 It is a challenging task, with no guaranteed results, but it is at least a helpful 
suggestion. 
 Yet, I wish to argue that for such a consensus around a “higher” value to form the basis 
for a larger unity and not some new grounds for conflict, it also needs to connect to a larger 
collective-self-narrative that articulates a new mode of belonging. A common value can produce 
conflict in its own right, because that value will eventually realize multiple and potentially 
conflicting interpretations. All the more bitter disagreement might become. A narrative about 
being a united world polity is needed as well as shared ideals. This larger narrative of belonging, 
perhaps marshaled from a Gadamerian fusion of horizons, is necessary for a practically 
realizable world polity, one that goes beyond the recognition of basic needs, or even a consensus 
on admirable goals, but one that is practically realizable because it is united, having a sense of 
togetherness and belonging, a self-image of a united humankind that provides reasons to 
overcome what conflicts might emerge. If extended towards a shared value or collection of 
values, connected to a shared sense of belonging, then the practice of dialogue and engagement 
that some cosmopolitan thinkers have promoted is a helpful, if not guaranteed, step towards 
realizing a world polity vision. 	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Much of the problem is that the search for a world polity is still preoccupied by what 
William James would call monistic thinking.267 As I suggested in Chapter 1, it is too easy to 
think that since the idea of a world polity is meant to embrace all humankind and requires all 
humankind to embrace it, then there must be one answer, or a small range of answers, that all 
humankind can accept as one. There must be some answer, some vision, that can effectively hold 
up the big tent and bring humankind all in. Because the vision involves one unity, it is too easy 
to think that humankind needs one vision, one creed, one answer, to pull it off. To begin to 
wrestle out of the search for the needed vision, it is helpful to remember that no polities are 
monoliths in practice; they always contain multiple rival interpretations, competing and 
interrelated webs of collective-self-narratives. If a world polity were inclusive of all humankind, 
with all its histories, cultures, and local contexts, we can expect it to involve and generate more 
interpretations than any other. A realistic and relevant collective-self-narrative of a world polity 
cannot be found by searching for a single story, since a world polity would in practice invariably 
contain many flows of world polity narratives. Recognizing this suggests the search for the 
horizons of a world polity is potentially more fruitfully conceived as a collaborative bricolage 
inter-narrative effort, a kind of many splendid story or stories. A narrative of narratives, a 
civilization of civilizations, is perhaps our best way of getting at it.268 Again, as I suggested in 
Chapter 1, I do not mean a revival of the ancient Greek ecumenical worldview, where religious 
differences are seen as superficially different expressions of a single cosmos. I mean something 
more diverse, more complicated. The search for one answer only leads to new and greater 
grounds for conflict and it makes possible the ugly and self-defeating thought of eradicating the 
rival answers that stand in the way of the universal acceptance of an answer. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have conceded that even if moral universals do exist amongst humankind, there 
is no image of world unity and order that can be derived from a universal moral code, because 	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this code will always be met with competing interpretations, especially in a modern age, and it 
will also be met with hostility and resistance in a post-colonial context. I engaged the 
cosmopolitan global democrats, and found they needed a further narrative, one with sociological 
bases in a collective identity, if their vision is to meet the criteria of practicality. Then I 
considered the political philosophy of global distributive justice and dignity, but found this too 
needs support from a larger narrative. I argued that basing a world polity on universal basic 
needs, capabilities, or utility, is impractical, if unsupported by a further collective-self-narrative 
about shared ambitions that can legitimate the hierarchies and acceptance of burden-sharing that 
world unity involves, due to the conflicts arising from disagreements on the ambitions and ideals 
that goods are needed and utilized for in practice. Beyond this, I considered the Kantian inspired 
dialogical approaches, but found they are only a process towards a world polity, and not the 
sought for image of a world polity, and that this process is without guarantee of practical success. 
Finally, I returned to the point that the collective-self-narrative of a world polity need not be 
singular in content, and likely would take the form of a narrative of narratives. 
 In the next chapter, I want to turn to the critical emancipatory tradition that contains an 
image of an emancipatory world polity, not only because it is a prominent and highly developed 
literature, but also because its emancipatory character gives it an expansive and inclusive sense 
that one might think could fit the search for a larger narrative of unity that, in this chapter, I have 
concluded is needed to practically realize a world polity. 
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Chapter Four. 
Emancipatory Horizons 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Philosophically, the search for a world polity issues from the fundamental question Jacques 
Derrida put best, what it means to ‘live together well’.269 Human beings, cultures, generations, 
civilizations, epochs and ages contain innumerable answers to this question, applied to immense 
varieties of particular life-worlds. Yet, answers always beg the question of a wider and further 
togetherness; every answer extends the question, from self to other, neighbors to foreigner, etc., 
logically, and in a globalized age, practically, towards the furthest and widest propinquity, all 
humankind. Starting roughly with Kant, the modern tradition of critical theory tells us the widest 
circle should have as much and as many effective freedoms and liberties as any other, but that it 
should not restrict the others, as they should contain the same degree of freedom and equality. 
Living together well as being free and equal, if grasped as an answer, is pulled by its own logic 
to its maximal application, to all humankind and all its social sub-sets. If valid here, amongst us, 
then there too, everywhere, for everyone, the critical thinking goes. Realizing this conclusion, 
means, as critical theory tells us, emancipating mind and practice from unjust hierarchies and 
social categories, from unjust legal, economic, and political discriminations of race, gender, 
class, creed, etc, so lifting humankind socially and materially towards the realization of a proper 
human community, one that properly realizes what it means for all to live together well. 
Marx’s communistic future is archetypal for this current of thought: worldwide 
emancipation from the weltmarkt. In a modern age where everyone demands their rights and 
liberties, the critical vision of freedom and equality for all is undeniable. Yet, I want to argue an 
emancipatory narrative of universal freedom and equality does not amount to living together as a 
world polity, because issues of practicality and coherence arise in the absence of a universal 
sense of belonging together and being-in-it-together. If I might put the point in overly simplistic 
terms, universal solidarity around universal emancipation, as universal liberation, is not the same 	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thing as a universal solidarity of a single polity. Marxism, as an historical movement, was a force 
for liberation in world affairs, creating solidarities amongst a universal proletariat, but also 
amongst communist nations, colonized peoples and suppressed minorities, women, and races. 
These solidarities for liberation from oppression and exploitation did not automatically translate 
into solidarity amongst liberated communist peoples, when communist regimes found their 
interests at odds with one another, for instance, even if they mutually aspired to a maximally 
liberated world order. An additional unifying collective narrative is needed to bring liberated 
freedoms and equalities together and negotiate the conflicts arising from their multiple uses. The 
more promising if not guaranteed path in the search for a world polity is through getting a better 
sense for the shared ambitions and ideals of the historical present, rather than the neutral 
organizing principles of an emancipated time.  
Contemporary critical theory is a vast terrain. In it, three strands of world polity 
conceptions stand out. The most well known is Habermas’s conception, which is also the most 
elaborate and clearly expressed, even if his critical credentials are sometimes questioned. I 
appraise the work of Nancy Fraser on this count. Beyond them, I find conceptions inspired by 
Heidegger are also increasingly popular and increasingly of a critical character, and so make an 
exploration of it, even though it is not usually lumped in with critical theory. Lastly, there is 
Agamben’s early work, The Coming Community, which is a unique critical vision, later 
expanded upon by Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri. Agamben’s vision is the conceptually 
cleverest but also the most demonstrative of my criticisms. I address each of these strands of 
critical thought in turn and conclude by reassessing the positive take-away this exploration 
provides and by pointing the way towards sociologically empiricist alternatives. 
 
4.2 A Universal Discourse Community?  
 
Jurgen Habermas’s towering movement provides a thought-through and prominent position in 
this realm of critical world polity thinking.  It also evinces the main lines of criticism I wish to 
raise, even if it is corrected and supported with qualifications. Habermas’s vision of a realized 
“world society”, as he refers to it, is superficially similar to Held and Archibugi’s vision of a 
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global democracy.270 It entails virtually all the same institutions and human rights commitments 
through a world union of sorts with global citizenship. The key difference is Habermas’s 
emphasis on the emancipatory interests of a universal discourse community.271 He conceives a 
world society as pluralist because its norms, produced by a universal discourse community, are 
supposed to be universally valid, ethically neutral. It is, in Habermas’s terms, based on generally 
valid moral norms rather than certain ethical values.272 Life in Habermas’s aspired world society 
would not be too unlike that in today’s liberal democracies, but it would involve far more rule 
following deliberations and a general shift in attitude towards moral learning through discourse, 
chiefly in the context of a global public sphere, taken to be a self-conscious practice of moral 
deliberation by the global public at large.273 All the institutions and structures would be hardly 
changed, but all social and political life would undergo a huge shift in moral attitudes. It involves 
a collective-self-narrative of humankind united around a commitment to universal moral 
progress, through the deliberations of a universal discourse community. 
It is an uplifting vision of unity, but suffers some practical limitations and some of its 
assumptions are debatable. For instance, the aspirational character of this vision, of deliberations 
aspiring towards unity, creates a potential practical difficulty, because its discourse mechanism 
shuttles the contents of a world polity into the future, which, in turn enables the deliberating part 
of humankind to be with the times ahead, if they grasp the right moral answers today, which also 
casts the rest as behind. The point of a discourse is to genuinely search together for an answer, 
without presuming who might be right or who knows better, but as a discourse it creates a circle 
of those already engaged and benefiting from discourse, and those yet to partake. There is a 
potential problem in this temporal division, reaching back to Kant’s distinction between 
immature and mature, the problem of deciding what and thereby who is with the future and who 
then is stuck in the past, hence Habermas’s huge system of thought devoted to the conditions of a 
discourse community, to enable a proper decision, through a proper discourse. A second practical 	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challenge arises from the presence of power in the practice of society and moral discourse, since, 
in practice, discourse is shaped by power. In Foucault’s classic words, ‘A society without power 
relations can only be an abstraction.’274 Is the aspired genuine unity of a universal discourse 
community inherently impractical, in a world inherently shaped by power? Some classes or state 
powers can be imagined as taking advantage and corrupting the project, shaping it towards their 
benefits, or particular version of morality. Against this, Habermas has found some defensible 
ground, in his famous suggestion that ‘in the process of enlightenment there can only be 
participants.’275 This is to say that, for Habermas, the problem of power is neutralized if moral 
learning is properly pursued by all. It is an uplifting vision, although it is untested in practice, at 
least on a global scale. The vision also raises an important point, because it suggests a common 
view of participants as participants; it conveys a sense of belonging, together, as participants in a 
shared universal project. Thus, a condition of its realization is the general if not universal and 
uniform acceptance of participation in the project by the majority of humankind, the additional 
unifying narrative of a collective pursuit of the universal discourse community. Yet, the appeal 
of this narrative, connected to the ambition of “enlightenment” for all humankind, is somewhat 
doubtful in a late modern context, where “enlightenment” values are increasingly seen as not 
only those of an earlier modernity, but also, to some extent, those of an earlier European 
modernity. 
Still, let’s say this estimate is wrong and that humankind is up for the enlightenment 
project of a universal discourse community. There are some further practical barriers and needed 
correctives, particularly economic and distributive issues, as Nancy Fraser has argued, for 
instance.276 In principle, these economic obstacles can be corrected for. Beyond that issue, a 
further issue of practicality centers on the participatory and discursive theory of moral learning. 
It is questionable whether universally neutral moral norms are possible to achieve. If ultimately 
there are no universal moral norms, an alternative theory of moral learning might be introduced. 
Contrary to Habermas, it could be suggested that moral learning can be understood to involve 
increasing concord of moral specificity, rather than morally neutral norms. An alternative theory 
of moral learning suggests it involves more and more clarity and agreement about what 	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participants take specific values to mean, rather than Habermas’s value-neutrality criteria of 
moral norms. The definition of moral learning is ultimately debatable, although the possibility of 
universally neutral norms is questionable. The alternative position is that there are no morally 
neutral norms to be found at the end of that critical discourse, only clearer and “higher” but 
ultimately specific and never neutral norms. Collective moral learning, on this alternative 
account, is not about learning what is a morally neutral norm for the whole, but, I want to 
suggest, the clearer grasp of a “higher” shared moral norm. This is why Habermas’s demand for 
universalizable moral norms is logically circular, since that demand presupposes a moral 
position.277 This is also why Habermas’s project of emancipation paradoxically endorses the 
liberal democratic societies we already know, albeit with adjustments. From an alternative 
perspective, moral learning is not a rational exercise, or exercise in rationality, but rather, one of 
clarifying the moral values participants hold and constitute their self-conceptions and political 
societies with.278 From this view, there are no neutral moral stances, norms, or principles 
awaiting a universal discourse community, regardless of whether its practical conditions are 
satisfied. This is why even liberal societies struggle to be morally neutral in practice.279 From the 
alternative view I am introducing, all that can be hoped to be achieved is a transvaluation of 
values, an Umwertung, a transformative reconciliation of conflicting values, perhaps through a 
Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’, one producing new “higher” moralities, but not more neutral 
moral stances.280 
Andrew Linklater has expanded upon the Habermasian image of a post-Westphalian 
world society, with global level institutions and citizenship, but he has also been steadily 
extending it towards arguments based on a distinct civilizational level of collective moral 	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learning, which in his later work, incorporates Norbert Elias’s theory of the civilizing process.281 
In his The Transformation of Political Community, Linklater placed an emphasis on 
transculturally recognized human harms as a foundation for a post-Westphalian cosmopolitan 
order.282 Drawing on Norbert Elias’s sociology, Linklater’s more recent work has explored the 
growth of cosmopolitan harm conventions as a civilizing process.283 This is a subtle and 
potentially significant departure from Habermas’s project because it emphasizes a narrowing in 
on definitions of harm and civility, not more neutral definitions of morality. Stress on 
civilizational analysis introduces a subtle shift from the search for neutrality towards the search 
for moral specificity around a global ethic of harm and care. It introduces an alternative historical 
and sociological path, one potentially leading to the bases of a world polity, one set in a process 
of taking on an increasingly realized historical form of civility, becoming more and more 
internalized across the generations as a more and more admirable quality, making more and more 
restrained practice, being esteemed more and more in a global civilizing process. This process 
does not necessarily lead to a world polity, only potentially, because it first and foremost leads to 
more “civilized” international relations, albeit in a globalizing context. A global civilizing 
process is not the same as a global unifying process, but there is a potential overlap, in the long-
term perspective of the interconnected insecurities of a global context that incentivize a civilizing 
process of restraint as well as a unifying process of collective identity formation.284 Linklater 
suggests, 
 
Global narratives that offer long-term perspectives on the development of human 
societies can play a vital role in addressing the disjuncture between traditional 
patterns of emotional identification with “survival units” and levels of global 
integration that require new levels of international cooperation to address the 
multiple challenges facing humanity.285 	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In the study of global civilizing processes, there is a discernable subtle shift towards finding the 
sociological bases of an increasingly civil international society, potentially working towards the 
global narratives and vision of a trans-civilizational world polity built on those bases.  
Looking back, I raised Fraser’s thought above as a corrective to Habermas. It is 
worthwhile, for several reasons, to consider her thought specifically, as a potentially distinct 
critical vision of a world polity. For Fraser, redistribution is not a mere democratic prerequisite, 
but is an increasingly complex political question of rival political possibilities. This insight, 
foregrounds the contradiction between the global economy and the Westphalian political order, 
and premises a distinct critical-emancipatory vision of a post-Westphalian world polity. Fraser 
argues the contradiction between economic globalization, and a Westphalian framework, where 
state actors build up a system of global governance to manage global challenges, creates a 
‘democratic deficiency’ and a ‘deficit of political efficacy’, because global governance structures 
are two or three levels removed from democratic representation, and lack administrative and 
legislative capacity for effective government.286 In response, Fraser proposes a vision of a world 
polity that is democratic, like Habermas’s, but emphasizes distributive justice, to make 
participation in that political scheme equitable and effective. She envisions a global institutional 
structure of democratic governance that engages in dialogic relations with a transnational civil 
society that is underpinned by a principle of ‘parity of participation’ meaning that, ‘justice 
requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life.’287 Fraser has 
argued that this democratic world polity is needed today because the context of justice is post-
Westphalian in a global era, where social life is transnational, and where the justice of one state 
cannot be easily disentangled from all the others.288 The point of this world polity vision is 
emancipatory justice, in a global context.289 Like Habermas, Fraser considers her scheme to be a 
neutral meta-framework of justice, deferring moral choices to the democratic process creating 
formal ‘binding decisions’, so requiring all humankind to ‘participate in social life as peers,’ but 
she offers the corrective of the distributive conditions of its practical realization.290 The vision 
also offers the mechanism of ‘binding decisions’, which, as binding results of the democratic 	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process are not morally neutral, but decisive, favouring, or reconciling, different specific moral 
positions. 
Fraser’s vision nearly overcomes the two critiques I leveled against Habermas’s vision, 
economic inequities connected to the question of power and a debatable understanding of moral 
learning. The economic position of participant parity is well-taken, and even the vision of 
democratic governance is not entirely objectionable, if it could be based in a novel constitutional 
arrangement. These details are technical questions that could conceivably be overcome in 
practice. The still unclear question is why the binding decisions of a global democracy should be 
considered as binding, what the reasons are beyond technical needs for decisions. To revisit the 
critiques I made against the cosmopolitan democrats, Archibugi and Held, the question is what 
the “weness” feeling is of Fraser’s envisioned world polity. What does it means to consider all 
humankind as “peers” in the social life of a world polity? Peers in being equally free and held 
with equal worth, perhaps, holding the same status as free and equal, in the world polity. The 
point of this narrative would be the achievement of a more effective and thoroughgoing freedom 
and equality for all, which is a reasonably acceptable narrative in a modern context, and the 
mechanism of binding decisions is helpful for practically reconciling conflicting uses of 
freedoms. Yet, what are the reasons participants would have for legitimating that process of 
binding decisions? Why would they wish to be involved in that process and submit to democratic 
decisions? Is the narrative of being free and equal meaningful enough to legitimate a world 
polity with binding decisions? Does it express a genuine notion of togetherness and belonging, or 
is it too superficial, too general? Detractors will say that their freedoms if not equality are more 
effectively attained in a system of independent states, which is what the process of 
decolonization and the globalization of international society was meant to achieve. Fraser’s 
thought provides important correctives to Habermas, but its potential to articulate a world polity 
vision is limited, much like the theorists of distributive justice in Chapter 3, who took the fact of 
a global collaborative scheme as the reason for just distributions, but struggled to clarify the 
crucial question of belonging, the prior reasons for being-in-it-together, in a world polity. What 
we gain from Fraser’s vision is a greater appreciation for the image of a practically just world 
polity, but we need to search further and expand on the contents of the constitutive-collective-
self-narrative and sense of belonging for a world polity. 
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4.3 Being-in-the-World-Community 
 
In this respect, a detour from critical thought, worth taking here, is into the writings of those who 
have stretched and extended Hiedeggerian themes towards all-inclusive ethical outlooks in 
contemporary world politics. This channel of thought does not easily or readily fit into the 
emancipatory project, but is a detour worth taking here, due to its line of reasoning that similarly 
searches for a neutrally all-inclusive ethical outlook. It is worth exploring, as such, partly for its 
novelty and originality, but also because, in spite of its unique features, it evinces similar 
limitations to the current of critical thought in general. 
First, Lousiza Odysseos, with subtlety and originality, has defended the critical use of a 
Heideggerian ethics of openness as an alternative means to coexistence beyond insiders and 
outsiders in world politics.291 While this is a fascinating and strongly defended ethics, it is not 
necessarily a basis for a world polity, since being open is not the same as being together, or in-it-
together. It is questionable how this ethical outlook could practically underpin a world polity, 
because, as I argued above, goods and ends conflict, ideals collide with others, including even 
openness. If everyone adopted an ethic of openness, there is still a further needed narrative about 
being-in-it-together, about why being-in-it-together in a world polity would be a shared 
aspiration, because it would require the management of conflict and burden sharing choices, that 
might more easily be avoided. Being open provides an ethic of getting along as it were, but not 
an ethic of getting together, so to speak. 
A second thinker, Alphonso Lingis also develops Heideggerian themes towards 
cosmopolitan questions. His vision, in The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common, 
arises in debate with Michel Serres, who conceived communities as an establishment of language 
through the bracketing-out of background noise, the reduction of static and fuzz by definitions 
and rules, the rational elimination of the elements of incomprehension.292 This linguistic project 
is rational-universalist, seeking to undo babel, to construct the rational cosmopolis, a universal 
language of and for all things.293 Lingis points out how this project assumes we want to or can 
say the same things and want to communicate in this bracketing-out way. He suggests the ‘other’ 	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(the Aztec cannibal, the last nomads, the hermits of humanity), represent, in their hostile 
reclusiveness, unincorporateable alien communities, the ‘other community’, the fuzz of 
humanity, its noise, a human static lost to and pushed out by the project of a universal 
language.294 This pushing out is problematic and needs to be overcome, Lingis argues, not least 
because others are valued for their affirmation of one’s own reality. This is to say that the being 
of outsiders shores up or fleshes out the being of civilization, phenomenologically. That is, the 
witness of their otherness brings one’s own reality into view.295 Without this encounter, one still 
exists, but the being of one’s reality is backgrounded, unnoticeable. In this critique, Lingis finds 
a paradox between the outsider nature of the other and the sense that their deaths matter, the 
feeling of culpability in the death of obscure people, unknowable, distant, “Cambodians, and 
Somalians” for instance; “the social outcasts”.296 He asks, how is there “a growing conviction … 
that the dying of people with whom we have nothing in common … concerns us?”297 There is, in 
some way, a sort of strange community feeling for them. How can this be? Reaching across that 
irreducible alterity Lingis sees a communal burden between fellow mortals, “the community in 
death.”298 For Lingis, there is only one community of all humankind, the imperative to console 
the dying, the universal due of not being alone in death, be they friend or stranger, citizen or 
foreigner. For Lingis, cosmopolitan questions are not primarily about laws of hospitality or 
distributive justice, but about different Hiedeggerian themes of understanding the modern 
cosmopolitan self through encountering the other, and having consolation and compassion for 
dying strangers, because of a shared being-towards-death, together form a world community with 
distant strangers and those strangers valued only for their otherness. The point of this vision is to 
identify and defend the human blind spots in the ambition of a world unity. Its point is to defend 
the existence and worth of the vulnerable people pushed out of the world by the world polity, so 
to make room for them in a more inclusive scheme. 
Lingis makes an important point about the value in “others”, not as a caricatured other, in 
Edward Said’s sense of an Orientalized other, but as the actual others of global modernity, the 
last uncontacted tribes, the recluse peoples, in the world, but other-than modern. When we 	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witness these peoples, from helicopter cameras, it reminds us of the historical specificity of our 
global modern selves, and the possibility and reality of distinct historical selves. There is 
something important to the point that if there were a world polity, it would have others, on the 
inside, and that the epistemology of the world polity is at least partly connected to its others.299 
In this sense, the uncontacted tribes and reclusive peoples, in worlds all their own, are a part of 
the imagined world polity, important to it, and their continued seclusion would be worth 
defending, as others apart from the world polity on its inside. The seclusion of such peoples 
would be worth preserving, for the self-awareness that such “others” would yield for a world 
polity wherein everyone would in principle be together. 
There is also something to what Lingis says about our community in death, but it is less 
persuasive. The vanishing of distant persons, any person really, affects us because it could be us. 
We share something important in the awareness of our mortality. Heidegger was right about this. 
So was Montaigne.300 Yet, the consolation and compassion due to dying strangers is only 
compelling in times of direct social relation, face to face as it were. We are in an indirect relation 
with those beyond the immediate grasp of our senses.301 The dying of far way friends and loved 
ones summons us to be beside them in direct relations. The dying of strangers does not in the 
same way, because we do not know them, they do not share with us a background social 
psychology built up from having lived together in direct relations. Strangers do not know one 
another’s lives. It is only in the hypothetical situation of being in the direct presence of a dying 
stranger that we feel compelled to console them. My point here is that it is not entirely coherent 
to attempt to delay or prevent the death of any and all dying distant strangers we do not know or 
understand for the sake of their otherness. Contrary to Lingis, I would suggest we increasingly 
care about the deaths of distant others today because of modern values and self-conceptions that 
in a modernized world provide reasons why distant others do not have to die in an untoward 
way. 302  There is a general sense amongst modern peoples that modern technology and 	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infrastructure can and ought to be used to protect people from plague and famine, natural 
disasters, war and ethnic cleansing, whether those people are distant or not, and regardless of 
their “otherness”. Global ethical questions about distant strangers have arisen because it is a 
globalized world, because there is a global situation where there has been built the technological 
capacity to systematically avoid arbitrary death on a global scale.303 Although a shared mortality 
does play a part in the late modern ethics of distant strangers, it is the emergence of a global 
consciousness and infrastructure in a modern context that gives Lingis’s paradox of saving 
distant strangers its global reality. 
A curious neo-Heideggerian approach is found in Peter Sloterdyjk’s sphereology series 
that could potentially be extended to a world polity vision. In his history of being and space, 
Sloterdijk argues, with the spatial metaphor of “spheres”, that with the Copernican revolution the 
‘One Orb has imploded’, the conceptual possibility of the single-encased perfect cosmological 
sphere is popped. If the Babylonians viewed the cosmos as a clam shell for instance, there was a 
“roof”, but the absence of a ceiling, in the modern worldview, is an important change for being 
in space, Sloterdyk argues. He goes on to suggest that modern capitalism seeks to insulate 
humankind by creating a world interior, a new shelter, a global urban space, a global mall, a 
global crystal palace, with wifi.304 This world interior is not worldwide, he points out. The 
developed capitalized interior constitutes a world outside of the developing and underdeveloped 
world. The way forward, he suggests, is to bring society into a state of foam, a mass of shifting 
microspheres in and across marcrospheres, global and local.305 Make the space global, he 
suggests, but go beyond the idea of making all an inside. Make it, somehow, a world of jumbled 
foam-oceans of spheres, capitalist, political, cultural, global-geographic, etc. This is a vision of a 
world polity achieved by reimagining the spatial dimensions of inside and outside. Sloterdijk 
admits his ideas exaggerate the conditions of modernity and capitalism and that they over 
abstract space as shapes, but the point of his foam-world image is to help conceive (however 	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ridiculously abstract and metaphorical), a society beyond the inside/outside problem, what 
Heidegger was attempting to achieve, but did not quite grasp with his ethics of openness. 
Sloterdijk’s vision is to maximize this image of the foam world in practice, to make permeable 
all rigid spheres and make-up a kind of world polity of foam play, a world order with no 
inside/outside. The vision conveys the kind of useful entropy and spontaneous orders of some 
sort of ‘open plan’ global Google headquarters, the ideal world of the creative designer and 
entrepreneur, one in which individuals are free to join up and split off spheres as they may wish 
on a global scale. 
There are historiographical issues in the spatial narrative that I want to criticize because 
they relate to the coherence and practicality of this foam-world concept. The main issue is the 
impoverished portrayal of human beings as cave denizens, creatures wanting interiority, as if 
spheres of spatial security are all we have ever sought from our orders and cosmologies. 
Cosmology is not this simple. The phenomenology of space is not all-important. The human 
understanding of the cosmos has shaped our conceptions of political order not so much by 
situating their security and insecurity but by providing models of order, be it Pythagoras’s idea 
that the cosmos is ordered mathematically, or the medieval image of the great chain of being, or 
modern heliocentricity.306 These images of order gave expression to the order people admired 
and wanted to achieve in social and political life. These models hung together with self-
conceptions and conceptions of the good. Why were the Mesopotamian metropolises designed to 
physically reflect the order of the cosmos? Why did the Byzantine emperors order their court to 
mirror the order in heaven? How could there be a Sun King of France? It is the visions of order 
that are mirrored in these cases. Sloterdijk’s narrative of space also forgets time, that is, the 
importance of creation myths and the question of when we are. For the ancient Greeks, the earth 
was made from chaos and could be made orderly. The medieval world was pre-fabricated, pre-
ordered, and set on a limited history. For the late-moderns, the universe was cracked-open from a 
big bang in which we have been created, and in which we can create, but like surfers our 
creations ride within the time/space forces of the bang’s cosmic wave. Sloterdijk is correct that 
the post-Copernican, post-Mercator, and post-earth-horizon lunar visualization of the globular 
earth, adrift in the universe, has disrupted the place of the divine, and brought us back to earth, as 
it were. But, this back-to-earth turn is not the whole story or end of the story, because there are 	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contents to the questions of who and when we are that matter equally for what we admire and 
aspire to  
If where we are is not the whole story, and if who we are matters equally if not more, 
then Sloterdijk’s foam world seems to be missing the most important parts of a concept of a 
world polity even though it is an interesting approach. To coherently suggest 7 billion plus 
bubbles can or do form a polity, a larger story is needed about their self-conceptions that can 
shape the moral and historical character of their conception of order, their institutions, and 
practices. Without a bigger story, a more comprehensive narrative, about who we are and want to 
be, about what we admire and despise, the foam-world cannot be put into practice because there 
is no sense of what the point of its inclusivity is. Besides the ability of people to be 
unencumbered by inside/outside boundaries, it is not clear why they would wish universal 
inclusivity. 
 
4.4 The Whatever Community 
 
The most ingenious critical thinker to offer a world community vision has been Giorgio 
Agamben. His later political theory has mainly analyzed state powers, but in his early book The 
Coming Community, he offers the clever if unduly complex concept of the ‘whatever 
community’. I want to explore this concept, if it can be done without exploring the entirety of 
Agamben’s thought, because with it Agamben seems to have made a forthright effort to 
overcome those modern biases that confine the world polity to the realms of utopia, dystopia, 
and retrotopia. 
Rather than searching a common set of universal rules or conventions, Agambens’s 
concept is based on “indifference”, not in the sense of disinterestedness or apathy, but in the 
sense of an absence of both difference or sameness, differentia or category, without distinctions 
between its members or an attribution of a common class.307 With affinity to Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
idea that every being is being-with, and sharing his and Alain Badiou’s search for a society 
without a specific subjectivity,308 Agamben’s idea of a whatever community is conceptually 	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clever because it overcomes the inside/outside emancipation problematique of critical political 
theory by making everyone a limbo-outsider/insider (in the sense of being on the threshold or in 
purgatory – neither in nor out). The whatever community, according to Agamben, is a “whatever 
singularity” that has no inside nor outside, no terms of exclusion, since its members share no 
common properties, essence, or identity.309 This offers a new way of imagining belonging. 
He explains its historical emergence with quasi-Marxist analysis. Written in the 1990’s, 
but still with some plausibility, he claimed that the triumph of capitalism and ‘a single planetary 
petty bourgeoisie’ has replaced/erased or ‘dissolved’ class difference and rendered individuals 
fungible by making them indistinct and indifferent products of advertising, labour roles, and 
body commodification.310 For Agamben, the whatever singularity exists via the geo-capitalist 
situation, wherein its whatever community is at once imminent and latent. He suggests the 
existence of the whatever community across the globe is a world only slightly changed, 
superficially the same, but containing a politics of conflict between the state and the whatever 
community, which, I would suggest, is Agamben’s radically revised conception of the 
proletariat. Because the whatever community has no insiders or outsiders, the whatever 
community can have no representatives, which brings it into conflict with the state. 311 
‘Everything will be as it is now, just a little different’ because it would be marked by the 
constant consciousness of the presence of the whatever community’s potentiality. Because it is a 
whatever community, it is latent or dormant, able to be and not-be at any time.312 Agamben gives 
the example of Tiananmen Square as an event approaching the presence of the whatever 
community, an event of spontaneous solidarities and global actions against the state that cannot 
represent the unrepresentable whatever community.313 
The point of this concept’s use, for Agamben, at least in his early thought, is to support 
resistance to state representation and to be used to critique exclusions and exploitations based on 
attributions of social difference. The empirical validity of capitalism’s indifferentiation of 
humankind’s subjectivity is questionable, with a host of examples, cultural and political, and 
ultimately rests on debatable assumptions about the subjectivity of capitalist life. It is hard to 	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think of real-life examples of indifferent persons. The conceptually more problematic issues are 
the coherence and practicality of Agamben’s account of what makes the whatever community 
communal. His thought is fox-like and gymnastic, but the search for neutrality and inclusivity, in 
this case through a neutralization of the problem of difference and sameness, is self-defeating.  
How is the whatever community communal? Distinguishing communal from the societal, 
Agamben claims, ‘Whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do not possess any 
identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition.’314 From its 
etymology in Roman private law, the societal indicates a consented project, an agreed contract, a 
club membership brought into existence by avowals. Societal membership has speech act 
conditions. The communal indicates a consent-regardless indebtednesses of each owing one 
another each’s own due, speech act regardless. As Roberto Esposito’s Communitas suggests, the 
etymology of community entails its conceptual indication of an indebtedness to others,315 a 
feeling of moral obligation, or unconditional loyalty, what Collingwood called “the suum 
cuique” of the community; its members owe each other each other’s due.316 This is how Maurice 
Blanchot was able to find the paradox of making an avowal to one’s community, since 
communities are, as he suggested, unavowable things. 317  This is why the theorists of 
cosmopolitan moral obligations, Pogge, Nussbaum, and Singer, for example, use the language of 
a world community rather than a world society. It conveys their point that humankind has 
obligations to one another, that each of us are owed a certain due. 
 The role of ethics and love in Agamben’s thought encapsulates the communal 
indebtedness conceived within his whatever community but it also reveals its impractical 
idealism and internal contradictions. Ethically, he suggests that because, ‘the being most proper 
to humankind is being one’s own possibility or potentiality, then [because] being potential- is in 
a certain sense lacking … humans have and feel a debt’, each are due their being-potentiality.318 
There is a debt, he says, to become being-potentiality, to attain a kind of ‘becoming-being’, as it 
were.319 In combination with this, according to Agamben, whatever singularities are ‘the 	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Lovable’, meaning unconditional and total love, ‘loved … with all of its predicates, its being 
such as it is.’320 Thus, the whatever community is lovable, but, as it is a community of 
humankind and human beings are rightly being-potentialities, what is loved is the being-
potentiality of all human beings. For all its clever suspensions of identity politics, this being-
potentiality love is, at bottom, the uber-idealist nub of Agamben’s whatever community. Loving 
everyone for their potential to become is not an emerging condition of humankind, as Agamben 
suggested, nor is it likely to be. Humankind is rather moved more by love for specific kinds of 
things and ambitions, modern ones above all others today. 
 Two specific criticisms can be made, but have to meet Agamben at his abstract level. 
First, the claim that each owes a debt to humankind to be being-potentiality requires more 
reasoned defense. It could just as easily be claimed that people are obliged to be something, to 
fulfill their potentiality in a certain way. Second, a major tension here is the contradiction 
between what is loved, with all its predicates, and the debt to be being-potential, devoid of 
predicates. Where is conflict in Agamben’s community? If what is loved conflicts with one’s 
own life potential, it either must become indifferent, or one must modify one’s own life to be 
indifferent; the difference must be suspended somehow. But can this really work out? Does it not 
reduce to a world of indifferent paralysis, loving every potentiality and so no actuality at all? 
Contrary to Agamben’s ideal of indifference, for a community and communal ethics to exist (be 
it via some sense of indebtnesses, loyalties, or love) they require (and indeed are constituted by) 
certain unifying intentionalities between its members, certain backgrounded consciousnesses of 
collectively regarded we-ness or us-ness consciousness. 321  The being of this unifying 
intentionality fills in the contents of the being-with, it is the being-with-whom that Agemben 
seeks to do without that is necessary for a community to exist. This is also why the concepts of 
community and society are historically and culturally specific ways of conceiving such unifying 
intentionalities.322 Communities and societies, that exist, are the emergence of more than mere 
being-with, they are certain social stuffs, socially defined social things. Not only is Agamben’s 
concept unduly idealistic, its premises do not hold up under scrutiny. 
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 We can perhaps get a clearer grasp of these issues and tensions by turning to Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s work. Their concept of commonwealth draws much of its inspiration 
from Agamben’s whatever community and illustrates the same flaws. They build the concept of 
the ‘commonwealth’ on their concepts of the ‘common’, the ‘multitude’, and ‘Empire’. With 
some similarities to Wallerstein’s center-periphery world system,323 ‘Empire’ is their conception 
of the US centric capitalist world order embedded in a web of global governance structures.324 
For Hardt and Negri, this global system constitutes the proletarian-esque multitude, a crowd-like 
image of humankind, a stochastic assembly, constituted by the common context or situation of 
Empire, not by some uniformity or common identity trait.325 Hardt and Negri conceive the as yet 
unrecognized and unclaimed property of the multitude as the common, taken to be all things held 
in common, including both the resources of the earth as well as those of human culture and 
society like shared languages and practices.326 As such, the commonwealth is the appropriation 
of the common by the multitude, which they conceive as a revolutionary and properly 
democratic transformation of Empire. 
With inspiration from Agamben’s whatever community, the concept of the 
commonwealth makes some original twists, but struggles with similar difficulties. For Hardt and 
Negri, the establishment of the commonwealth would form a communist-like world community, 
a more properly democratic one beyond the failed experiments of the 20th century. Yet, what this 
means is both unclear and cringingly optimistic, where, for example, they describe it as the 
‘institution of happiness [and] joy [through] love and laughter.’327 The generality of these ends 
and means makes understanding what kind of world a commonwealth looks like or for whom 
incomprehensible. It could be applied to any number of happy imaginings. Envisioning a world 
of common abundance, Hardt and Negri have no conception of conflicts between values, no 
apparent awareness of the moral dilemmas between different happinesses and joys that every 
life, society, and civilization must necessarily struggle with to exist. They offer no sense of what 
a world community might specifically aspire to be, only that it should be happy and full of love, 
and should appropriate the ‘common’ for all humankind. 	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4.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the attempt to find a world polity vision in neutral ethics is 
problematic because it always runs into cases of conflict, where the inclusive benefits of 
neutrality run up against conflicts of values and ideals. I found the Habermasian ambition of 
clarifying more and more neutral, impartial, or accommodating norms to be vulnerable to this 
criticism. I also found it to be helpfully qualified by Fraser’s vision of practically minded insight 
into the economic and structural requisites of a practically effective world polity. I found the 
Heideggerian inspired visions to offer interesting ideas that illuminating some of the historical 
aspects of a world polity in a modern context that can potentially be expanded, prarticularly 
notions of shifts in time and space. But, I also found these Heideggerian visions struggle to 
articulate a sense of belonging, offering notions of openness, a common-being-toward death, and 
a shared notion of cosmological space and time, but struggling to articulate a practical notion of 
being-in-it-together. A world polity cannot be practically found in a Heideggerian “openness” 
ethic, or the shared being-towards-mortality of others, or even the shared space of others. These 
being-in-the-world and being-amongst-others-in-the-world feelings lack a larger unifying 
belonging-together-in-the-world narrative that would be needed to legitimate and practically 
realize a world polity in practice. Lastly, I found that capitalism has produced a global system 
and a global situation, but that it does not make humankind an indifferent throng imagined as a 
“whatever community” by Agamben and the “multitude” by Hardt and Negri. I found these 
visions to suffer from incoherence, because humankind in a modern capitalist world system is 
not indifferent, but rather that it is busy living billions of meaningful modern lives, different lives 
with variety of goals, ideals, and identities that often conflict. The visions of the whatever 
community and multitude also struggle to provide a practical vision because they rely too heavily 
on idealistic notions of love and solidarity that bely the existence of conflict and practical need 
for a meaningful narrative. 
 All this leads to the question that if the collective-self-narrative of a world polity must be 
something sociologically specific and if it cannot be morally neutral or utterly indifferent, then 
what are the range of historically and sociologically specific narratives that it could possibly 
take? In the following chapter, I turn to historical conceptions of a global civil society often 
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conceived in liberal cosmopolitan terms, but also in historically specific sociological terms. This 
idea of a global civil society was, not too long ago, fairly prominent in the discourse of world 
order. Starting with an exploration of this current of thought, I also push the search in the next 
chapter into the territory of what historical conceptions are rising in the place of declining and 
problematic visions of a global civil society. 
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Chapter Five. 
Towards a Trans-Civilizational World Polity 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In a late modern era, the citizen to whom a single set of laws cannot apply is the citizen of the 
world. In a context where capital ‘C’ definitions of civilization are overturned, in an age of 
multiple and oftentimes rival cosmopolitanisms, the ancient connection long ago made by Zeno, 
between a universal cosmos and the universal law of a world city, no longer holds water.328 
Whose cosmos? What law? In this chapter, I want to suggest that the self-consciously historical 
and “anti-foundationalist” liberal cosmopolitan successor to modern liberal universalism is dying 
in practice and is increasingly difficult to defend in theory.329 Beyond it, I make an expedition 
into what I characterize as a trans-civilizational vision, one that is anti-foundationalist and 
cosmopolitan, but not exclusively liberal, representing the push towards a new cosmopolitan 
imaginary. I point towards a variety of thought that can be seen to share a common post-Western 
and trans-civilizational cosmopolitics. 
My aim in this chapter is to suggest the decline of the liberal notion of a “global civil 
society”, and pushing past it, to draw out the emerging trans-civilizational conception of a world 
polity and subject it to conceptual scrutiny. My argument is that this new conception has points 
of strength, but also significant weaknesses, particularly the tenuous patchwork character of its 
historical narrative that makes it vulnerable to detractors, as well as its dependence on an as yet 
underdeveloped global political economy model. In this argument, I first briefly review the rise 
of anti-foundationalist liberal cosmopolitanism of the global civil society vision. I make the case 
for its decline in practice and review its critics in theory. Second, as a corrective to analyses that 
conflate multi-polarity with civilizational clashes of multiple modernities, I explain why the rise 
of a multipolar balance of power means neither a “realist” disorder, nor a mere loosening of the 
liberal world order, but the growth of a post-Western world order, in the continuing realization of 	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modernity. Third, I unpack the meaning of an emerging post-Western cosmopolitanism as a 
position on world order, and fourth, I draw out and analyze the trans-civilizational world polity 
conception it offers. My conclusion points towards the problem of climate change and changing 
ecological conceptions of society in nature that ultimately might wash this vision away before it 
ever takes root. 
 
5.2 The Decline of Liberal Cosmopolitanism 
 
The high tide of liberal cosmopolitanism in world politics is hard to place, but it has undoubtedly 
broken. What was it? In one strain, it was conceived in universalist terms, expressed in the 
search for universal moral codes, like those studied in Chapter 3. In a different strain, it was 
conceived in historically and culturally specific terms, as a liberal Western culture thought to be 
of cosmopolitan relevance and import. This movement from universal codes, to the sentiments 
and sympathies of historically and culturally specific liberal values, particularly in the writings of 
Richard Rorty, was a helpful and important step in the right direction, in the search for a world 
polity. It raised the possibility of a shared collective-self-narrative that could express and help 
generate the sentiments and common sympathies needed for a world polity, regardless of what 
universal laws may exist.330 Its limits, however, in its ability to convince all humankind of the 
virtues of liberalism has to be questioned. Whether or not they are better virtues, it is a liberal 
fantasy to believe all humankind would become liberal, not only because the world has so many 
cultures, but also because its societies have been galvanized to defend their distinct cultures and 
identities in a post-colonial context. An historically and culturally specific narrative of a larger 
loyalty and belonging is needed to legitimize and ground a world polity in practice, but a 
narrative larger than Western liberal-democratic horizons is needed too. 
A recent strain of liberal cosmopolitanism was conceived by many as an emerging 
“global civil society”, an altruistic transnational network of solidarities, expressed in 
cosmopolitan law and norms, advocated for and shared by NGO’s, individuals and social 
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movements, various groups, and philanthropic corporations.331 Proclaimed by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and intellectuals at the London School of Economics, this global civil 
society was called on to cajole the international community towards a more free, equal, and 
pacific world.332 Building upon an historical experience of modern liberalism, with civil society 
and a public sphere as an achievement of modern history, this movement shed the universal 
foundations of liberalism, but maintained much of its contents, seeking historical and 
sociological foundations for the idea of global civil society.333 
Though popular for a time, this movement had its critics and is, today, increasingly 
difficult to defend in theory and dying practice. In practice, its effectiveness was undermined by 
the failures and upheavals of the global war on terror. Its promise of a more prosperous world 
has also been sapped by the great recession and evident failures of neoliberal economic 
globalization, to which it was closely aligned. Global civil society, as a moving force in a new 
globalized world order, failed to deliver on its promise of peace and prosperity. In theory, the 
concept of a global civil society was criticized for lacking a world government to direct its 
energies towards and to be cohered by. The criticism is that there has to be something to be a 
public of or towards for the idea to be coherent, there has to be some political framework to 
constitute a world public.334 The modern idea of a civil society is about a public and public 
sphere discussing and advocating certain actions of a shared government and taking action where 
the government fell short of responsibilities and expectations. This idea does not make sense in a 
global context lacking a common government. The idea of a global civil society, in this respect, 
is aspirational, but ultimately problematic when taken from the domestic realm and applied to an 
international context. More damaging was the criticism that a precondition for a cosmopolitan 
global civil society is the liberal imaginary of altruistic solidarities amongst atomist 
individuals.335 It is a certain Western, liberal, and bourgeois way of seeing the social world, not 	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easily or unproblematically applicable to non-Western contexts. To an extent, there is something 
of a transnational civil society network emerging around global governance structures, but its 
civil society does not really exist beyond the bourgeois world of mostly Western elites.336 The 
cosmopolitan solidarity that global civil society advocates aspire to requires a larger more 
encompassing, cosmopolitan narrative than the predominantly liberal-Western vision of 
collaborating cosmopolitan individuals on a global scale. If a world government were 
established, hypothetically speaking, the practice of a global civil society would need to 
accommodate alternative forms of belonging and public discourse, beyond the fairly Western-
centric conception presently entertained in the global civil society idea. 
Mervyn Frost has argued that the bedrock of the global civil society movement is the 
promotion of human rights, because they constitute human beings as rights bearing civilians, 
constituting the ability to engage in civil activities.337 Yet, as we saw in chapter 3, there is more 
difficulty in agreeing on which rights really matter in a global than local context. To overcome 
this challenge, some have suggested a pragmatic solution, making human rights matter for 
pragmatic ends, practical achievements and actually desired goals and values.338  This suggestion 
salvages the utility of human rights discourse, pointing the way for their local and issue specific 
use. But, on a global scale, it hardly escapes the question of which goods human rights are good 
for and for whom. It is correct so say that this is important for establishing an overlapping 
consensus on human rights, by clarifying which rights are practically desired and which make a 
practical difference. Yet, that is still an ambition and not a practical achievement. There is still 
no consensus on which rights matter, when, where, and why. The public discourse and activities 
of an imagined global civil society might help work towards an overlapping consensus, but it 
itself cannot be based on human rights, in so far as there is no agreement on which take priority, 
and to what ends. 
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These critiques of global civil society discourse have arisen alongside the anti-
globalization movement embracing the global poor and working class, socialist intellectuals, the 
green movement, and global south. The anti-globalization camp, picking up added momentum 
from the 2008 financial crisis, has appropriated the idea of a global civil society, giving it a 
critical twist of resistance “from below”.339 This movement embraces several movements, a 
grand alliance of resistance to economic globalization. It has a semblance as a resistance 
movement and it rallies larger masses of people than elitist forms of globalism, but, as a 
movement, it is still searching for its vision of a better world. It is, primarily, a resistance 
movement, rather than a revolutionary movement with a practical vision. Rather than a single 
idea emerging from this movement, it contains several, critical emancipatory ideas and 
ecological planetary ideas most prominently. Those ideas I consider on their own terms. 
However, their common rival, the liberal discourse of a global civil society, is increasingly 
difficult to defend in theory and dying in practice. 
 
5.3 Civilizations are What Humankind Makes of Them . . . 
 
What comes next? In this section, I want to devote some time to discussing what does not follow 
from the decline of liberal cosmopolitan globalism. This lay some of the foundations for my later 
argument. The first mistaken idea is the thought that the wake of liberal cosmopolitanism means 
an end to cosmopolitanism. That is a nauseatingly liberal-centric notion. This notion is 
sometimes thought to be given support by the contemporary context of an emerging multipolar 
world order, where a relative decline of the liberal West reveals new world order questions. Yet, 
the relative decline of Western powers also raises new opportunities, about world order 
trajectories and possibilities.  It is too easy to think the concurrent decline of liberal 
cosmopolitanism and the decline of Western liberal powers means the return of a realist world 
order with a clash of civilizational states. The reality is more complicated, with multiple 
cosmopolitanisms and civilizations, at times colliding and conflicting, but also mixing and co-
constituting. To clear the way for an exploration of this complex post-liberal and post-Western 
world order that contains a new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism, I want to first briefly 	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suggest that conflict in contemporary world affairs is less endemic than realists claim but also 
more pronounced than liberals have admitted. 
The well-known Huntington Fukuyama debate exaggerates world affairs in a post-Cold 
War context, but it contains some insights nonetheless. In broad strokes, Francis Fukuyama 
argued capitalist liberal democracy, in its modern Western secularized form, was the “end of 
history”, but, in the rise of ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism, and geo-political rivalries 
in world affairs, it evidently was not.340 Fukuyama was right to suggest the conflict over 
modernity between Western ideologies was largely terminated with the dissolution of Soviet 
power. Soviet modernity had become defunct and invalidated, in Russia and abroad. 341 
Communism is no longer a major force in world affairs and no alternative socio-political 
economic system has emerged as a rival vision of modernity on the global and revolutionary 
scale that communism once held. The post-Cold War conflict that has emerged, first took on 
ethnic dimensions, in the ethnic cleansing episodes in the 1990’s, but on a geo-political level, 
tensions have also increasingly taken on cultural-civilizational dimensions, between Western and 
non-Western modernities, as Huntington had suggested it would.342 This return of history, some 
think, gives Huntington’s infamous clash of civilizations thesis the winning hand of empirical 
verification. Huntington argued that, in the absence of Cold War rivalry, “civilizations” would 
form the most significant foci of solidarities and fault lines of conflict in world affairs.343 This 
image of a civilizational clash, as has often been argued, is incoherent, because civilizations are 
not rigid freestanding blocks of culture. Civilizations are, rather, internally diverse, interrelated, 
and co-constitutive flows of meanings, narratives, and practices.344 As such, the meaning 
discursively attributed to one civilization, shapes the others, and vice versa. Their contents are 
interrelated, discursively, in their narrative construction. Because the civilizations are co-
constitutive narratives performed in practice, their clash is only a result of their relational co-
constitution, not a result of fundamental hostilities between them. The idea of a clash of 	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civilizations could be thought of as, at bottom, a clash of the values emphasized by the cultural 
systems of civilizations. Yet, again, the values that different civilizations emphasize depends on 
shifting webs of narrative and practice, interpretations of beliefs and events. Civilizations are not 
colliding fundamentalisms because there is nothing fundamental about them. For example, the 
events of Sept. 11, 2001, that gave wind to Huntington’s thesis, as its empirical verification, was 
also met by the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ and earlier ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ movements, 
that have worked to constitute an alternative narrative of the relations between Islam and the 
West.345 The response and interpretation of events depends on the narratives constructed around 
them. The relations of civilizations are socially constructed. There is more tension and conflict 
than the Fukuyama thesis predicted, because liberal-democratic Western civilization is not the 
only form of civilized modernity, but conflict is also not as impending and unavoidable as 
Huntington’s thesis suggested. 
It is the importance of “civilization” as a form of soft power in the modern discourse of 
world order that gives Huntington’s thesis its insight, but it is also the simplicity of his 
understanding of civilizational conflict that muddies the insight. Whenever conflict or rivalry 
emerges in the context of multiple civilizational attributes and symbols, the clash of civilizations 
thesis appears to be verified. Beyond the war on terror, the rise of civilizational great power 
states has given Huntington’s thesis a further source of support combined with familiar 
understandings of great power rivalry. China, India, Iran, Japan, amongst others, including, 
according to Vladimir Putin, Russia as well, all involve the embodied notions and discourses of a 
‘civilizational-state.’346 The increasing use of civilizational narratives by great powers today 
marshals their soft power in a modern context. Civilization is a powerful idea in the modern 
discourse of world order, because civilization was once equated, in the practice of international 
law and in the lectures of Guizot, for instance, with the West and Western modernity, both 
racially and culturally.347 The concept of civilization, so conflated with Europe and the West, as 
such, was discursively used to legitimate the world order supremacy of Western powers and 	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constituted the civilizing mission of Western modernity, as the self-styled height of humanity’s 
modern progress. As such, the appropriation of the concept of civilization by rising non-Western 
powers legitimates their search for great power status in world affairs, as rival and equally 
modern civilizations.348 Yet, it is the conflict between the great powers that is primary, not their 
civilizational soft power discourses.349 The relative decline of the U.S. and rise of China, for 
instance, is not the fault line of an impending civilizational great power clash. It is a power 
transition between a rising and declining hegemons that could result in a clash. G.J. Ikenberry 
and others have rightly argued the degree of conflict in this context of an increasingly multipolar 
balance of power should not be exaggerated.350 The rising powers are pushing for fairer position 
in international organizations, and the continued, if reformed, importance of those organizations, 
and the globalization agenda in general. These great powers are not trapped in the implacable 
conflict of colliding civilizational values, they are seeking position and leverage to advance their 
conflicting power interests. 
The relative decline of the Western powers does mean a decline in Western led and 
enforced world order values and principles, primarily liberal world order values and principles. 
John Mearsheimer, a hardnosed kind of realist, argues a great power struggle is inevitable, not 
because of civilizational discourses, but because to rise, other powers, in relation, must decline, 
which powers rarely if ever willingly do.351 The inevitability of a clash is too strong a position, 
because there is a difference between power balancing, which goes on and on, and power 
struggles, which are started by actors and end, with victorious and vanquished actors. 
Mearsheimer is too “structural-systemic” in his thinking, overlooking the role of agents and 
circumstance, history, in the origins of great power conflicts.352 Although the majority of 
hegemonic transitions in the past five hundred years have resulted in military conflict, there is no 	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definite reason why ongoing power balancing and rebalancing must lead to open power 
struggle.353 There is an awareness of a historical trend of conflicts and a mood of fear amidst a 
condition of uncertainty, but there are no implacable or inevitable conflicts amongst the great 
powers, be they conflicts of modern values or economics or security or territorial claims. 
Although there are obvious tensions in world affairs between the great powers, that could spark 
power struggles, it is more accurate to say that rising powers are reform minded, rather than 
outright revisionist. China pursues a policy of a “peaceful rise” and seeks a fairer and mutually 
secure international order, although there are tensions produced by some specific policies used 
towards these ends. Rising powers are not liberal powers, and so there is a potential for conflict, 
but neither are they illiberal, in the sense that they are not fundamentally opposed to liberal 
values per se, they merely do not wish to be liberal themselves. As Ikenberry points out, rising 
powers want first and foremost a fair seat at the table in international organizations, like the UN 
Security Council, World Bank, and so on. There is no inevitable clash of civilizational great 
powers, only a decline of the preeminence of Western led liberal values, with the relative decline 
of Western power, coinciding with the criticism of liberal Western ideas in theory. 
 What does a less Western-centric world order look like? There are a few visions of a 
revised world order. Ikenberry argues a ‘liberal internationalism 3.0’ is emerging.354 This would 
be a new installment of a liberal world order, the first being set in 1919 at Versailles, the second, 
2.0, being set in 1945 and revised and expanded with the Washington Consensus. The picture of 
liberal internationalism 3.0 is a world order with enlarged and multiplied global institutions, a 
revised UN, WTO, and IMF system, potentially with greater ability to interfere in domestic 
policies, but it is also a more inclusive picture, where international institutions are less dominated 
by the US and less US centric in their policy directives. An alternative vision to Ikenberry’s, is 
Amitav Acharya’s vision of an emerging regional world order. He likens it to a ‘multiplex 
cinema’, with many simultaneous regional theatres staging local norms and rules.355 Acharya’s 
picture is not unproblematic, however. While different regional organizations develop and 
decline at different speeds the chief problem with Acharya’s image is that the regions are already 
integrated globally to such an extent that their further development would practically require an 	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overarching ordering framework.356 Acharya suggests the regionalist order can serve as a 
‘stepping stone’ to a ‘universal’ order, but he fails to realize how a multiplex theatre requires a 
pre-established building in which to house the many simultaneous theatres, since otherwise it 
would not be a multiplex, but multiple separate buildings.357 Barry Buzan’s alternative picture of 
‘decentered globalism’, where globalization continues, but is less US centric, has more affinity to 
Ikenberry’s vision.358 But, what is being globally decentered in his picture is not articulated 
sufficiently beyond a notion of global capitalism.359 The trouble, conceptually, is how Buzan and 
Ikenberry are both short on details about normative ordering principles. For Buzan, neglecting to 
fill in the contents of his picture stems from his lack of interest in normative principles. For 
Ikenberry, this neglect amounts to an oversight in his analysis where he does not admit that while 
rising powers demand fairer position in international organizations, they also demand fairer 
recognition of their moral principles and positions. He is mistaken to suggest that, ‘It remains a 
question whether the norms –or ideology of liberal order- are sufficiently coherent and widely-
enough embraced to make this post-hegemonic order function.’360 It is not an open question. 
Liberalism as it has been conceived during the era of US supremacy, with universal human 
rights, and secular Western democracy, is increasingly difficult to defend in theory and it is not 
widely enough embraced in practice to ground the logic of the system without persistent US 
supremacy. Even its economic face, neoliberal economics, is not without question today, and, is 
in several ways struggling to maintain itself in theory and practice. 
But, again, if this decline of liberalism does not inevitably mean a clash of civilizational 
great powers, then what does the emerging shifted and ‘decentered-globalism’ look like? I want 
to argue that the emerging multipolar world order enables and necessarily involves a new trans-
civilizational cosmopolitanism, to give meaning and form to the necessarily globalist aspects of 
that world. For a world order to be achieved, it will necessarily remain globalist in scope and 
content, as Buzan, Hurrell, and Ikenberry suggest, because the world is already integrated and 
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interdependent. The question, however, is not so much whether liberal principles will endure, but 
rather whether liberalism and its contenders can be subsumed into larger trans-civilizational 
ordering principles. It is too easy, and more than a touch Eurocentric, to think the decline of a 
liberal world order and neo-liberal cosmopolitanism means the decline of cosmopolitanism 
generally speaking. Despite its complexity and hurdles in practice, the vision of a trans-
civilizational world polity is not impossible, only unlikely and fragile. Yet, why should the rise 
of contemporary geo-political rivalries and global disorder not be taken as the birth pangs of an 
alternative post-liberal and trans-civilizational world order? New orders are always born out of 
the collapse and destruction of old orders. 
 
5.4 The New Cosmopolitanism 
 
What do I mean by trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism? I mean a kind of culturally pluralist 
cosmopolitanism, one wherein a trans-civilizational collective-self-conception connects to a new 
sense of belonging with a new cosmopolitan character. By this, I do not mean the 
cosmopolitanism of UNESCO, which also has a trans-civilizational character. The UNESCO 
idea of a “cultural heritage” of humankind is conducive and supportive of the idea of a global 
civilization and trans-civilizational narrative, but it is not exactly what I mean by the collective-
self-conception and sense of belonging associated with a new cosmopolitanism. A common 
cultural heritage is not the same thing as a common sense of belonging. The former is not 
constitutive of a “society” or polity; it only forms a cultural background in a world of multiple 
polities.361 It is a conceptual category mistake to say a world cultural heritage forms a world 
polity or “society”.362 A shared sense of belonging, connected to a meaningful collective-self-
conception, is what I mean by a new cosmopolitanism, one that is constitutive of the collective 
identity of a realizable world polity. Paul Gilroy has pointed towards South African politics as a 
site and source of the new cosmopolitanism that I mean, where belonging is grounded in a 
narrative connected to the rejection of Apartheid and development of a pluralistic 
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cosmopolitanism beyond race, class, and nation.363 There is, in this new cosmopolitanism, a co-
constitution of civilizations, rather than their clash, a new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism 
with a sense of belonging. 
An interesting expression of this idea is Achille Mbembe’s recent articulation of 
“Afropolitanism.” He describes this outlook as cosmopolitan, but from the perspective of Africa 
as a part of the world, and not apart from it. Pan-Africanism, by contrast, was a racial solidarity 
against the white world order. Afropolitanism is about Africa being a part of a cosmopolitan 
world and the world being incomplete without it.364 For Mbembe, Afropolitanism is one amongst 
many cosmopolitanisms, in a ‘common world’, a ‘tout-monde’, one world of worlds, a 
worldcosm, if you will, a cosmopolitan imaginary of all the imaginings and dreams of 
humankind forming together the world dream of a common world project. Mbembe explains, the 
‘project of a world in common founded on the principle of “equal shares” and on the principle of 
the fundamental unity of human beings’ is ‘a universal project’ today.365 This expresses a 
narrative of narratives, taking the form of a new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism, where the 
shared experience of modernity, the common post-colonial and capitalist world, has come to 
form a common world, a global civilization containing a plurality of civilizational worlds.  
This vision is increasingly expressed in world politics. Another interesting discussion 
from theory is Giorgio Shani’s work on post-secular human security.366 As Shani demonstrates, 
liberal cosmopolitanism can be provincialized in a world of cosmopolitanisms, all intermixing 
and interrelated, spatially, temporally, conceptually, politically.367 Secular narratives of the 
human and cosmopolitan belonging are but one outlook in a world of cosmopolitan outlooks. 
Shani’s work is important because it broaches the shores of that larger cosmopolitan collective-
self-narrative of humankind, beyond the parochially global secular liberal order, towards a post-
liberal, post-secular, post-Western, trans-civilizational cosmopolitan human security. This is an 
interesting example because it allows for a plurality of principles on a global scale, rather than 
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seeking one principle. The writings of L.H.M. Ling and Anna M. Agathangelou provide a 
similarly pluralistic vision, tailored towards the world order question. They suggest that beyond 
the neoliberal Westphalian world order there is emerging a ‘world of multiple worlds’.368 They 
articulate an outlook of ‘worldism’, where the multiple civilizational worlds of the world are 
seen as relationally co-constitutive, relationally productive of a mutual, shared, world, conducive 
to a transcivilizational world order. For instance, Ling argues the Chinese world order vision of 
Tianxia and the liberal Wesphalian world order vision are in a co-constitutive relation, a part of 
one another, and so, offering the shared world for a shared world order, a larger co-constitutive 
trans-civilizational collective-self-narrative and emerging world order vision.369 We might look, 
for instance, to the slogan of the 2008 Olympics, “One World One Dream”, which, coupled with 
the Chinese state’s recent motto of a “China Dream”, was deliberately articulated to be inclusive 
and not exclusive of the older rhetoric and ideal of an “American Dream”. This language of 
national dreams is a national discourse, about national patriotism, but the language of a world 
dream, as an inclusive multi-civilizational concept, is suggestive of Ling’s ‘worldism’.370 
Elsewhere, in the context of the turmoil besetting the Middle East, for instance, there are 
beginnings of discussion about an emerging new pluralistic cosmopolitan imaginary, one in 
opposition to both the religious fundamentalism of ISIS and the Islamic Brotherhood, as well as 
their secularist rivals.371 The world level idea here is for a trans-civilizational world order where 
its globalist component is a new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism that is contingent on the 
decline of liberal universalism and embracing of various non-liberal pluralistic 
cosmopolitanisms. 
In line with these trends in thought is the book A Transcivilizational Perspective on 
International Law, by Onuma Yasuaki. He argues Bentham’s old term ‘international’ is wearing 
thin and that a trans-civilizational world order is on the horizons of world politics, if not 
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immediately of a post-Westphalian form.372 He suggests, ‘international society composed of 
States will gradually assume more characteristic features of a global society’ involving a trans-
civilizational perspective on international law.373  He estimates its realization is practically one 
hundred years out because the 21st century will involve significant development and state 
building.374 Perhaps his estimate is correct, but perhaps the two movements, building a world 
polity on top and fixing up the weak places and inequities in the society of states, can go 
together, mutually reinforce. Today, the idea of a “global civilization” is often used in an 
imprecise way, just to mean the global systems, economic and bureaucratic, of modernity, the 
globally connected and interdependent modern world. Some, however, see the multiple 
civilizations of humankind as forming today, in a more meaningful way, a single global 
civilization of modernity, a civilization of civilizations that enjoys contributions, and could not 
exist without, each of its constitutive civilizations.375 This larger civilizational outlook could 
grow through discursive action and performance in the context of a trans-civilizational world 
order. Perhaps over two or three generations, this sense of a world civilization, pluralistic and 
world-spanning would be the historical norm. 
 
5.5 A Post-Western Modernity? 
 
The new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism constitutes a narrative of narratives, as a 
civilization of civilizations. I have often times suggested in this thesis that such a meta-narrative 
is needed to legitimize a world polity. The feature of a narrative of narratives is needed to make 
the concept acceptable to all parties, who, in a late modern age, are not ready to accept claims to 
the universal narrative of a universal authority, above the others. In a late modern context, which, 
importantly, is a post-colonial context, everyone has been mobilized to defend their way of life, 
their nation, their creed, and civilizations, the primary means to which has been revolutionary 
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freedom and independence.376 An anti-imperial age, a revolutionary age, has mobilized, if you 
will, huge numbers of peoples and churned countless cultures in countless ways towards the 
defense of equal claims to equal shares and equal standing in modernity, with distinct identities 
and particular cultural heritages, via striving for freedoms and independence. Any unifying 
collective-self-narrative must contend with and accommodate this modern ambition. If the world 
polity were not realized with a trans-civilizational character, it would not get off the ground, 
because it would face too many detractors who would find it unacceptable to their modern self-
conceptions and ambitions as distinctly modern civilizations, with distinct, meaningful, and 
embodied cultural forms of being modernly civilized in the plurality of modern civilizations. 
The realizable world polity, in a late modern era, must chiefly involve a trans-
civilizational narrative, rather than a religious, political-ideological, scientific narrative, or some 
other narrative of the collective identity of humankind, because in modern times, civilization is 
intricately connected to modernity and world order. In a modern context, civilization in its 
modern usage as the mastery of technological power and “civilized” practices and worldviews, is 
imagined as the achievement of modernity, and has become the source of legitimacy in the 
modern discourse of world order, as the language for the modern standards and hallmarks of 
human excellence and exemplariness.377 Late modern civilization is global, but also plural.378 
The concept of civilization once used to legitimize European empire, has been appropriated by 
post-colonial peoples, in their ‘systematic defense of the non-European civilizations.’ 379 
Huntington’s thesis of an impending “clash of civilizations” has been much critiqued, but it 
contained the insight that in a modern world, everyone wants ‘to modernize but not to 
Westernize.’380 Because “civilization” was the historical criterion of legitimacy in the modern 
discourse of world order, and so became a systematically appropriated concept by post-colonial 
peoples, legitimate standing as a world power is connected in contemporary late modern times 	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not only to global democratic, human rights, and market standards of modernity, but also to 
civilizational distinctiveness and integrity, distinct ways of being modernly civilized, Japanese, 
Chinese, Indian, Russian, Iranian, and so on.381 If a world polity did not involve civilizational 
discourse, it would be confronted and challenged and undermined by these established 
civilizational discourses and practices of legitimacy in late modern times. In late modern times, 
for there to be a world polity to support a unified world order, a “higher” trans-civilizational 
narrative is needed to legitimize it as a shared project for all humankind and all its civilizations. 
By, “higher”, I do not mean a universally superior Civilization, because there are no generally 
recognized superior or inferior civilizations in late modern times. I mean a civilization that 
enables shared values and ideals across and above those of the plural civilizations of humankind. 
This notion of a trans-civilizational narrative is a tenuous and difficult to realize 
narrative, however, because civilization and what it means to be modern, has been fiercely 
debated and pluralized, in modern times, mobilizing modern Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Russian, 
and many other civilizational self-conceptions, to cast off and rebut the colonial pretense of a tri-
parted synonym between Western civilization, modernity, and being civilized. There are multiple 
civilizational collective identities in late modern times, and they all matter, providing sources for 
shared values and meaningful lives, and they have played an important role in undermining the 
conceit of Western colonialism as a civilizing mission. If a world polity is to practically appeal to 
humankind in modern times, practically uniting humankind with a united world order as a shared 
project of humankind, it must rally and marshal modern civilizational narratives around a larger 
narrative of a shared global civilization of modernity, through the articulation of a trans-
civilizational collective-self-narrative, reimagining what it means to be modern and civilized in 
trans-civilizational terms, so to enable the imagination of a larger shared set of “higher” ideals 
about who we aspire to be and admire, fostering a larger sense of belonging to a common 
modern civilization with a shared world polity project. Belonging in the world polity would 
mean membership in the trans-civilization of global modernity, sharing in its “higher” 
understanding of being modern and civilized. Opposing membership and contribution to the 
world polity project would be seen as uncivilized. Universal narratives, grounding a world 	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authority, like the narratives of the ancient cosmologically central empires, Egyptian, 
Babylonian, Persian, Roman, Byzantine, Chinese, etc., are no longer coherent in a modern age 
and in a global post-colonial era of multiple civilizational modernities, where virtually all 
humankind rejects the primacy of any idiosyncratic narrative. This is much of the appeal of a 
trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism, that it makes a “higher” narrative out of multiple narratives 
of what it means to be mondernly civilized. 
But, what about the in-it-together feeling of solidarity that I have also argued is needed? 
Does this new trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism contain this sense of belonging and 
solidarity? A sense of being-in-it-together, a sense of solidarity, is also needed for this narrative 
to have a practical application to practice. Without such a sense of belonging and mutual 
commitment of support, conflicts become difficult to reconcile and questions of distributive 
justice become difficult to work out on a practical level. The question needs to be pried open 
slightly before it can be reasonably answered.  It is important to point out again that civilizations 
are murky things, as it were, with no central inner essence. Civilizations are webs of meaning 
and varieties of practices, with no essential features, only shifting composite ones, marshaled in 
discursive action.382 As such, I want to argue that it is not the civilization itself per se that 
civilizational solidarities are formed around. It is the shared beliefs and ideals that marshaled 
civilizational discourses enable and sustain that people fashion solidarities around. For instance, 
it is modern but Western notions of liberty, it has been argued, that have been enabled by the 
discourse of Western civilization in modern times, which gives the narrative of that civilization 
its images of shared ambitions and embodied practices of what Westerners admire and despise, 
in various ways, in general, in the many iterations of the “West” across time and space.383 The 
“West” is not a singular or static thing, with a core essential value identity, but rather a 
complicated realm of discourse and practice that enables the promotion of values, and 
reimagination of values, to give meaning to practices and actions, by mustering narratives and 
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worldviews.384 This is to say that it is what the civilizations are marshaled to stand for, at least 
what they are taken to stand for, in a given time and discursive action, that people rally around 
and invest identities in on civilizational scales. Civilizations, like nations, are imaginary,385 
indeed, but they do matter to people, because of the meaning they enable and the values they 
harbor with that meaning. Chinese civilization matters, the West matters, Indian, Persian, and the 
other civilizations matter to peoples lives, enabling the imagination of worlds of ideals and 
meaning. 
In this respect, what are the ideals of a supposed world civilization transcending all the 
distinct civilizations, what are the “higher” ambitions that it involves, what sorts of things does it 
enable us to admire and strive for? What would solidarity around this civilization mean? This 
question is easier to answer if we make it clear that the purpose of a trans-civilizational world 
polity is a larger belonging that enables humankind to overcome the problems of its division into 
multiple races and nation states, whilst also not excluding different cultural ways of life or 
privileging any one civilization. If this is the aim of a trans-civilizational world polity, then, I 
want to suggest that its ideal, enabled by its narrative of a world civilization of civilizations, is a 
new post-Western (but nonetheless modern) sense of freedom as a larger belonging, inclusive of 
all civilizations. This trans-civilizational sense of freedom means the freedom to be a part of the 
world, irrespective of one’s cultural horizons and to pursue the ideals and goods important to 
those horizons, because the world is imagined as incomplete without those horizons. One of the 
fundamental lessons of late modern times, most appreciated by cosmopolitan Anthropologists, is 
that all civilizations and cultures have something to say and contribute to the world and that the 
world is “larger” for them. The sense of freedom I am getting at goes beyond and is a “higher” 
value than any one sense of freedom, individual or collective, Western or otherwise. It goes 
beyond liberal notions of “liberties”, for instance. It is the value of a post-Western sense of 
freedom that would rally a sense of solidarity, of something around which to stand together for 
as a world polity, to be in-it-together for, as a shared ambition connected to a sense of belonging. 
Let me attempt to unpack it further. Some of this discussion below is slightly repetitive, 
but is meant to state the idea I am advancing in several ways, to get it across as it were, because 	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it is a hard idea to comprehend, perhaps especially for those working from a liberal Western 
outlook. In a modern age, everyone has demanded and defends their rights for the sake of 
freedoms, albeit various kinds of freedoms, individual and collective, all conceived in culturally 
distinct forms in multiple forms of modernity. This suggests that what is emerging in the new 
cosmopolitanism is a new enlarged multi-civilizational multicultural sense of freedom, one that 
is about being a part of the world, as belonging to the world, rather than having freedom apart 
from it. It is not a loosening of liberal freedom, but the provincialization of liberal notions of 
freedom, in a larger multi-civilizational post-liberal and post-Western sense of modern 
freedom.386 I mean a sense of being in-it-together so to be free together, by realizing a larger 
belonging of all humankind in its multi-civilizational dimensions, in a late modern and multi-
civilizational era. This is about moving beyond the liberal politics of difference, where being in-
it-together was paradoxically restricted to conditions of sameness. 387  The conditions for 
solidarity, for being in-it-together, in the new cosmopolitan politics of belonging, are about 
conditions of being in the modern world, so being of the modern world, and thereby part of the 
modern world, belonging in it, not apart from it. This notion is not about everyone recognizing 
everyone else in the world, even though recognitions are an aspect of it (is it even possible for 
everyone to “recognize” everyone else in the world?). This new cosmopolitan belonging is about 
making a larger belonging around a multi-civilizational sense of freedom, as strong evaluation, 
against which other values can be evaluated. It is about making solidarity with the variety of 
forms of freedom as a shared value, a shared ideal, against which the other values can weighed 
and measured. It is this sense of a larger belonging of humankind, a shared commitment to a 
diverse sense of freedom that is held up by the narrative of a world civilization of multiple 
modern civilizations. It is upon this fixture of this shared value in the narrative that solidarity can 
fasten. One way to put this is to say that if the world is becoming “decentered” but will remain 
“globalist”, as Buzan has argued, then the “globalist” aspect of “decentred globalism” is 
potentially more than global capitalism, it is potentially a stage for this post-Western 
cosmopolitanism. 	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 The emergence of this new sense of freedom, as a larger trans-civilizational belonging, is 
not the decline of modern notions of freedom, but their increasingly realized form. Modern 
liberal concepts of freedom, it has become increasingly apparent, are not the only valid modern 
conceptions of freedom. This is why what I am driving at can be understood as post-liberal. 
When I say post-liberal, I mean the decline of a world in which liberal values are taken to be the 
universal values, be they stated on foundationalist or anti-foundationalist grounds. Not only has 
the universality of liberal ideals become increasingly invalidated, in an age of civilizational and 
identity politics, but the power to project liberal ideals upon the world is in decline, prefacing the 
rise of a world in which non-liberal powers articulate and project non-liberal values in world 
affairs. Western liberty is becoming a provincial ideal and a new cosmopolitan politics with a 
“higher” notion of freedom is on the horizon of a post-Western world. In this sense, the new 
cosmopolitan politics of belonging, with a “higher” or “larger” sense of modern freedom, is the 
continuing realization of modernity in practice, from a Western-centric dominated discourse and 
practice, to a post-Western discourse and practice. 
It is reasonable to suggest that the West itself is shifting as well in late modern times, that 
Western liberalism too is shifting in this context, in response to the decline of Western 
preeminence and in response perhaps to a larger cultural awareness as well. The new post-
Western cosmopolitanism parallels a variety of post-liberal trends in Western discourse, 
political, artistic, social, and religious.388 I am saying that liberal peoples are finding post-liberal 
outlooks, but I am not saying everyone was liberal, and is now becoming post-liberal. The 
suggestion is only that there is an increasingly evident post-liberal discourse in Western contexts. 
It conveys an image of social life that is more “relational” than “atomist”, where the members of 
the social enterprise are constituted relationally, rather than independently and prior to social life. 
There is a quasi-rebellion, an intellectual and social rebellion, a cultural rebellion that is, against 
the old dichotomies of the liberal imaginary. Where everyone in the modern liberal social 
imaginary is imagined as individuals, albeit in gendered and racialized and national-citizen social 
categories, the signs of a post-liberal imaginary suggest a more socially complex and convoluted 
picture, since it is increasingly grasped and recognized that not everyone is or need or ought to 	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be so liberal or individualistic. The picture of who is collaborating in a modern order, and how 
they are co-constituting, that is, is highly complex, unspecific, in contrast to the specifically 
atomistic liberal image of social life.389 This connects to a shift in the meaning of liberty, from 
the atomist to relational. From this relational outlook springs the vision that people are not 
becoming more and more alike, because the more they relate and share narratives and practices 
the more social complexity develops, the more possible combinations of self-conceptions and 
practices are relationally co-constituted.390 As noted above, this post-liberal outlook implies that, 
rather than a clash of civilizations, civilizations are relationally co-constituting one another. 
Identity politics in a globalizing world and the late modern idea of social construction are, it can 
be suggested, impacting Western discourses. Yet, their rise in Western discourses, by effect, has 
contributed to a subtly reimagined “post-liberal” self and politics as produced or constituted by 
the relations between persons, groups, and peoples, rather than amongst “atomistic” rational 
individuals. To what extent this rise of post-liberal discourse in the West represents a genuine 
transformation or a counter-culture is not entirely clear, but it does parallel the mood and attitude 
of the new post-Western cosmopolitanism, forming its expression in a Western context. 
 Even if this post-Western trans-civilizational cosmopolitanism is difficult to comprehend 
(but not impossible), one of its merits is that it is more coherent than its liberal cosmopolitan 
predecessor. Liberal cosmopolitanism, as has so often been pointed out, is too often Eurocentric, 
imagining everyone in liberal categories.391 A post-Western cosmopolitanism does not suffer 
from this invalid empirical assumption and its emphasis on co-constitution and relational social 
processes grasp social reality is a more accurate way than an atomist view.  
 
5.6 Towards a Trans-Civilizational World Polity 
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Does this post-Western cosmopolitanism connect to a vision of a world polity and to what extent 
is such a vision practically realizable? A world civilization and a world polity are not the same 
things, but the idea is that trans-civilizational aspirations might provide a narrative for a world 
polity that could make sense to future generations. Post-Western cosmopolitanism, I am 
suggesting, creates the bridge from a trans-civilizational multipolar world order to a trans-
civilizational world polity. I use the language of a trans-civilizational world polity carefully. I 
mean by trans-civilizational a civilization composed of multiple interrelated co-constitutive 
civilizations producing one that is beyond them all, greater than its parts. In this speculative 
social imaginary, one would be able to identify with the West or multiple civilizations, but also 
with a shared trans-civilizational world civilization of global modernity. It is empirically 
possible, if not a reality today. In a post-colonial, economically, and technologically integrated 
modern world, flows of civilizational discourse and practice are interrelated in increasingly 
complex forms, internally and collectively, amounting to a trans-civilization with intra-
civilizational diversity. 392  Some meanings, narratives, and practices are attaining a trans-
civilizational scope and quality, but there is no monolithic civilization. “Trans-civilizational” is 
not the fusion of civilizations, or the erasure of nations, but the emergence of supra-civilizational 
flows of meanings, narratives, and practices above, across, through, and alongside them. In the 
vision of a trans-civilizational world polity, I use the language of “world” to mean worldwide in 
scope, but also to mean worldly in character, specifically the worldly pluralistic character of 
post-Western cosmopolitanism. The alternative term of global is too spatial in connotation.393 By 
worldly, I mean a post-Western sense of plurality, diversity, social immensity, and socio-cultural 
multiplicity. By the term, polity, I still use it instrumentally, as a careful placeholder, instead of a 
more precise but more debated term. Presently, I am again borrowing Ferguson and Mansbach’s 
definition of a polity: one containing a weness feeling, internal organization and hierarchy, and 
an ability to organize resources for political ends.394 The precise descriptor of a world polity 
would be essentially debated by its participants; whether it would be a “community” or “society” 
and in what respects, for instance, would be politically debated. It would be multisided, taking on 	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different angles of perspective, depending on one’s point of view, be it from a Chinese context, 
or Indian, or multi-glocal bourgeois perspective. I will unpack the institutional order most 
conducive to this world polity vision in Chapter 7. I wish to hold off presently, until I explore 
further ecological conceptions in Chapter 6. 
To combine all these conceptual features, the vision is of a trans-civilizational worldwide 
and worldly polity, being a member of which would constitute a new “higher” sense of being 
modernly civilized and entailing a shared sense of solidarity and belonging around the “larger” 
sense of modern freedom the world polity would be imagined to stand for as a shared project of 
humankind in late modern times. It is a trans-civilizational and worldwide flow of plural 
meanings, narratives, and practices beyond and across multiple civilizations that provides the 
cultural wherewithal and share ideals of an expanded post-Western sense of belonging and a 
collective-self-narrative that guides and legitimates alternative world order hierarchies and 
resource management. A trans-civilizational collective-self-narrative matters and makes this 
concept strongest where its competitors are weak. It does not suffer from the impractical reliance 
on universal or neutral ethical codes, nor on an impossible moral and cultural uniformity of 
humankind. When we explain our actions, when people ask us to explain ourselves, there are 
different kinds of stories we can tell. Some stories point to circumstance: I or we were 
misinformed, or, it was raining. We were in danger, or, I happened to forget this or that. Other 
explanations cite codes of conduct: It was within my rights, or that’s what procedure called for, 
or that action would have been against the law and morally wrong. Another kind points to the 
self, it makes a literal self-explanation: “That is what I like to do”, or “this is who I want to be”, 
or “I am just such and such a kind of person, I can’t help it”, or “we are such and such a kind of 
people”.395 Liberal universalism, applied to world order and human rights discourse, was a use of 
code answers to explain conduct and fathom the purposes of world ordering practices.396 The 
decline of universalist cosmopolitanism, the rise of cultural cosmopolitics means the use of these 
code answers will no longer hold water. Neoliberal cosmopolitanism was the use of old 
universalist liberal code answers with an added self-narrative answer to support them. The very 
question of the best code of conduct is dissolved in a post-Western imaginary where the politics 	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of belonging form the primary problematic. A trans-civilizational collective-self-narrative of a 
new post-Western cosmopolitanism offers a grander kind of self-narrative, enabling self-
description answers constituting the weness feeling and legitimating actions towards constituting 
a world polity. Where competing conceptions of a world polity stumble for lacking a coherent or 
practicable collective self-narrative, this concept of a trans-civilizational world polity is 
strongest. 
If it is the problem of difference that was the problematique of the Westphalian world 
order, what problematizes this supposed self-discourse and collective-practice of a trans-
civilizational world polity is the problematic of belonging, of what it means to belong in the 
world whilst being a part of it. In a world of mass migrations, increasingly complex biographies, 
immense diversities, local and global, post-liberal cosmopolitanism underpinning the outlook of 
a trans-civilizational world polity, is an answer to this question of belonging, of who belongs, of 
how to belong in a complicated and problematic world. In this outlook, the problem of difference 
is out and the problem of belonging is in. World order, in this context of an increasingly global 
but also multipolar world, is less and less a problem of tolerance and civilization, if everyone is 
civilized.397 There is no monopoly on civilization, and, if a higher notion of being civilized, as 
belonging to a trans-civilizational world polity were to arise, tolerance vs. civilization would no 
longer be the political world order question. It is increasingly a problematique of “fitting-in” the 
world, of being in the world through a part of it, so to speak. The problem of difference between 
civilizational moralities and local practices would not be the politics of a trans-civilizational 
world polity. It would not be inside and outside, either, that is too simple.398 It would be the 
politics of belonging, about belonging together, not a part. It is the question of what it means to 
belong in the world by being in a part of it. It is hard for the liberal imaginary to grasp how this 
is not the same problem as that between civilization and tolerance, but it is not. An expression of 
the attitude of new post-Western cosmopolitanism is Taiye Selasi’s self-description as a ‘multi-
local Afropolitan’.399 This self-identification is not responding to the problem of civilization and 
toleration. Selasi is not asking what is tolerable in the civilized world or apart from it. She is 	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crafting a way to be in and a part of the world. The question of where one comes from is 
increasingly problematic in a globalized world, as the lives of more and more people are multi-
local. In an imagined trans-civilizational world polity, the problem of belonging would be the 
key world order problem, since, as a world polity, it would, by definition, have no outside. The 
main political battle lines would be about how everyone belongs to the world polity, with a 
variety of extreme fringe positions arguing humankind belongs apart, or that certain persons do 
not belong in the world polity.  
In practice, this post-Western cosmopolitanism in a trans-civilizational world polity 
would take on a complicated form, exhibiting the interrelatedness of modern experience, but also 
its multiplicity. The language of human rights, for instance, would likely persist in use, but its 
meaning would become enlarged, trans-civilizational, serving more as a lingua franca for 
normative issues of right and wrong, than a list of precise rights per se.400 R.J. Vincent’s later 
work gestured in this direction, towards a trans-civilizational world polity, one with problem of 
human rights brought into shared terms, perhaps even a consensus on them, cohered by a shared 
modernity.401 Likewise, the variety of modern international world order principles and practices, 
democracy, capitalism, perhaps first and foremost, would attain an enlarged trans-civilizational 
understanding of their meaning and the diversity of their legitimate practice. These principles 
and practices, so enlarged, trans-civilizationalized, would be nonetheless joined and moderated 
by a larger sense of belonging, constituted by a shared trans-civilizational collective-self-
narrative. 
This vision of a trans-civilizational world polity, constituted by these enlarged horizons 
of a shared modernity, is possible under certain circumstances, but it is an extremely unlikely 
possibility, requiring generational scales of discursive and social action. Practically, it is 
ambitious, to say the least, because it is in contest with the clash of civilizations narrative that is 
bleeding into great power rivalries today. This is one of its major weaknesses, its pluralism 
makes it practically possible, but it is also thereby a tenuous achievement; it requires a 
constitutive patchwork of narratives that could easily and habitually slip into familiar narratives 
of clash and difference. Civilizational discourse has roots in European imperialism, in the 	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imperial notion of European civilization as the definition of Civilization, needing to be spread 
and imposed upon the world through colonialism. In practice, the envisioned attempt to 
appropriate and transform civilizational discourses away from great power politics towards 
cosmopolitan purposes would carry with it the danger of a reversion from trans-civilizationalism 
to narratives of civilizational clashes, regardless of the incoherence of those narratives in theory. 
Practically, a trans-civilizational world polity has a fragility, an inherent vulnerability to the dark 
side of civilizational discourse in the counter-interpretation of rival and exclusive civilizations. 
Regardless of the incoherence of that interpretation of civilizations as implacable and conflicting 
things, the use of that interpretation of civilizational discourse is capable of ripping up the 
patchwork of a trans-civilizational aspiration, to undo the whole thing, revert it from a productive 
and “higher” co-constitution to a clash. Extending this speculative discussion a little further, it is 
reasonable to suggest that a world polity, whether constituted through civilizational discourses or 
otherwise, may always suffer from the weaknesses of fragility, where the principle of all-
inclusivity and total human belonging, can always and likely will be turned against it. There may 
always be a contest between cosmopolitan ideas and their detractors. In its historical patchwork 
character, the trans-civilizational idea of a world polity finds its strength, conceptually, but, 
because it is not universal and foundational, because it is an historical patchwork achievement, it 
seems particularly vulnerable to detractors who may seek to divide and disrupt it in practice. 
A further practical hurdle to the vision of a trans-civilizational world polity is the need 
for the support of a new cosmopolitan political economy. Instability and division follow from 
poor economics. In times of economic collapse, revolutionary discourse and divisive practice 
abounds, as J.M. Keynes theorized. Globalist neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, with its world order 
project of global governance and economic globalization, found a practical source of validation 
in the utopian dream of economically lifting all boats, the notion that global economic growth 
translates into global prosperity.402  This practical justification, supporting its more lofty world 
order complex of rights and governance, was always subject to criticism, because its growth was 
unequal, but it has also begun to waver since the 2008 financial collapse. A post-Western trans-
civilizational world polity requires an alternative and practical cosmopolitan political economy 
model to support it, if it is to avoid derailing economic instabilities and overcome a slide into 	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civilizational clash and anti-cosmopolitan autarky. Contemporary global capitalism is under 
strain and is built for an international order. The absence of a new cosmopolitan political 
economy model, one that rivals and offers a viable alternative or substantial modification to neo-
liberal free market capitalism in theory and practice, is a major impediment to the practicality of 
the vision.403 
It is worth considering, however, that this lack of a political economy model might be 
over-stating the problem, because it is a technical question and would be easier to resolve in a 
context less structured by the rival interests of nation-states. Depending on the degree of unity a 
supposed post-Western trans-civilizational world polity would cohere, the degree of legitimated 
world hierarchies might be sufficient to overcome the massive economic problems created by a 
world order of multiple national economies. A single world economy with a proper reserve 
currency could unleash hardly imagined volumes of trade. It would also enable a world 
progressive taxation system that Thomas Piketty has advocated as the solution to global 
inequality, but whose application is unrealistic in a divided world order.404 The agreements and 
policies of economic organizations like the WTO and IMF would, potentially, be revised and 
transformed by a transformed world order structure. No longer would all agreements and policies 
be products of the interests of rival nation states, with the hegemon receiving the lion’s share of 
influence and benefits. World trade and finance could potentially be shaped around a properly 
world economy. The end of war is not the only good a world polity brings. It also promises to 
unleash the untold productivity of humankind, debilitated today not only by war and war 
spending but also by its division into multiple uneven and never free markets. Vast waste on 
armaments could be channeled to a proper world development programme. The vast amounts of 
hidden offshore wealth, estimated at 8% of the world’s financial wealth, over $7.6 trillion US 
dollars, is stagnant and unmoving presently but in a world polity it would be vulnerable to a 
world tax authority and could be re-infused into the global economy, potentially stimulating 
some of the largest economic growth in human history.405 The sense of belonging of a world 
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polity, if sufficiently cohesive, could legitimate these presently wildly radical global economic 
proposals. 
Here, however, discussion is moving into technical questions of the best design of 
institutions to realize a world polity. I wish to hold off on these institutional questions until I 
have considered the ecological and space ship earth visions in the next chapter, because the 
ecological crisis seems to be unavoidable and important for these institutional questions. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have argued the notion that an historically and sociologically ascendant global 
civil society is a less and less a defensible vision, due to its incoherence in theory and practical 
limitations in practice. In its wake, I have argued, is not necessarily a return to a Hobbesian 
world and clash of civilizations, but rather, in the context of a shared civilization of modernity, 
what follows is the opportunity of a post-Western cosmopolitanism, based on a new enlarged 
cosmopolitan sense of freedom and belonging, potentially bridging a post-Western world order 
to a pluralistic conglomerate-like trans-civilizational world polity. I argued that in a late modern 
context, any world polity that did not involve a trans-civilizational narrative would be 
impractical because it would be unacceptable to humankind, who in a modern multicultural and 
anti-imperial age demand accommodation of their modern identities and beliefs in political and 
social life. Humankind is, today, in some ways similar in condition to the Hellenistic age. Both 
systems had multiple rival powers of mixed but interrelated cultural horizons thrown up by failed 
imperial projects. And both systems were ages of flourishing trans-cultural accomplishments, 
where cultural practices, whole peoples and personal lives, science and technology, art, 
commercial goods, and ideas mixed in brilliant ways, producing important and impressive 
civilizational achievements. Globalized world politics today, situated in a modern, post-colonial 
and cosmopolitical context, begs important questions about cosmopolitan ideas, such as those we 
have studied in this thesis thus far. Whose cosmos? What laws? How can a cosmopolitan order 
be imagined in a late modern world of multiple modernities? These questions, in the modern 
context, demand more complicated trans-civilizational answers. I have suggested the empire of 
modernity, in its multiple forms, nonetheless provides a minimal background upon which a 
unifying collective-self-narrative based on post-Western cosmopolitan principles might be 
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fathomed and defended. There is a possibility, however slim, that if clarified and circulated, such 
a cosmopolitan collective-self-narrative could cohere the ambitions of multiple great powers, 
which might put it into institutional practice, given sufficient world order insecurity and crisis. 
This is speculative and aspirational however, and a remote hope, but a possibility nonetheless 
worth clarifying, conceptually, as an answer in the search for a world polity. Because this idea of 
a trans-civilization of global modernity is complicated, and forcefully met by the alternative 
clash of civilizations narrative that bleeds into geopolitics, it is more likely that the great powers 
will continue to shuffle the system and never transform the game, accumulating regional bases of 
their power, perhaps, again, not entirely unlike the Macedonian kingdoms of the Hellenistic age, 
who routed, in a grand alliance, Antigonus’s final defense of Alexander’s unifying project, and 
maintained an era of rival warring empires set amidst flourishing trade and learning, for 
hundreds of years. 
The speculative and aspirational vision of a systemic unification around a trans-
civilizational cosmopolitanism is not the end of the search, however. In the next chapter, I want 
to explore how the coming deluge of climate change complicates this trans-civilizational world 
polity vision. The changing nature of nature, so aptly put by Paul Wapner, raises alternative 
conceptions of a planetary geo-polity that complicate the vision I have been exploring in this 
chapter.406 Does the common community of ecological fate usher a post-political and post-
human cosmopolitanism, as some have suggested? Will it wash away the ideas I have been 
exploring in this chapter, before they ever take root in practice? 
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Chapter Six. 
Space Ship Gaia: Common Community of Fate or Common World? 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the search for a world polity, the importance of Pythagoras should not be overlooked. There 
could be no cosmopolis until there was a cosmos. Diogenes and Zeno, the first theorists of a 
cosmopolis, did not arrive at the concept out-of-the-blue, or from up on high. Its conceptual 
precondition was the awe inspiring and dazzling grandeur of Pythagoras’s teachings of a 
mathematically ordered cosmos. What Diogenes and Zeno did was make that cosmology 
political. In an age of ecological crisis, when the world is increasingly seen as a planetary ark, 
when humankind is reacquainting itself with nature, it is helpful to remember the achievements 
and legacy of Pythagoras. Of equal significance to his connections between earth and knowledge 
through measurement, Geometry, is his harmonic connection between an ordered cosmos and 
spiritual life. He was not really a scientist. He was much more than that. His vision carries that 
polymathic stamp of the remote Axial Age, the historical epoch distinguished by the emergence 
of such world reforming figures as the Buddha, Confucius, and Zoroaster.407 
 
The essence and power of [Pythagoras’s] vision lies in its all-embracing, 
unifying character; it unites religion and science, mathematics and music, 
medicine and cosmology, body, mind and spirit in an inspired and 
luminous synthesis.408 
 
There could be no cosmopolis without this grand cosmology. 
In this chapter, I want to argue a common climatic situation qualifies rather than 
invalidates the vision of a trans-civilizational world polity discussed in the previous chapter, 	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because its coherent and pragmatic conception in this context requires reformulation of the 
connections between cosmos, politics, and spirituality, not least because their disconnect is a 
spur to the problem. Bruno Latour’s vision of a ‘common world’, I argue, points the way, but I 
question how ‘common’ it can be and what is common about it.  
 I structure my argument in three parts. First, I explore the scientifically inspired notion of 
space ship earth politics but find it struggles to achieve a coherent basis in theory and doubts 
arise concerning its practical feasibility. Second, I explore the Gaia cosmopolitics of Bruno 
Latour and his idea of building a common world, reconnecting the cosmos and politics and 
resetting modern distinctions between immanent and transcendent, society and nature. I find 
Latour’s contributions to be immensely important but caution against overly singular 
conceptions of a common world. I argue what is common about a common world is not a 
common cosmos, but a world constituted by a common ambition of ecological wellbeing. Third, 
with these ideas, I revisit the less singular image of what a trans-civilizational planetary polity 
might mean. I conclude with a measured dose of pessimism about meeting the conditions of 
achieving a common world polity. 
 
6.2 Same Boat Arguments 
 
Concerns for environmental degradation are found in sources as old as Plato, where the soil was 
seen to be washing away. But it was in the 20th century that these concerns took on a planetary 
scope and excited new ideas of a planetary world community. The famous NASA image of the 
blue marble, combined with a new awareness of the possibility of global nuclear winter and mass 
extinctions suggested for some intellectuals the image of the one earth as a common habitat, with 
finite resources, constituting the space ship earth common community of fate.409 
Daniel Deudney has called this a “terra-politan” outlook, the sense of the Earth as a 
homeland.410 The most well-known and eloquent voice of this movement was Carl Sagan. His 
famous Cosmos and earlier Cosmic Connection attempted to reframe human existence as minute 	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and fragile, within an immense and impersonal universe. He drew attention to the smallness of 
human affairs on the cosmic scale. He conveyed something of that humbling awe Pythagoras 
once evoked. Sagan also attempted to reconnect humankind and nature, but on the level and 
scale of a modern secularized cosmos, by drawing attention to the atomic composition of 
everything, and everyone, by showing how every thing and every one is made of stardust, 
wrought by primeval cosmic events.411 
The intellectuals of this movement, such as Barbara Ward, Kenneth Boulding, and the 
Club of Rome, were scientifically and technically minded Economists, Architects, and Systems 
theorists. They took up the practical questions of devising a responsibly managed space ship 
earth, of realizing the scientific cosmopolis.412 This vision was not entirely limited to the 
confines of the earth. In the pioneering era of space exploration, particularly for the more starry-
eyed Soviet Cosmonauts, the cosmopolis took on the infinity of secular dimensions, when they 
spoke of being citizens of the universe. This current of thought carries on in more recent 
responses to planetary climate change. In 100 years, physicists have estimated, humankind will 
have developed the technologies of what is, according to the Kardashev scale, a Type I planetary 
civilization, able to harness the entirety of the energy within earth systems.413 Currently, the 
global civilization of modernity classifies, according to this scale, as a pre-planetary Type 0 
civilization. Achieving a planetary civilization, requires, no doubt, planetary planning, but, 
already, humankind is struggling to manage its Type 0 civilization. To manage the climate, a 
new generation of scientifically minded space ship earth visionaries are planning the planet with 
geo-engineering proposals, meant to turn climate change into climate control.414  
 A minor problem with this scientifically minded current of thought is the question of the 
ability of technology to master and order ecological problems on a planetary scale. Is it really a 
question of the right use of technology or are some of these ecological problems inherent to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Carl Sagan Cosmos (London: Macdonald & Co, 1981); Carl Sagan The Cosmic Connection: An Extraterrestrial 
Perspective (New York: Dell Publishing, 1973). 
412 Barbara Ward Space Ship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Kenneth Boulding, ‘The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth’ in Henry Jarrett (ed.) Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966); Kenneth Boulding, ‘Cowboys on Spaceship Earth’, Monthly Labor 
Review, 97 (1974), pp. 33; Stephen Toulmin Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990). 
413 Michiu Kaku, ‘Future of Humanity: Planetary Civilization’, Physics of the Future: How Science Will Shape 
Human Destiny and Our Daily Lives by the Year 2100 (New York: Anchor Books, 2011), pp. 378-426. 
414 Clive Hamilton Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2013); see, also, The Oxford Geoengineering Programme, http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/. 
	   155 
use? There is a sense of irony in the use of technology to solve problems produced by 
technology. For instance, proposals for the geo-engineering of the climate, with the distribution 
of sun-reflecting particles into the atmosphere, prompted the climate activist Naomi Klein to ask, 
“the solution to pollution is pollution?”415 The major problem, however, is the conceptual leap 
from a common habitat, even a common Earthwide planetary homeland, to a common 
community, in the sense of common moral obligations and commitments. The global commons, 
furthermore, implies common interests, but not common sympathies or solidarities. The Earth 
Charter, established in 2000 by civil society actors, working in association with the United 
Nations, calls for humankind to, ‘recognize that in the midst of a magnificent diversity of 
cultures and life forms we are one human family and one Earth community with a common 
destiny.’416 The Earth Charter prescribes the realization of a common Earth community by 
asserting the shared principles of ‘respect and care for the community of life’, ‘ecological 
integrity’, ‘social and economic justice’, and ‘democracy, nonviolence, and peace’. Yet, the 
obligations following from a common habitat can just as validly be thought of as amounting to 
no more than a proscription of destroying the common habitat of humankind. Critics of the space 
ship earth thesis rightly argue that being on the same boat does not necessarily mean that 
passengers ought to or will collaborate as a crew, or elect a captain.417 There is a missing 
connection between the problem of sharing a common habitat and the idea of a common Earth 
community. What gives these criticisms their bite is the lack of clear and sure moral footholds in 
the secular outlook of scientific space ship earth thought; the unmooring of morals in a 
disenchanted universe, where cosmos, politics, and spirituality are all untied and, even, at 
odds.418  Space ship earth thinkers carry the legacy of Pythagoras’s cosmos, but they have lost its 
spiritual connection to the transcendent. They struggle to find universal morals in an impersonal 
secular cosmos. 
 Accordingly, Deudney suggests a “terra-politan” sense of homeland needs to be 
spiritually supplemented by a ‘Gaia Earth religion’.419 An interesting but quaint strain of this 
notion is what we can call the neo-pagan approach. I only bring it into the discussion as a 	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contrast, to help clarify the sense of disconnect and reconnect between human being and nature 
at play in the question of the ecological crisis. This neo-pagan alternative seeks the footholds of a 
spiritual reconnection by reviving the understanding of the mother earth as not something that 
can be mastered by science, but as a creator and destroyer, to be worshiped. This approach has 
little expression in academic contexts, or in policy discourse, but it is a social movement, one 
largely found in Western secular cultures. It is helpful to take note of this movement, even if it 
does not have a clear political statement, since it responds to the ecological crisis by attempting 
to revive spiritual connections between human beings and the earth. Its advocates are those who 
gather at Stonehenge on the solstice. We can also contrast these neo-pagans with the Sierra Club, 
the American conservationist movement. This movement, with Christian rather than pagan roots, 
developed the idea of the ‘cathedral of nature’, the majesty of nature as a vision of the divine 
Spinozian cosmos, where God and nature are one. 
Both movements attempt to muster a spiritual reconnection between humankind and 
nature, the first by reversion, the second by a new reverence, but both are modern attempts. The 
Sierra Club’s reconnection of the immanent and transcendant in nature re-enchants nature and 
justifies the reservation of a place for nature, perhaps even half the earth.420 It can be said that the 
ability to revere the earth in such ways is less and less feasible in the age Earth Systems theorists 
are calling the Anthropocene, an age where the footprint of humankind has been measured on the 
geological history of the earth. For the geo-engineers of space ship earth, who are drawing plans 
for global climate control systems, the earth has lost much of its sublime quality.421 But, more to 
the point, what is interesting is that this is a modern re-connection, since nature is, in its modern 
outlook, still distinct from the world of humankind, the social cosmos, society and the modern 
world. There is a more thorough-going and, in a sense, cosmopolitan reconnection in the neo-
pagan movement. It harbors the eccentric notion that we are all children of a wrathful mother 
earth. The neo-pagan movement forms a current in the larger green movement, pushing for local 
small crop agriculture, and earth worship as a way of life. Practically, this neo-pagan approach 
would doom the interdependent global civilization of modernity to logistical collapse. The global 
food supply requires its technologically facilitated global economy. But, what is interesting is the 
neo-pagan attempt to recall a worldview from a time before the distinction between humankind 	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and nature was made. This is why it is eccentric, because the ambition of a reconnection, of 
getting back to mother earth is a modern assumption, but also one that is not only against the 
trend of modern attitudes and beliefs, but also one that can never really be fulfilled because of 
those same modern assumptions. The distinction of the immanent and transcendental, and later 
abandonment of the latter, giving rise to what Taylor has described as the immanent frame, is a 
cosmology peculiar to Western modernity.422 But, the connection the neo-pagans attempt to 
revive can never really, authentically, be remade.423 It is always a re-connection in a modern 
secular context.  
Claude Levi-Strauss, the French anthropologist, grasped more of what the emergence of a 
world polity connected to ecological wellbeing involves. 
 
It would take a spiritual revolution as great as that which led to the advent of 
Christianity. It would require that man, who since the Renaissance has been brought 
up to adore himself, acquire modesty, and he learn the lesson of all the atrocities we 
have experienced for thirty or forty years. He would do well to learn that if one 
thinks only that man is respectable among living beings, well then, the frontier is 
placed much too close to mankind and he can no longer be protected. One must first 
consider that it is as a living being that man is worthy of respect to all living beings 
–at that point, the frontier is pushed back, and mankind finds itself better 
protected.424 
 
What would clarify the prescriptive question of the ecological crisis, what would make that 
connection between planetary crisis and a world polity, is a transformative understanding of 
common self-constitutive values, a new sense of who humankind is and what it aspires to as an 
ecologically embedded species on a planetary scale. 
This promotion of ecological wellbeing as a shared value can, hypothetically, amount to a 
collective-self-constitutive good. The adoption of ecological wellbeing as what the 
communitarian philosopher Charles Taylor has described as a strong evaluation (a good valued 	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so strongly that is it constitutive of the self and can used to measure other goods against), would 
constitute a historically specific and self-conscious collective-self-narrative of humankind as a 
planetary polity collaborating towards the valued end of ecological wellbeing. It can transform 
what Bruno Latour calls our modes of existence, by reshaping the constitutive and structuring 
value-based logics of human and non-human relations.425 This alternative approach to the 
ecological crisis involves the use of constitutive self-descriptive explanations of ecological 
prescriptions, rather than the rule-based moralism of space ship earth thinkers. 
  This alternative constitutive approach is more promising than the space ship earth 
theorists and quaint if illustrative neo-pagans and Sierra Club, because it offers what we might 
call a “reformative” response, where the neo-pagans offer a problematically anachronistic 
“subtractive” response and the space ship earth theorists offer a morally unsuccessful and 
practically questionable “additive” response. 
 
6.3 A Common World? 
 
Concluding his genealogy of the concept of a world community, Jens Bartelson argues climate 
change, 
 
leaves us with the task of reformulating our conceptions of community in the light 
of our cosmological beliefs about the human habitat, rather than conversely. … If 
mankind is no longer separate from nature, we might as well reunite in the face of 
the Flood that threatens to diminish the habitability of our planet. But that Flood is 
also what now promises to wash the maps of empire away for good.426 
 
What Bartelson is calling for here is a reformative alternative, one based on changing 
cosmologies about the human habitat. This conclusion, is complemented by the post-colonial 
thinker Dipesh Chakrabarty, who argues, 
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climate change poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a 
figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world. It is more 
like a universal that arises form a shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global 
approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian 
universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We may provisionally call it a 
‘negative universal history.’427 
 
But, what could the contents of such a “reformative” alternative universal be? What collective-
self-narrative could it coherently and practically espouse? How could it reweave humankind and 
nature in a more compelling way than Sagan’s impersonal cosmic perspective? 
Far and away the most inventive and intellectually liberating contributions relevant to 
these questions are those of Bruno Latour.428 Exploring his conceptual revision of the distinction 
between humankind and nature opens the search to new terrain. His cosmos re-connects 
humankind and nature in a way Bartelson and Chakrabarty gesture towards, but I want to caution 
against an over-reliance on one cosmos, and Latour’s cosmos in particular. I question how 
‘common’ his ‘common world’ can be. I attempt to clinch the point by showing the historical 
contingency of Latour’s own cosmology, its place in what Wade Davis has called the 
ethnosphere, ‘The sum total of all thoughts and intuitions, myths and beliefs, ideas and 
inspirations brought into being by the human imagination since the dawn of consciousness.’429 If 
Latour’s cosmology is idiosyncratic in this dynamic and immense ethnosphere, how common 
can an envisioned common world be? Will it not inevitably involve many rival and historically 
peculiar cosmologies? I argue in this section that what is common about a common world is not 
a common cosmos, but a world constituted by a common ambition of ecological wellbeing. 
 Latour’s thought is complicated, at times counter-intuitive, and offers important insights, 
but also has subtle limitations, so I wish to take some time to spell it out, to give it a proper 
account. The keystone in Latour’s movement is a Whiteheadian process cosmology. This is a 
post-Darwinian picture of the cosmos, one that sees the cosmos as a web or network of 
interrelated processes. Gone is Newton’s clockwork cosmos of fixed regularity. The cosmos of 	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Latour and his followers is an empire of diachronicity. For them there is only the dynamism of 
process. This throws analytical philosophy out the window. Is a feature of the sky blueness? 
Only if eyes that receive certain wavelengths of light look at it: only if those eyes are a part of 
the process. Things, in this view, are synchronic abstractions, constellations plucked out from the 
diachronic process. It problematizes the possibility of synchronic distinctions between past 
present and future. In this way, this empire of diachronicity transforms conceptions of causality. 
No longer are there causes and effects, since every effect is also a cause and vice versa. This 
means that what matters are the networks making up the process. Most importantly here, 
Latour’s ally Isabella Stengers argues that if a Whiteheadian cosmology is adopted then the 
makeup of the cosmos, its synchronic image, becomes a political question, because its construal 
is always open to question. There is always a cosmopolitical question.430 For Latour, there is 
only the ongoing causal process. 
This seems, in a way, like a return to Heraclitus. All is flux of fire. But, I think Latour’s 
Whiteheadian inspired movement is more like a return to Pythagoras, for it was Pythagoras who 
overturned the cosmological debate of the ancients from the question of the primary elemental 
constituents of things, to the question of the movement and transformation of things, to know 
things not by their constituents, but by their actions and changes, which he showed can be 
measured, mathematically, and analyzed to reveal the hidden harmonic patterns of the cosmos. 
Drop a lump of coal, a fish head, or walnut into the water, and they all produce a marvelous 
series of rings, Pythagoras showed. 
For Latour, there is no subject and object, there is no human society and material nature, 
there is only the process of changing networks of actant things, human and non-human. For 
Latour, since all things have tendencies, which impact other things, and so collaborate in the 
networks they form, agency is not an exclusively human property, or exclusive to a part of the 
animal kingdom, or even life. The planetary scale network of actant things is Gaia, the earth 
systems, incorporating everything and everyone on earth into one vast network. By Gaia, Latour 
does not adopt James Lovelock’s hypothesis of Gaia as an organism, but, like Lovelock, he does 
see its macro earth systems that tend towards a stable climatic equilibrium conducive to life, 
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consistently over millions of years, as a product of a dynamic process, not a fixed design.431 
Humankind is part of, embedded in, born from, this process and vast network of networks. With 
this vision, Latour erases the distinction between natural systems and human systems, the human 
world, society, and the natural world. With reference to the sociology of Gabriel Tarde, his 
monadology, Latour argues there is no society, since every thing is, in a sense, already a society 
of things, a network of monads, in the vast and dynamic process network scheme of things.432 
For Latour, the vision of society as a collaborative endeavor of human subjects, the modern 
social imaginary, is just that; it is an imaginary; it never existed.433 
For Latour, in the grand network of Gaia, there can be no world society, there can only be 
what he calls ‘a common world.’434 For Latour, it is the distinction between human beings and 
nature that has spurred the ecological crisis. Disavowing the distinction, and composing the 
proper relations of humans and things, is Latour’s idea of a common world. In a context of 
ecological crisis, this vision offers an important way forward towards answering Derrida’s key 
question of ‘living together well’, that we encountered in chapter 4.435 For Latour, if the modern 
distinction of subject and object, society and nature, is escaped, ‘The old metaphor of a Political 
Body might take on a new lease on life, if it is another name for living with Gaia.’436 For Latour, 
composing a ‘common world’ means a, ‘good common world, cosmos, the best of worlds’.437 It 
is a positive world, one of maximal ecological wellbeing. It means living with Gaia well. 
 Latour’s early political theory in The Nature of Politics suggests a common world can be 
created, democratically, through the establishment of what he calls a parliament of things. Rather 
than science dominating politics, as the space ship earth thinkers suggested, or for politics to 
dominate science, as climate deniers wish, Latour crafts the parliament of things as a political 	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vision combining science and politics, with the representation of things in politics, and so 
overcoming the social inside and natural outside through new practices. He means the 
representation of things, literally the earth systems of Gaia, the oceans, lands, ecosystems, and so 
on. This representation creates a unification of politics and science in practice. Non-human 
things would be represented by people, like lawyers represent clients. He suggests they could be 
represented in a lower house that integrates things of concern, expanding representations. An 
upper house would legislate the common world, composing it, defining it bit by bit, network by 
network, into a larger and larger Gaia scale collective, made, by democratic process, into a 
common world. 
Latour is unclear about whether this parliament of things would or could be planetary,438 
with the scale and authority of a world government, but it is hard to see how it could make sense 
or practically function otherwise, since the networks of Gaia are planetary in scale. To support 
his scheme, Latour suggests a possible re-conception of sovereignty. The globe, Latour rightly 
points out, is a spatial designation, a product of European imperial cartography, particularly in 
the nineteenth century. He suggests the earth, as the grand network systems of Gaia, is the actual 
place of sovereignty. Thus, rather than understanding sovereignty as demarcating realms of 
autonomy upon the globe, Latour suggests it might instead be conceived as an assemblage of 
relations, a constellation of networks across the earth. 439  Thus, he suggests reimagining 
sovereigns as interpenetrated networks, inextricable from larger earth systems. Like the systems 
theorists we considered at the outset of this study, Latour attempts to swamp the sovereigns in 
larger systems, to drown their autonomy in webs of interconnections. Upon this grand network of 
systems things, if sovereignty were so reconceived, we might envision the development of a 
planetary parliament of things, mandated with resolving ecological crisis through composing a 
common world. How might this hypothetical composition of a common world resolve the 
ecological crisis? By fixing the importance and meaning of things, by drafting a cosmos, to 
establish how things are, so to determine how their proper relations are. In this way, it would 
establish, compose, what ecological well-being means. This is a new way of performing the 
cosmological move, by composing the world through practice, rather than declaring it in theory. 	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Qualifying his movement, in crucial respects, is Latour’s more recent magnum opus 
‘modes of existence’ project.440 In this project he offers an answer to the question of what we 
have been, if not modern. His answer focuses on the different modes of network connections that 
follow from different values. He recognizes a plurality of modes, legal, political, religious, etc., 
each with a different value-based logic of connections, setting their own conditions of validity. 
The point of mapping these modes is first, to provide a fair account of modernity, on more 
coherent terms than modernity provides. Second, this provides an ability to reassess modern 
modes of existence and third, to begin to envision the possible formation of a universal planetary 
civilization, a common world, with a common response to the ecological crisis. Latour sees the 
programme as a reformation not only of Western modern modes, but all collective modes, 
Western and otherwise, since, he argues, no way of life and no cosmology is prepared for this 
crisis, even all those unhindered by the Western modern distinctions of subject and object, nature 
and society. For Latour, all ways of life, modern, indigenous, etc., need to be reformed. 
The practicality of his parliament of things is not hopeful. Its theatrical test model, ‘Make 
It Work’, organized by Latour’s followers, produced a universal agreement on climate 
governance, but, even with the absence of traditional geo-political power rivalries, it nearly 
failed to do so, as it struggled to put alternative conceptions of sovereignty into practice. 
Representing people in politics has proven to be, in the great democracies, difficult. A world 
parliament of things is practically ambitious, if not completely impractical. 
But, nevertheless, Latour’s reconnection of humankind and material objects with a 
political programme is important because of its break from visions of a world polity studied thus 
far. It is an important step beyond the limitations of the problematic ideas of a need for a 
salvaged mastery of nature (as with the geo-engineers), a new contract with nature (that appeals 
but lacks moral and practical footholds in a modern and multicultural context), or a 
romanticization of the pre-moderns or indigenous horizons that do not incorporate modern 
distinctions of society and nature. Latour’s break opens up thought to the conception of a trans-
civilizational planetary polity that reforms prevailing outlooks and modes of existence. The exact 
contents of that vision are still, alas, far beyond imagination. Yet, Latour has opened the door. 
But, has Latour overplayed his hand? Is his break too clean? My major cautionary 
qualification to Latour’s political programme is that the goal of composing a common world 	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needs to be distanced from overly monistic or singular cosmopolitics. A common world, as a 
singular world, is practically utopian and would be self-defeating on the vast multicultural scale 
of all humankind. For starters, Latour’s own Whiteheadian inspired outlook that supports his 
scheme is not universal nor will it likely be universally embraced. The cosmological background 
against which he operates, the impersonal process cosmos, is one idiosyncratic cosmology 
amongst many. If Latour’s programme for composing a common world is dependent on this 
cosmology, it is as utopian as the modern vision of a secular future, where all religions and 
competing cosmologies are forgotten. Latour does not intend to overplay his hand. He is aware 
of his idiosyncrasies and is opposed to fundamentalism. But there is a danger of over reliance on 
his cosmos, of not recognizing that any cosmology, including Latour’s, is not without 
controversy and multiple rival interpretations. 
If there is no final cosmology or ever even one cosmology, only ascendant cosmologies, 
how common can a common world be? For instance, a challenge for Latour’s vision comes from 
religious traditions that balk against his secular cosmos.441 He seems to recognize this challenge, 
where he argues, 
 
For those who use the term ‘religion’ are really appealing to another world! And 
this is exactly the opposite of what we are trying to identify. There is no other 
world –but there are worlds differently altered by each mode. The fact that the 
people speak tremulously of ‘respecting transcendence’ hardly encourages the 
ethnologist to take this phenomenon seriously, since she sees quite clearly here the 
wrong transcendence, the one that has immanence as its opposite rather than its 
synonym.442 
 
Without favouring, or even sympathizing with mobilizations of religious fundamentalism, I do 
doubt the spiritual self-interpretations of people will ever agree with Latour’s secular cosmology 
that reduces the spiritual to a religious mode of network amongst people and things, without 
some faith based sense of a higher power, Spinozan or otherwise. As I have been consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Charles Taylor, ‘Religious Mobilizations’, in Dilemmas and Connections (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), pp. 146-164. 
442 Latour An Inquiry in Modes of Existence, p. 299. 
	   165 
arguing throughout this study, the collective response should not be equated with singularity. 
The vision of a common world needs to be more pluralistic than singular. 
To clinch this cautionary criticism of an over-dependence on Latour’s common world 
cosmology, I want to point out its historical contingency, its sources in the ethnosphere. What I 
am wagering here is that the dreams, imaginaries, cosmologies, beliefs and intuitions of 
humankind, the history of the ethnosphere, is prime for any cosmology, and that there is no final 
weltanschung, no last cosmology upon which to build a common world. The conception of Gaia 
and measurement confirming existence of the Anthropocene is cosmos dependent. As 
Collingwood argued in response to Whitehead, 
 
natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a context of 
history, and depends on historical thought for its existence. From this I venture to 
infer that no one can understand natural science unless he understands history: and 
that no one can answer the question what nature is unless he knows what history is. 
This is a question which Alexander and Whitehead have not asked. And, that is 
why I answer the question, ‘Where do we go from here?’ by saying, ‘We go from 
the idea of nature to the idea of history.’443 
 
Latour’s cosmology is idiosyncratic and not the last. 
There never will be a singular common world, where the meaning and relations of all 
things are agreed in a grand Gaia scale collective. What is common about a common world is not 
a common cosmos, but a world constituted by a common ambition of ecological wellbeing, 
reshaping collective-self-conceptions, ushering up new admired and legitimate orders. There are 
and likely always will be many co-constitutive, competing and conflicting ways of being and 
relating that draw on many colliding and co-constitutive flows of cosmological imaginaries, 
stating how things are, so to say how to be. There is no single cosmos that a new Pythagoras can 
draw upon today. Nor will there be a last cosmos tomorrow.444 Caution against the utopianism of 
a singular common world is needed in the ambition of a common world, hence my insistence on 
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the import of a trans-civilizational collective-self-conception, albeit one shaped by an emerging 
planetary politics and shared ambition of ecological wellbeing. 
 
6.4 Planetary Politics 
 
Yet, Latour’s question of a common world is important, even profoundly important. In the 
context of ecological crisis, it is a vital route to Derrida’s question of living together well, even if 
caution is needed in respect to the challenges that that path involves. How do Latour’s 
contributions qualify the vision of a trans-civilizational world polity considered in the previous 
chapter? 
First, they open up the debate for a more thorough-going “reformative” response to 
ecological crisis. They open the door to the vision of composing a common world, even if 
caution is needed in thinking about how common that common world can or need be. Latour’s 
programme for composing a common world is symptomatic of an emerging planetary 
consciousness and is one Western attempt to conceive a means to practice planetary politics.445  
It is one idiosyncratic instance of a “reformative” approach to the ecological crisis. This 
planetary consciousness is distinct from the consciousness of globalization, the condition of 
globality, imagining one spherical, circumnavigable, connectable, space. 446  Planetarity is 
atmospheric, ecological, imagining one interrelated system of earth systems. Global 
consciousness hangs together with global connectivity. Planetary consciousness hangs together 
with the planetary ecological interdependence, made evident by the planetary ecological crisis. 
This planetarity, planetary consciousness, enables, constitutes, a planetary politics, the politics of 
how to order it, for whom, and why. It is, as Latour puts it, an entirely new form of geo-
politics.447 The earlier space ship earth thinkers also tapped into this consciousness, even urged it 
on, but were unaware of the question of a common world, and found no footholds for a planetary 
politics in their scientific, impersonal, cosmos. 
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Second, Latour’s contributions of opening up the question of a common world for 
ecological wellbeing also offers the substance of a collective-self-narrative. Even if there is no 
common cosmos, nor last cosmology, the value of ecological wellbeing is an increasingly 
common need, potentially for all humankind. It, in itself is not enough, but it is important enough 
to qualify the trans-civilizational image I explored in the previous chapter. It can cement the 
sense of belonging that a hypothetical trans-civilizational world polity could attain. If the vast 
majority of humankind were to make ecological wellbeing (even with its various particular 
definitions) what Charles Taylor calls a strong evaluation, a constitutive good, then it could come 
to underpin the narrative of a trans-civilizational world polity.448 Indeed, if this imagined world 
polity did not embrace this common value, it likely could not practically endure in a world 
suffering from the effects of climate change. 
 Working from a Nietzschian tradition of thought, the political theorist William E. 
Connolly offers an alternative path forward. Connolly advances the cause of ecological 
wellbeing, but he resists to an extent the adoption of ecological wellbeing as a way of collective-
being, however formulated, since, for Connolly, to be, rather than become, restricts, represses, 
ultimately corrupts and the potential for new ways of being generated by resistance to the social 
categories of given ways of being. Alternatively, Connolly offers a vision emphasizing becoming 
through dynamic eco-militancy, a planetary ‘politics of swarming’, connecting a grand alliance 
of groups of resistance: indigenous, labour, scientists, trans-national actors, etc., capable of 
forming new collective identities in collective social actions, such as a global general strike.449 
He explains, if ‘the fragility of things is actively pressed by a positive constellation of minorities, 
it may also be possible to expand the cadre whose political commitments express attachments to 
the planet.’450 Connolly suggests, 
 
a promising lure may be to prepare large minorities within several constituencies 
and regions for the day when we can enact together a general strike in several 
countries simultaneously. Perhaps it could be a graded strike at first, with one-day 	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actions followed by longer periods. The immediate goal would be to press 
international organisations, localities, states, corporations, banks, labour unions 
and universities to defeat neoliberalism, to curtail climate change, to reduce 
regional and national inequalities, and to infuse a vibrant pluralist spirituality into 
democratic machines that have lost too much of their vitality.451 
 
This alternative, offers some insights,. A politics of swarming may indeed helpfully expand 
planetary commitments, by making grass roots movements into global actions practically 
realized in sites of battle and alliance in planetary politics. 
The criticism is that Connolly’s programme makes an extreme case for the importance of 
becoming over being and so does not in-itself amount to a world polity able to address the 
ecological crisis. As I have been arguing in this study, something more is needed, a larger 
narrative. Connolly’s programme is conducive to instigating that narrative on the ground, in and 
through practice. But, a programme of global alliances and protest is not the same thing as 
composing a common world, even if it might be a part of the process. Process matters, however, 
in two important respects. First, an important part of the image of a realizable world polity is 
how it is an ongoing process of realization, being realized and re-realized, discursively and 
performatively in practice, on an ongoing basis. Second, process is generative as much as it is 
regenerative. The realization by agentic action shifts the structure, which shifts the agents, in an 
ongoing process of change and continuity.452 This is to say that the image of a realizable world 
polity is not a stasis, but an ongoing realization of its ideals and social form, becoming realized 
in its unifying process that is never complete or correct, but always shifting, historically. New 
and innovative understandings and practices are realized in this ongoing social process of 
realization. 
A repeated finding of this study is that the conversion of all humankind is practically 
impossible, especially in a modern context. Universal narratives are suspect today. A collective-
self-narrative needs to be in a “rallying” form, we might say, for it to be positively received and 
so meet the criteria of practicality. With respect to the ecological crisis, once the question is 
asked why ecological wellbeing matters, there is no agreement in a multi-cultural world, and so 	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an overlapping consensus is the best that can be achieved. This is why realizing a world polity 
around ecological wellbeing means mustering the many cosmologies towards a common strong 
evaluation of ecological wellbeing, which could underpin a constitutive trans-civilizational 
collective-self-narrative. Pope Francis’s environmental statement, his Laudato Si Encyclical, On 
Care For Our Common Home, is important, not because it declares the cosmos, but because it 
mobilizes a cosmos, it makes a “reformative” contribution to address the ecological crisis.453 
Equally important is the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader, his Holiness the Karmapa, Ogyen 
Trinley Dorje’s treatise, Interconnected: Embracing Life in Our Global Society. This book 
mobilizes Buddhist worldviews, reforming their teachings for a global context and marshaling 
them towards addressing ecological crisis by realizing a global society that embraces global 
interdependencies as a way of life.454 Rallying modern cosmologies requires marshaling them in 
a “reformative” way as well, moving beyond the distinctions of society and nature, subject and 
object, as Latour has shown. But this is not the only movement needed to rally the world to 
address the ecological crisis. Indigenous ecological politics that do not suffer from these modern 
distinctions between society and nature, but reform in their global application, when joined by a 
wide array of ecological movements in world politics.455 
Yet, ecological wellbeing can have all manner of definitions, and so its ambition, the 
ambition of a common world, also needs to be connected to the trans-civilizational ideas 
developed in the previous chapter, to be practically realizable. If so connected, the vast kind of 
pluralistic movement towards ecological wellbeing that marshals multiple cosmoses, would be 
constitutive of a common world, one totally unlike that which Latour might envision, but one 
where a strong evaluation of ecological wellbeing would help ground, in a constitutive way, the 
in-it-together sense of a trans-civilizational world polity. This is highly abstract, yet the point is 
that rallying the world, not converting the world, is indispensable in practically realizing a 
common world. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 	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In this chapter I explored the ecological conceptions of a world polity. I found the planetary 
space ship earth tradition to be impractical and somewhat incoherent because a shared sense of 
place is not the same thing as a shared sense of belonging. Beyond this, I found Latour’s vision 
of a common world to be significant, particularly for its depth of thinking on the relation of 
culture and nature, but I questioned what is common about his vision of a common world and 
how common it can be, thus staking out my argument that ecological crisis and ecological 
conceptions do not wash away the trans-civilizational conception of a world polity, but, rather, 
are needed to support it, and are themselves equally in need of support from it. In the following 
chapter, I want to explore the combination of these ideas, the trans-civilizational and planetary 
world polity. 
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Chapter Seven. 
Reimagining the World Polity 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Imagining the world polity is a categorically distinct experience to imagining the nation. 
Benedict Anderson told us, ‘Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.’456 Imagining the world polity, 
as a trans-civilizational planetary polity, or in any other form, is about imagining oneself and 
strangers fitting into the world, together, joining up with the world, not imagining being distinct 
and apart from a divided world. Imagining the world polity is about imagining all the polities of 
humankind being one. It involves imagining oneself and strangers in the world and so of the 
world and inherently belonging in the world, as a part of it. It is an all-embracing imagination. 
The nation is imagined, Anderson tells us, as a socially and territorially limited and sovereign 
community.457 The world polity, by contrast, is almost always imagined as having the opposite 
qualities, being unlimited in spatial and social if not temporal terms, being an all-embracing 
community with universal authority. Where the members of nations direct their loyalties and 
affinities in on themselves, away from the world, to form the nation, within the world, the world 
polity is formed by directing allegiances and attachments outwards towards the world, joining up 
with the world and holding up a higher authority under which all belong. Imagining the world 
polity, in any age, means calling to mind a qualitatively unique variety of images and moods. 
When we imagine the nation, we recall and conjure up thoughts of persons and events that 
evince and exemplify the imagined qualities of the community, moments and faces we remember 
or invent that exhibited a national character and special communal feeling. The images brought 
to mind when imagining the world polity are inherently immense, in a Bachelardian sense, of 
vast beyond knowing, quasi-sublime.458 They are images encompassing all the world, not a part 	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of it, pictures of cosmopolitan sites and crossings, including the mélange of metropoles and 
global trade routes, as well as the remotest peripheries of the world, obscure villages and hamlets 
practicing unique local ways of life. It is an all-embracing imagined community. The difference 
is a matter of style of imagination, not reality and falsity. 
Still, the universal, unshakeable, cosmologically central and divinely mandated doctrines 
of world unity that ordered humankind for thousands of years, the imagined universal 
communities of the colossal empires, Egyptian, Babylonian, Roman, Byzantine, and Caliphate, 
the world-spanning realms of religious belonging in Christendom and the Umma, for instance, 
have no universal or solid bases in the modern political imagination of a modern age, where 
everyone has been mobilized to defend their particularisms and particular universalisms, and 
where, in a secular age, portions of humankind increasingly believe there are no universals. The 
sweeping era of human history, when most of humankind was ordered in cosmologically 
grounded empires, from the remote Axial Age, is ended in late modern times.459 Reimagining the 
world polity today, in this context means rallying belonging beyond the nation, but not by re-
connecting to its religious antecedents. In this study I have argued it necessarily means clarifying 
the collective trans-civilizational and ecological narrative of humankind in a late-modern era, 
legitimating a political authority “on top” of the nations, being realized by a new mode of 
belonging that has a socially unlimited quality. 
Imagining the world polity as a “trans-civilizational planetary polity”, a “terra-politan 
civilization”, we might say, gives the ancient idea of universal human unity a meaning in a 
modern context. If the world polity were not realized with a trans-civilizational character, it 
would not get off the ground, because it would face too many detractors who would find it 
unacceptable to their modern self-conceptions and ambitions. Yet, if the world polity was not 
also realized with an ecological component on a planetary level, then it would become 
overwhelmed by the practical consequences of uncontrolled climate change. The trans-
civilizational planetary polity is not the final and ultimate vision of human unity. Other visions 
will be imagined for other times, times beyond modernity and beyond its late modern and often-
called post-modern shadows. In our late modern but still modern age of multiple civilizational 
modernities, where ecological crisis is a fact of life, any attempt to imagine a realizable world 
polity of all humankind must necessarily adopt trans-civilizational but also ecological qualities. I 	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do not argue that this vision will or must arise in practice, but only that if a world polity were to 
be realized in the foreseeable future, it would necessarily have to involve these trans-
civilizational and planetary features, so long as modernity itself does not collapse, bringing down 
all its modern assumptions on which our imagined communities are based. This trans-
civilizational and planetary vision is complicated and perhaps the most likely path to its 
realization were if the international system becomes invalidated by proving its inability to sustain 
modern ambitions, by itself posing a universal threat to humankind. Perhaps a limited 
thermonuclear exchange between great powers would precipitate such an event, by wiping 
swaths of the world out of existence. We need to remember that thermonuclear weapons are 
vastly more destructive than the atomic bombs used against the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. One thermonuclear weapon can destroy all of Japan, Texas, or France. The ballistic 
exchange of even a few of these weapons would be a world-changing event, cognizing the 
world-scale threat posed by these weapons, and questioning the competence of the international 
system to manage them. The worst effects of climate change might also de-legitimate the idea of 
a “society” of states, proving its incompetence as a society, pushing humankind (by force of a 
common threat and common ambition of ecological survival and wellbeing), to unite around a 
world polity, perhaps gradually, perhaps swiftly. These scenarios are unlikely, if less unlikely 
than we might hope. Yet, if even under such unlikely circumstances this vision of a trans-
civilizational and ecological world polity were achieved, it would still be a fragile achievement, 
always subject to detractors, advocates of division and the politics of difference. It is possible, if 
imagined rightly, but it is still unlikely and fragile nonetheless.  
This vision of a trans-civilizational planetary polity is a long way from the image of the 
moral community of humankind, the secularized cosmopolis that we began the conceptual 
investigations with. In this chapter, I want to cement this vision of a trans-civilizational planetary 
polity, to clarify its implications for the image of a realizable world polity. I address three 
connected lines of questioning: First, what exactly is the image of a trans-civilizational planetary 
polity? How do we best fit together the ideas of trans-civilizational belonging and planetary 
ecological wellbeing? Second, what institutional arrangements are fitting and conducive to this 
vision? How hierarchical and how centralized need they be? That is, what world order does this 
vision imply and require? Thirdly, can this vision, so specified, satisfy the criteria I laid out at the 
outset and applied throughout this study? To what extent is its point comprehensible? To what 
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extent is it coherent? And, to what extent does it represent a practical vision? My argument in 
response to these questions is first, that the trans-civilizational planetary polity means a larger 
belonging supported by ecological wellbeing, not the reverse, which, second, practically entails a 
world federalist order to be achievable, and, taken together, thirdly, that it satisfies my stated 
criteria. 
  
7.2 Two Concepts of the Trans-Civilizational Planetary Polity 
 
First, how is the relation between the idea of a trans-civilizational polity and the idea of the eco-
planetary polity best conceived? What is the relation between the values of an expanded sense of 
modern freedom and the value of ecological wellbeing? Which takes priority? I want to argue 
that the relation is not conflictual, rather mutually supportive, but neither is it an equipollent 
relation, where each has equal priority. Instead, the argument here is that the ideal of a trans-
civilizational belonging is more fundamental and necessary, in the vision of a trans-civilizational 
planetary polity. The common ambition of ecological wellbeing is vital and transformative, I 
have argued, but I want to argue it is also instrumental to the notion of an enlarged trans-
civilizational ambition of freedom. That is, ecological wellbeing is a practical necessity, one of 
transformative qualities indeed, but it is an ambition that is ultimately secondary to modern 
ambitions of freedom, the expanded trans-civilizational understanding of which enables a shared 
sense of belonging and solidarity, because it satisfies the practical possibility of the aims and 
ambitions that freedom is valued for. Ecological wellbeing is only and can only be a primary and 
not secondary ambition for a small portion of humankind, the most ardent green advocates, who 
make ecological wellbeing the center of their lives. As I argued in Chapter 6, ecological 
wellbeing also requires the support of trans-civilizational belonging, because there are limits to 
how common a “common world” of ecological wellbeing can be. The two values, trans-
civilizational freedom and ecological wellbeing, are mutually supporting. But, the ecological 
cannot take priority, the aims and life goals of humankind, individual and collective, are too 
diverse. It is the trans-civilizational component that is more fundamental and primary. 
 Let me unpack this by setting-up and exposing the opposite position, where the politics of 
the planet would instead be given a priority. This would be the vision of a planetary polity much 
closer to Latour’s vision of a common world, where ecological wellbeing were to become a 
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shared strong evaluation for all humankind, albeit necessarily taking on various cultural forms, 
as I argued in Chapter 6. The shared ambition of ecological wellbeing would constitute a 
common world, where the entangled and complex multiplicity of civilizational-cultural ways of 
imagining and practicing ecological wellbeing would be secondary to the primary ambition of 
ecological wellbeing itself. This would be a world like a new eco-Medievalism, where ecological 
wellbeing and planetary politics would shape everything else in world affairs, enabling 
hierarchies of authority that would bring ecological considerations into every realm of world 
order, security, economic, etc. The difficulty with this vision is that it cannot be practically 
realized. This is because humankind pursues too many ideals and ambitions for ecological 
wellbeing to become a common primary ambition. I mean that humankind never will “green” to 
that extent because ecological wellbeing is valued not in itself but for its instrumental importance 
for achieving the immense varieties of goals and ambitions, personal and public, individual and 
collective, that modern notions of rights and freedom are demanded for.460 Ecological well-being 
is vital but ultimately instrumental to the ambition of a “higher” freedom, in a larger belonging 
of humankind. An eco-Medievalism, or any neo-Medievalism, where one primary definitive 
value coheres belonging and every aspect of social life is not realizable in a modern world of 
hardly imaginable variety of aims and goals. It is this plurality of modern life-ends that makes 
freedom highly prized and defended in modern times. Humankind shares ecological wellbeing as 
a common ambition, increasingly so, indeed, but it will not increase to the extent that it overturns 
and eclipses all other ambitions, chiefly, the ambition of freedom itself, which ecological 
wellbeing is vital for but only instrumental to. Because ecological wellbeing is vital but 
instrumental to modern ambitions of freedom, an expanded notion of which I have argued 
enables a larger trans-civilizational belonging, it is this latter ideal of trans-civilizational freedom 
that takes priority in the vision of a trans-civilizational but also planetary polity. 
 
7.3 Realizing the World Polity 
 
Second, what world order model is implied by this vision of a trans-civilizational but also eco-
planetary polity? How centralized and hierarchical an order does it entail? What would this 	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proposed image of the world polity look like in practice? What kind of institutional set-up fits 
this imagined world polity? Does it imply a cosmopolitan “solidarist” society of states, 
transformatively unified by cosmopolitan solidarity, legitimating international authorities above 
the states?461 Or, does it imply something more hierarchical and centralized?  
I want to suggest that because the proposed form of a world polity I have been distilling 
is still based on modern horizons, but of a trans-civilizational variety, it is best fit to a global 
variant of federalism, largely but not exactly along the lines spelled out by Daniel Deudney.462 
Deudney’s vision has more practical merits than alternative models. The world polity could not 
consistently be constructed through a post-Westphalian cross-stitching of the states system with 
webs of cosmopolitan solidarist regimes, because that structure maintains the primacy of states, 
even if they imagine themselves as post-national polities, which makes it inconsistent with a 
larger sense of belonging and makes it inherently brittle, inevitably to be snapped at the flick of 
the sovereign’s wrist. A world union, like the African Union or European Union reimagined on a 
global scale, likewise, suffers the same underlying inconsistency with a larger belonging and 
practical fragility. What Deudney proposes might be thought of as a sturdier system of checks 
and balances, constitutionally more robust, with a higher degree of hierarchy and authority, than 
a web of regimes across states. If this vision of a world polity I am trying to distill is 
characterized by a sense of trans-civilizational belonging, the proposed federalist structure is also 
conducive to the trans-civilizational collective-self-conception, enabling belonging as well as 
multiplicity. In a modern age, the neo-Medieval vision of a single ethos welding overlapping 
authorities is no longer practically valid, there are too many variety of modern ambitions to be 
governed via overlapping authorities, and the practicality of the Medieval system has long been 
questioned due to the persistence of wars in the Middle Ages. The federalist innovation is a path 
towards union in a modern context, where a division of powers between federal and local 
government clearly delineates authorities within a single polity, but with a structure Deudney 
defines as “negarchy”, where the checks and balances negate the ills of pure hierarchies. Yet, 
while Deudney’s world order model has been widely praised and has consistency with a trans-
civilizational but eco-planetary vision, Deudney has not sufficiently explored the modernity of 	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his vision, how it involves multiple modernities, and an unavoidably pluralitistic connection to 
ecological wellbeing, features which I have been steadily unpacking in this study. 
Let me first consider a number of alternatives to the world federalist model, before I 
clarify its precise features. Are there not serious alternatives? Four traditions of international 
thought, above all others, profess that a world polity has no need for a world state, federal or 
otherwise: the tradition of political anarchism, the tradition of Kantian democratic peace theory, 
the tradition of liberal laissez-faire economics, and the tradition of international functionalism. I 
want to argue that it is correct to suggest that a world polity would practically require a world 
government of some kind, but not because of a need to suppress chaos, as some political realists 
might suppose. Rather, because a world polity is a response to and is responsible for a broader 
range of world-scale problems than anarchist, Kantian democratic, laissez faire, and functionalist 
forms of organization cannot practically manage. Conceptually, this is to say the vision of a 
world polity is impractical if it rejects the role of a world government. 
 
An Anarchical World Polity? 
 
The “English School” tradition of international thought that includes Hedley Bull’s Anarchical 
Society, has resisted this logic, defending the merits of international society. 463 But, this 
tradition’s leading thinkers have supposed that if a transformative world polity were to emerge, a 
world law and likely some form of world government, or at least world governance, would 
emerge along with it.464 However, the tradition of political anarchism, of Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Proudhon, and so on holds the principle that the combination of authority, hierarchy, and power 
is a major source of political problems, not their solution.465 Conceding the anarchist principle 
means that the last leviathan would resolve the insecurities of an anarchical system of states, but 
would inevitably produce greater ills by dint of its greater power concentrations. For the 
anarchist, a world leviathan would be corrupting, turning human ambitions away from the 
betterment of humankind, towards the allure of ruling all humankind, blunting and twisting all 	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the fruits of human creations towards the interest of ensuring the overawing power of the one last 
state. 
The classic puzzle is that if the conditions for a world state were met, via unity, then 
would the world state still be needed? The anarchist tradition offers a rival non-statist vision of a 
world community that can exist and is better off without a world state. This broad tradition holds 
out an alternative path for humankind, one where people are free from arbitrary authorities, able 
to co-operate creatively, in wider and wider and eventually world-spanning circles, always and 
increasingly for the betterment of all humankind, not merely for some part of it. This tradition 
suggests human beings could be free to co-operatively pursue their full potential in service of no 
goal smaller or greater than the betterment of all humankind. The anarchist supposes a world 
without states will have no need for a world state, since it is the state, ancient and modern, that 
has made civilized humankind barbarous and the abolition of the state is, for the anarchist, the 
prerequisite of human flourishing. It is interesting to note, albeit with awareness of the 
anachronisms involved, that Zeno himself, the first political theorist of the cosmopolis, has been 
thought of as a kind of anarchist, since he is said to have questioned the validity of individual 
states, but saw no need for a world state either.466 In some ways, the trans-civilizational polity 
can be seen as aided by an anarchistic order, wherein all modes of existence would be free to 
associate and practice their ways of life, which is part of the trans-civilizational point. 
 However, the flaw in the anarchist vision, in general, is not so much the Hobbesian drama 
of primordial violence, the untold chaos the state is thought to suppress. Rather, it is the boring 
question of the administration of public needs. A stateless world may not need thermonuclear 
arsenals, but what of the administration of carbon emissions, what of the management of mass 
economic and climate migrations, regulation of the oceans and skies, peaceful nuclear uses, outer 
space satellite and debris regulation, and so on. What of all those needs the state and 
international system is presently administering, for health, clean water, highways, and the like? 
An anarchical world polity, like any other, would need to rise to meet these challenges or drown 
in them. If a world polity were to exist, it would be responsible for global challenges, which, in 
principle are not local problems and cannot be locally managed. Yet, how can an anarchical 	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world polity be held to account? To who do we e-mail the complaints? How would it meet these 
global challenges? It is unlikely that it would be able to rise to the global challenges without 
some system or council for making global decisions and directives, which is what the 
bureaucratic nightmare of a global state would be charged to do. Even an anarchical world polity 
would need some form of global administration. The question is what structure it could feasibly 
take on, how centralized, democratic, and how imposing on the presently existing system of 
states. 
 
A Global Governance World Polity? 
 
In practice, the anarchical system of states has long recognized the need for some form and 
degree of international administration, but has avoided a world federation. It has instead pursued 
global administration without global government, largely through the elaborate international 
organization of the United Nations and development of a global governance system.467 The rise 
of global governance through the UN system has established a series of what are theoretically 
called, “international regimes”.468 This practice of global governance and international regimes is 
highly complex. Two of the most prominent contributing sources of these institutional practices 
are the traditions of liberal international economics and international functionalism, combining 
into a vision of order designed to move towards a world polity without a world government. 
The functionalist tradition theorized the path to a world polity without a world 
government via the establishment of a system of international organizations responsible for 
transnational and international problems.469 This functionalist programme was, to an extent, put 
into practice after the Second World War, with US leadership. As Dag Hammarskjöld reasoned,  
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It is because world community does not exist at a time when world interdependence 
has become a reality, that world organization has become a necessity as a bridge 
which may help us to pass safely over this period of transition.470 
 
Several realist thinkers, notably Hans Morgenthau and Frederick Schuman, threw their support 
behind this effort, as a second best option to a world state.471 
Allied with these functionalist efforts has been the applied tradition of liberal economic 
internationalism. This is the internally divided tradition of Richard Cobden, the early Norman 
Angell, J.M. Keynes and F.A. Hayek. This tradition of liberal economic internationalism holds 
out the vision of global order imparted by a global laissez faire capitalist economy, with some 
degree of support from international institutions, the WTO and IMF. Within this shared global 
market, a global community of entrepreneurial and pacific individuals engaging in free enterprise 
and trade is envisioned to emerge. The capitalist framework for a world polity was expressed in 
Fritz Koenig’s sculpture, The Sphere, formerly installed at the World Trade Centre plaza, a 
singular golden globe representing world peace and unity through free trade. Even though there 
is disagreement amongst liberal economic internationalists about the degree of needed 
institutional supports, they agree a world government is unnecessary for a world polity. The 
operating principle, Hayek argued, is that the larger the number of participants, the higher the 
ratio of detractors.472 Thus, it is more helpful and feasible for states, including a world state, to 
get out of the way because if a world government were established to plan order and effectuate 
unity, it would need to unduly impose its plan on its inevitable and (according to Hayek’s ratio) 
numerous detractors; better leave it to the individuals to order themselves. These ideas were put 
into practice in the post-war order, and reworked by Reagan and Thatcher and in re-envisioned in 
the Washington Consensus, whose legacy is the vast economic exploit of neo-liberal 
globalization, thinly regulated and supported by the economic wing of global governance 
structures. These are the ideas behind the words of Christine Lagarde, managing director of the 
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IMF, when she argued in Davos 2013, ‘This generation is a global generation and an open 
generation. Open to the world, and to the idea of a common global community.’473  
The combination of the functionalist and free market liberal internationalist movements 
in international affairs find their application in the idea and complex of practices of global 
governance today, a set of organizations, non-state actors, principles, and practices surrounding 
the international system, which has had US leadership at its center since its emergence in the 
post-war era. To some extent, the reimagination of this order along trans-civilizational and 
ecological lines is already afoot in world politics.474 The failure of these ideas in practice, 
however, to facilitate a sufficiently cooperative international society, let alone the emergence of 
a world polity willing and practically able to meet international and global challenges, is 
increasingly evident.475 Both the functionalist and liberal economic internationalists protest that 
their ideas have been both misapplied and insufficiently tested in practice. This is true, but it is 
true of all utopias. Functionalist inspired organizations and regimes have struggled to meet their 
basic goals and the recent near complete collapse of neo-liberal economic globalization has been 
a cause of disorder and social fragmentation. World affairs are as if at the tail end of a new 
twenty years’ crisis, since the end of the Cold War.476 Great power rivalries are reemerging, arms 
control is faltering, diplomatic commitments like the UN Global Goals and Paris Agreement are 
being unmet, and radical politics is attracting popular support. 
The point here is that a trans-civilizational planetary world polity would be no less in 
need of a world government than the anarchical society of states is today. Global governance is 
falling short. In this context, some have called for a regionalist alternative, a piece-meal world 
polity, using the local hegemons to order their regions first, and the world polity second. There is 
a sense that this might help facilitate a trans-civilizational ethos, by pluralizing the world order, 
along regional lines. Yet, regionalism is inadequate for the challenge because the world’s regions 
are already integrated to the point that regionalism is insufficient. A supra-regional governing 
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structure is needed beyond the regions.477 A world polity would need a world government as 
much as the society of states is in need of one today. Realist thinkers have revived the security 
argument for a world government,478 while liberal cosmopolitans have also touted the need for a 
world government to meet the demands of universalist liberal democratic principles.479 There has 
also been a growing interest in the need for a novel global constitution, one able to support a 
global government lite, or alternative quasi-federated model.480 
 
A Democratic World Federation? 
 
A third alternative to the world government structure, however, issues from the tradition of 
democratic peace. This tradition provides the structural alternative of a not-quite world republic, 
a peaceable world federation of republics. Kant argues that, ‘if everything is not to be lost’,  
 
in place of the positive idea of a world republic they put only the negative surrogate 
of an enduring, ever expanding federation that prevents war and curbs the tendency 
of that hostile inclination to defy the law, though there will always be constant 
danger of their breaking loose.481 
 
The basic idea is that if all the states were republican, or some favoured and consistent version of 
democracy, then a world polity could be formed without a world government, by establishing 
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rights within, between, and, across a federation of states.482 There could be a cosmopolitan law, 
without a cosmopolitan world government, so this tradition claims. We might plausibly imagine 
a trans-civilizational and eco-planetary world polity along these lines, with a trans-
civilizationally expanded notion of democracy and cosmopolitan law as well. 
Yet, there is some debate about how peaceable a world of democratic republics would 
be.483 Zones of democratic peace create zones of extra-democratic war.484 We might also 
question how consistent the constitutions of democracies could be if they were pluralized along 
trans-civilizational lines. What democracy, whose democracy, do we mean? However, the major 
issue is that regardless of the character of the states, the system would still require, practically 
speaking, a political authority for managing and administering system-wide problems, including 
ecological management, economic affairs, mass migrations, outer space and like concerns. 
Kant’s vision is said to have inspired the League and United Nations, as well as Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples. Both this application to practice and extension in theory make some room in their 
schemas for the establishment of a collective decision making body above the system of 
democratic states.485 Yet, even if the problem of war were to fade away, a system of consistently 
democratic regimes would require an authoritative international decision-making body or system 
of international authorities to manage and administer crosscutting system-wide problems and 
ambitions that Kant did not foresee and which the experiments in international governance 
through the United Nations and League have struggled to achieve. It is a short step from this 
federation of democracies with a clumsy international decision-making body, to a more secure 
and extensive world federation. 
 
A World Federal Government? 
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Amongst the recent world government proposals, one of the most promising and widely admired 
to date has been Daniel Deudney’s argument for a world federal republican government.486 The 
republican tradition that straddles realist and liberal approaches, Deudney tells us, can overcome 
the dilemma between the political ills of hierarchy and the disfunction of anarchy by its recipe of 
“negarchy”, the negation of both created by federal a division of powers. It is a short step, once 
we see it, from Kant’s loose federation of republics, to Deudney’s world federal republic. He 
makes the important and sensible distinction between a world government and a world state, the 
former being the administration of governance, the offices and bureaucracies of government, 
whereas the state is conceived as the larger package of sovereignty, territory, population, and a 
monopoly on the use of force. The distinction helps Deudney clarify his proposal of world 
government with a constitutional structure of divided sovereignty, a division of powers not 
unlike the American system, but global in reach and therefore, with no outside threats, and so in 
less need for an oversized military or any need for thermonuclear deterrents.  
What makes this proposal promising is that the need for a world government is shaped by 
current predicaments and its ambitions facilitate those of in a trans-civilizational and planetary-
ecological context. Starting from where we are now, with a society of states struggling under an 
institutionalized security dilemma, gives the vision of a global negarchical order a particular 
appeal. Scheuerman has argued Deudney’s world order scheme is Western and American-
centric, not readily applicable or acceptable to all humankind.487 This objection is unpersuasive, 
however, because federal schemes can be modified, and parliamentary federalism has been 
adopted in contexts beyond its Western conception, like India and Japan, and because the very 
point of federalism is to accommodate plurality, which is what makes it fitting for a trans-
civilizational world polity. Alternatives to Deudney’s model could be stretched to fit the trans-
civilizational vision of a world polity, but they struggle against the practicalities that a world 
polity and world government are imagined and practiced in response to. A global union model 
for instance, with a global constitution, reformed UN, integrating the regional organizations, 
might be equally consistent with a trans-civilizational ambition and its construction might be 
more easily achievable in practice. But, the ability of its governance to meet global problems 	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would be practically deficient without a federal division of powers and federal decision making 
system needed to sufficiently overcome the underlying structural constraints of hegemony and 
anarchy, so to practically enable global action. Without authoritative powers and decision 
making mechanisms, the governance capacity of such a global union would be paralyzed by rival 
state interests. The federal model is more practical than the alternatives because of its greater 
governance capacity, whilst also containing the potential to fulfill the ambition of a trans-
civilizational plurality of modern uses of rights and freedoms, with a federal division of powers 
(to negate the impractical paralysis of anarchy) and a system of checks and balances (to negate 
the potential excesses of an hierarchy). 
 
7.4 Reflexive Appraisals 
 
Third, how successfully does this conception of a trans-civilizational but eco-planetary polity 
with a world federal government meet the criteria I have been applying throughout this study? 
Because we have considered the different aspects of this vision fairly carefully across this study, 
and because it has been formulated by sifting the literature for features that meet my criteria, I 
can address this question of criteria fairly succinctly. Let me address each criterion in turn. 
First, on the criteria of comprehensibility, the point of the use of the conception of a 
trans-civilizational world polity is somewhat slippery, but is, basically, a combination of a larger 
trans-civilizational belonging and ecological wellbeing, with belonging taking priority. The point 
of using this conception is first, to realize a post-Western world order where everyone belongs 
with an enlarged new cosmopolitan understanding of freedom, wherein the world polity is 
imagined as incomplete without everyone, and wherein everyone has a place in the world 
together, in a common world. Ecological wellbeing is instrumental to the primary point of a 
larger belonging. This implies, in its practical application, I have argued, a world federal 
government, with inspiration from Deudney’s model, but modified towards trans-civilizational 
and eco-planetary purposes. 
Second, on the criteria of coherence, I have striven my best to give this conception a 
charitable expression, and suggest its most coherent definition above. It is, I have argued, more 
coherent than the variety of alternative conceptions because it issues from historically specific 
trans-civilizational self-conceptions, rather than a-historical or idiosyncratic and Euro-centric 
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conceptions. Much of the coherence of this conception is its congruence with the horizons of 
modernity in a global context, and how it avoids the false empirical assumptions of nationalistic 
and universalist Euro-centric conceptions, particularly the universalisms of liberal 
cosmopolitanism. Contra commonly held notions that a world polity would have a single 
uniform world culture, I have taken on the assumption that the greater the constituency of a 
polity the greater the ratio of its diversity, hence the vision that a world polity would necessarily 
involve trans-civilizational components, particularly in a post-colonial and modern context 
where singular and universal visions are suspect and resisted. 
 Yet, third, how practical is this conception? How realizable is it in a practical way that is 
not doomed to collapse? I suggested that because of the patchwork, meta-narrative, trans-
civilizational character of this trans-civilizational conception, it is easily countered by divisive 
narratives and is undermined by civilizational conflict in practice. Practically speaking, unless 
new technologies create an unforeseen concentration power in the system, the trans-civilizational 
vision requires the circulation of its narrative across multiple great powers mutually supporting 
the establishment of a world governing structure to manage conflict and continue to promote its 
collective-self-narrative. Thus, the conception, we have to admit, is, if not practically impossible, 
highly improbable. There is little practical hope of this world polity being realized, although it is 
not beyond the realms of possibility. If it were to emerge, it would be more practical that 
alternative visions. Any world polity necessarily would need to involve trans-civilizational and 
ecological features for it to be practically realizable. But, there is, presently, little hope for the 
practical realization of a trans-civilizational world polity in the near future. The systemic threats 
posed by thermonuclear weapons and climate change do not presently appear sufficient to 
instigate world polity formation. However, I do not rule it out in the next fifty to one hundred 
years, as the ecological crisis worsens and new disruptive technologies emerge. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Reimagining the world polity in this way, as a trans-civilizational planetary polity, with a federal 
world government structure appropriated and customized from Deudney’s stock model towards 
trans-civilizational and eco-planetary needs, helps defog our vision of the possible future world 
polity and it helps let go of some of the baggage of the past. A world polity is not merely the 
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connection of all humankind via global economic and communications systems. Neither is it 
merely the structural unification of humankind, with a world government or global governance. 
Furthermore, neither is a world polity a moral unity of all humankind, via universal moral codes 
and neutral moral norms. Moral principles are themselves insufficient to guide a polity without a 
sociological basis tied to a collective identity. Collective-self-conceptions and feeling of 
belonging make all the difference. Yet, neither is a world polity a seamless cultural fusion of all 
humankind. Cultures are not homogenous wholes and a polity is not the same thing as a culture. 
A world polity is involves the emergence of a common trans-civilizational and ecological 
cosmopolitan cultural discourse across a vast plurality of cultures and polities. Yet, furthermore 
still, neither is a world polity the peaceable kingdom or any other millennial or secular notion or 
planetary paradise, because it would be an historically specific, unique, and necessarily imperfect 
polity, like any other. Its cosmopolitanism would be historically specific, with its own 
imperfections and troubles, particularly the politics of belonging, as I suggested in Chapter 5. 
Even though a trans-civilizational planetary polity would experience conflict, inevitably, 
however, its sense of belonging, common sympathies of being-in-it-together, would give it the 
resources of solidarity to overcome conflicts of ideals and interests, providing reasons to share 
burdens and make sacrifices. The trans-civilizational, ecological, and now world federal 
components reimagine the realizable if imperfect world polity for our modern times. A world 
federal government, if it were established, would require a trans-civilizational character to 
generate legitimacy for itself in a context of modern identity politics on a global scale. Yet, if the 
world polity was not also realized with a supporting ecological character on a planetary level, 
then it would become overwhelmed by the practical consequences of uncontrolled climate 
change. Reimagining the world polity in this way helps shake off the imperial and universalist 
legacies of the concept, and it helps defog our vision of possible futures, by providing the image 
of a realizable world polity, albeit one that would be a difficult and unlikely but not entirely 
impossible or impractical, achievement. 
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Conclusion. 
No New Covenant? World Polity, World Order 
 
8.1 Why there is No World Polity 
 
Like the intellectuals in the Warring States period of ancient China, who formed a consensus that 
“stability is in unity”, a similar consensus is emerging amongst intellectuals today.488 A diverse 
group of realists, liberal idealists, constructivists, normative and critical theorists, and English 
School thinkers are beginning to form a consensus that a more unified world order is a practical 
necessity and desirable outcome.489 However, like the intellectuals in the Warring States period 
of ancient China, intellectuals today debate the possible, necessary, desirable extent and form of 
unity. In this study I set out to explain what it means for humankind, and its system of states, to 
form the maximal unity of a world polity, whether such an outcome is possible, under what 
conditions, from what contributing processes, and in what necessary social form. I have argued 
that it means all humankind forming one polity out of the problems of systemic insecurity and by 
the process of the reception and circulatory use of a hierarchy legitimating collective-self-
narrative, which, in the contemporary modern context, most coherently and practically would 
take on a trans-civilizational and ecological narrative content. In a late and post-colonial era of 
modernity, a world polity must attain a trans-civilizational narrative for it to be acceptable to the 
peoples and cultures that have been mobilized and marshaled to defend their independence and 
distinct identities against pseudo-universal ideas and imperial hierarchies.490 Yet, it must also 
involve an ecological component if is to be practically sustainable. These arguments form my 
two contributions: first, the development of an alternative eclectic world polity formation theory 	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that explains how systems of polities become single polities, and second, the clarification of why 
a world polity does not exist today, the conditions for its realization, and that it must attain a 
trans-civilizational but planetary form to be realized in a modern context. 
Developing this answer has been an odyssey. First, I started out by theorizing whether a 
world polity is possible, and if so, under what conditions and by what processes. I advanced an 
alternative eclectic theory of world polity formation by raising the level of abstraction to the 
question of how systems of polities become single polities. Working with this theory, I argued 
the emergence of a world polity out of the contemporary system is not entirely impossible, but its 
conditions of systemic concentrations of power and unifying narratives in a global system of 
multiple modern cultures are difficult to meet, particularly because the articulation of a unifying 
collective-self-narrative in this context is difficult to conceive in coherent and practical terms. 
Second, from this theoretical position, I moved to the question of how to evaluate the rival 
contemporary visions of what a world polity can and must be if it were to be realizable in 
practice. I developed a discursive pragmatist approach that aims to clarify what the concept of a 
world polity can mean within its context of the modern discourse of world order, and what it can 
be used to achieve when applied to practice. With this discursive pragmatist approach to 
conceptual analysis, I established three general criteria to evaluate rival conceptions with: 
comprehensibility, coherence, and practicality. With these criteria based on the general approach 
of discursive pragmatism, I moved towards a conceptual analysis of the major positions in the 
world polity debate within the discourse of world order. 
Third, I found visions of global democracy lacked a collective-self-narrative connected to 
a sense of belonging, that a world polity would practically require, particularly a democratic 
world polity. I argued furthermore that the liberal cosmopolitan vision of the community of 
humankind based on universal moral codes does not amount to a practical conception, because, 
even if we can accept that there are universal moral laws, what to make of them, as a world 
polity, is a distinct and overwhelming question without a further unifying narrative, because 
nothing is clear in laws themselves, as they nearly always avail multiple and often conflicting 
interpretations. I found the Kantian inspired visions of dialogue to be a helpful if not guaranteed 
means towards envisioning and realizing a world polity, but not the same thing as a world polity 
vision themselves. 
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Fourth, turning to critical visions of a world polity, I found they also struggled to 
articulate practical visions of unity, because the universal freedom and equality they strove to 
achieve also requires a further binding collective narrative, to inform what such freedoms and 
equalities are for, why and how they mean a larger belonging, to reconcile the innumerable and 
often conflicting aims and ideals such freedoms and equalities are rightfully demanded and used 
for. I found that the narrative and sense of belonging needed to overcome these limitations 
cannot be universally all-embracing across time and space, via neutral moral principles, but that 
it must necessarily have historically and normatively specific ideals and ambitions. 
Fifth, I found the anti-foundationalist but ironically universal liberal-universalist outlook, 
connected to the vision of a global civil society, to be impractical as a collective-self-narrative 
for all humankind, because it is not nor will it be ascribed to by all humankind in a late modern 
world where liberal ideals and identities are one amongst many, representing a secularized 
Christian Western modernity in a world of multiple and non-liberal modernities resistant to its 
universal pretenses. There are many equally valid modern ways of life, liberalism being one 
amongst many. Across these encounters, I frequently found more promise in a trans-
civilizational kind narrative, a bricolage narrative of narratives, which I suggested has a post-
Western trans-civilizational quality in a late-modern context. I argued the realizable world polity, 
in a modern era, must chiefly involve a trans-civilizational narrative, because in modern times, 
civilization has been intricately connected to legitimacy in the modern discourse of world order. 
What it means to be modern, is often taken to be what it means to be civilized in modern times. 
This is why rising great powers are employing civilizational discourses as a form of soft power 
to legitimize their great power status and rival Western notions of modernity and civilization. In 
a modern context, civilization, as the mastery of technological power and “civilized” practices 
and worldviews, is imagined as the achievement of modernity. As such, civilization has become 
a source of legitimacy in the modern discourse of world order, as the language for the standards 
and hallmarks of human excellence and exemplariness.491 Late modern civilization is global, but 
also plural.492 The concept of civilization once used to legitimize European empire, has been 
appropriated by post-colonial peoples, in their ‘systematic defense of the non-European 
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civilizations.’493 Huntington’s thesis of an impending “clash of civilizations” has been much 
critiqued, but it contained the insight that in a modern world, everyone wants ‘to modernize but 
not to Westernize.’494 Because “civilization” was the historical criterion of legitimacy in the 
modern discourse of world order, and so became a systematically appropriated concept by post-
colonial peoples, legitimate standing as a world power is connected in late modern times not only 
to global democratic, human rights, and market standards of modernity, but also to civilizational 
distinctiveness and integrity, distinct ways of being modernly civilized, Japanese, Chinese, 
Indian, Russian, Iranian, and so on.495 In late modern times, for there to be a world polity to 
support a unified world order, a “higher” trans-civilizational narrative is needed to legitimize it 
as a shared project for all humankind and all its civilizations. In a modern context where multiple 
modernities attain a common interrelatedness of modern experience and ambitions, I argued 
these narratives can, nonetheless, potentially form the larger narrative and sense of belonging in 
a global civilization of modernity, membership of which would entail the shared project of a 
trans-civilizational world polity. 
Sixth, I qualified this finding, however, by examining the implications of ecological crisis 
and ecological consciousness, in a planetary-scale Gaia-marking Anthropocenic age, where a 
shared ambition of ecological wellbeing affects virtually all humankind and virtually all human 
endeavors. I argued against seeing this planetary politics of the common community of fate as 
eclipsing politics, erasing all division, from a post-political orbital perspective, but instead, with 
concessions to Bruno Latour’s oeuvre, I argued “living together well” takes on a new ecological 
condition in an ecologically conscious age. 
Lastly, considering the relation of these arguments, the image of a realizable world polity 
that I wrested from the conceptual investigations is the image of a world polity with a trans-
civilizational but planetary ecological character, shaped by the common interrelatedness of 
modern experience of a new cosmopolitanism and “higher” notion of freedom and belonging. If 
the world polity were not realized with a trans-civilizational character, it would not get off the 
ground, because it would face too many detractors who would find it unacceptable to their 	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modern self-conceptions and ambitions. Yet, if the world polity was not also realized with an 
ecological component on a planetary level, then it would become overwhelmed by the practical 
consequences of uncontrolled climate change. 
In effect, my arguments have not only explained what a world polity must be if it were to 
be realizable in late modern times, but also why there is no world polity, of a world order 
significant kind in this context, and why its emergence is highly unlikely. The realization of a 
world polity is unlikely partly due to the diffusion of systemic power and limited and mixed 
perceptions of systemic threats, but it is also unlikely because of the difficulty and complicated 
nature of imagining a realizable world polity in a late modern age with multiple modernities and 
civilizational cultures mobilized against universalist narratives and hierarchical authorities. This 
thesis is largely about finding the image of a realizable world polity, but its answer, by effect, is 
also about why there is no world polity and why it is highly unlikely. A trans-civilizational 
experience of modernity and the transformative implications of planetary ecological 
consciousness are the most defensible footholds for conceiving a realizable world polity today, I 
argue, but they are practically weak nonetheless. In practice, the power-political impetus to 
unification is not yet acute enough and the complex trans-civilizational planetary narrative is 
vulnerable to counter-interpretations by a simpler clash of civilizations narrative, even if that 
narrative is incoherent in theory. 
 
8.2 The Insanity of Modernity? 
 
The realization of a unified world polity, if imagined rightly, promises immense if inevitably 
imperfect benefits for humankind: more equitable distributions of wealth, greater inclusivity and 
solidarity on a global scale, the dismantling the hegemony and imperialism of the great powers 
over the small powers, the elimination of thermonuclear weapons amongst great powers, 
ecological wellbeing, and so on. Some point towards the system of the thermonuclear balance of 
terror and modern guerrilla warfare, as the main reasons for the absence of a unified world 
polity. Others point to the failure of the people to achieve a world revolution. These are only 
reasons for the absence of global conquest or revolution, and do not explain why a world 
federation or union would be resisted with modern weapons and further revolutions. The reason 
for the absence of a world polity is also in the realm of the modern mind. Rousseau pointed to 
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the cornucopia of political unity, where abundance, science, art, and moral human achievement 
would be liberated from the waste, moral corruption, and destruction of war and its perpetual 
threat. Rousseau concluded his response to L’Abbe St. Pierre’s Perpetual Peace with the 
injunction that, if, ‘this Plan’, for unity, ‘remains unexecuted, it is not because it is chimerical; it 
is because men are insane, and because it is a sort of folly to be wise in the midst of fools.’496 All 
the modern dreamers of a future perpetual peace, Kant, Bentham, Marx, and all the modern 
dreamers of a final world state, Russell, Einstein, and so on, were sane rational thinkers, with the 
modern dream of a purely rational world of pristine ethics and world unity efficiently producing 
modern ambitions of humane peace, unlimited learning and prosperity. Rival dreams, however, 
are held by modern irrational thinkers, the dreamers of self-defined freedom and moral 
independence.497 In a cutting essay, ‘Wells, Hitler and the World State’, George Orwell wrote of 
H.G. Wells, the dreamer of a world government and planetary Utopia, that he was, ‘too sane to 
understand the modern world.’498 Yet, modern rational sanity and irrational insanity are not in a 
contest of good and evil, with one potentially emerging triumphant. They are of the same modern 
world, inseparable, with a shared fate. As Theodore Adorno suggested, modern ‘irrationality is 
not necessarily a force operative outside the range of rationality: it may result from the processes 
of rational self-preservation “run amuck.” 499  The forces of modern sanity and insanity, 
rationalism and irrationalism, are mutually culpable in the disasters of modernity, the barbarity 
of modern empire, modern gulags and genocides, two modern total wars on a world scale, nearly 
a third, runaway climate change. Modern humankind struggles to imagine a possible and 
desirable world polity, one that is sane, in modern rational terms, but also one that is meaningful, 
in modern irrational terms. Humankind is not insane, only modernly so. The modern imagination 
of a world polity enabled by modern outlooks is also constrained by them, giving modern visions 
their tendency towards either irrationally modern rationalism or rationally modern irrationalism. 
Struggling to conceive such a vision outside of paradox, the idea of a world polity is forced, in 
the modern mind, into the realms of utopia, dystopia, and retrotopia. 	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At a more general level, it is a modern cosmology that makes modern rationalism and 
irrationalism possible and condemns the world polity to unreality and irrelevance. Cosmology 
and conceptions of humankind in the cosmos are the basis on which humankind imagines what a 
political order is, what it is for, how it is possible. For the ancient Egyptians, for instance, who 
conceived the earth as raised up from the primordial waters by maat, the maintenance of maat so 
to uphold the earth from the waters, became paramount as the basis of what an order is, and was 
easily made consistent with a unified order of upper and lower Egypt. By contrast, for the ancient 
Greeks who conceived the cosmos and the earth as made from chaos, in the primordial wars of 
gods, more variety of legitimate orders could be imagined, because only the fortunes of humans, 
and not the fate of the earth itself, rested on their order. For moderns, although there are multiple 
horizons, multiple modernities, secular horizons have been a prominent force in world affairs, 
shaping, for a time, both the liberal democratic West and communist East. Modern thinkers, 
Hobbes, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Kant, Marx and Lenin, Bentham, Rawls, Nussbaum, Habermas, 
Fraser and so on, all share the kernel of St. Simon’s politics as the ‘administration of things’; the 
rationally devised secular order, a clock work order, run by moral calculemus. Modern 
irrationalism has rebelled against this cosmological inference and is equally valid in a modern 
cosmos. Who is to say what is “rational”, for me, or any one else, let alone all humankind, in this 
late modern age? This thinking is evinced by Herder, Hegel, Hiedegger, Arendt, amongst others, 
perhaps most clearly in Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Connolly. 
Beyond theory, in the realm of practice, in a late modern context where everyone has 
been mobilized and rallied to defend their independent rights and freedoms, the “rational” forces 
for a world polity, the functionalist planners and world order modelers, are almost entirely routed 
and face nearly insurmountable obstacles and resistance to its realization in practice. Humankind 
has striven and to an extent has, built up a shared order, tying anarchy down, cross-stitching an 
international society together with diplomacy, peace through law, bureaucratically rational 
international organization, and free trade interdependence, edging towards cosmopolitan rules 
and norms.500 But, the sovereign state, particularly in moments of power shifts and economic 
collapse, is susceptible to capture by pigheadedly principled modern irrationality, or by a more 
powerful modernly rational revolutionary vision. So the stitches of rational internationalism, 	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which never have been tightly sewn, are snapped, with the flick of the sovereign’s wrist. This is 
the pattern of recurrent world order crises in modern times: cross-stitching and collapse. It is why 
the globalist visions of our early third millennium have receded, just like the internationalist 
visions of the late 19th century, in Cobden and Ricardo, and again those doubly internationalist 
visions the inter-war years, the idealism of Alfred Zimmern and others, receded before the rise of 
nationalism and world war, just as the popular push for a world government after the Second 
World War sunk beneath the rise of the Cold War. The tide of world affairs will provide the 
dream of a world polity another chance in future, but if it is to succeed, it must reconcile modern 
rationalism and irrationalism, rallying all those populations that have been galvanized with 
nationalist and religious meaning, around a larger uniting trans-civilizational planetary narrative, 
so to constitute a new shared sense of a larger belonging and collective identity. 
 
8.3 The Prospects for Unity 
 
Is humankind hopelessly modern? The disillusioned idealist Richard Falk has recently been 
brought to ask, ‘Does the human species wish to survive?’501 He suggests humankind needs to 
adopt a global imaginary, leaving behind the national horizons of desire, for the planetary and 
species horizons of a world society. He takes the meaning of “world society” too uncritically 
however, assuming its possibility of realization, never fully exploring what its historical contents 
are, what it means to its historical participants, often deferring the question to a democratic 
means of defining it, with “globalization from below”. Yet, if the vision of a world polity comes 
from above or below, from one part of the world or another, it needs to be clarified, eventually, 
in theory or in practice, one way or another. I have striven in this study to clarify this question, 
searching the family of world polity conceptions for a realizable vision. 
The answers I have found are thin, nowhere as unshakeable as those ancient 
cosmologically based narratives of the Stoics, Egyptians, etc.. World order legitimacy in a late 
modern era is not derived from divine mandate. A world polity project in this context is not a 
new tower of Babel, gaining legitimacy and unity from a proximity to the divine; the legitimacy 
and unity of a world polity, in a late modern context, is tied not only to its ability to produce the 
material and political fruits of modern civilization, health, prosperity, etc., but also its ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Richard Falk Power Shift: On the New Global Order (London: Zed, 2016), p. 253. 
	   197 
connect these things to the pursuit of multiple and multiplicitous modern political ways of life. 
The idea of a trans-civilizational world polity emphasizing ecological wellbeing is a 
reconciliation of these twin demands of humankind in a late modern age, where everyone wants 
to modernize but not to Westernize. No matter from what tradition a world polity vision is 
devised today, it must involve trans-civilizational and ecological components to be practically 
realizable in the contemporary context. This follows because, in a shared modern context, no 
universal narrative can be legitimately or practically imposed on the rest. It is the empire of 
modernity that makes the world polity seem impossible and suspect, but I have attempted to 
argue that the practically possible world polity, within a modern context, is not unimaginable 
entirely, even if its practical realization in a new global covenant is highly unlikely. Diversity of 
interpretations, and thereby likelihood of conflicting interpretations, rises with the number of 
participants, and the world polity as the largest of polities, will involve the largest diversity of 
interpretation and thereby, conflict. Yet, finding a sense of shared collective identity is the most 
feasible way to realize the world polity, because a shared belief in belonging together, of mutual 
commitment to being in-it-together, is a basis for finding terms and practices of living together 
well. Conflicts in practice become more practical even technical questions, not mortal 
differences, where there is a shared sense of belonging partly constituted by a shared collective-
self-narrative. Difference and disagreement on the best practice of politically significant 
practices like secularism, democracy, and economics, and world order in general, are more 
resolvable and not implacable, because transvaluations are possible and commitment to binding 
decisions on them is attainable, where there is a commitment to living together well, based on a 
shared sense of belonging together.  
 
8.4 A World Polity Beyond Modernity? 
 
What of a new cosmology and new social imaginary, beyond modernity? Why not explore the 
world polity beyond modernity, if it is a late modern world that constrains and problematizes the 
imagination of a world polity? Why devote so much exploration to the modern discourse of a 
world polity, if a world beyond modernity might be more hospitable to realizing the world polity 
idea? 
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What does a world beyond modernity mean? Ulrich Beck argued humankind has entered 
a “second modernity”, a cosmopolitan and planetary modernity, and this is not entirely 
inaccurate, but it is a continuation of modernity, not a departure.502 It is the world in which a 
trans-civilizational but planetary world polity can make sense. Post-modern thought suggests that 
belief in modernity is over, and this is not entirely inaccurate either.503 Progress is a myth, we all 
see today, and belief in an achievable utopia is a dead possibility, hence the preeminence of 
dystopian and retrotopian thought in late modern culture. There are shifts in the modern 
imaginary, amongst them, post-Western shifts, I suggested. Post-modernity is a shift in language 
games, not a change of language games.504 Post-modernity is still modernity in its cosmological 
dimensions, where Einstein’s cosmos forms a common, if not universal, modern picture. Post-
modernity is largely what I have been calling a late modernity. It is not a world beyond 
modernity. By a world beyond modernity, I primarily mean a new epoch with a new view of the 
cosmos and a re-conception of what humankind is and can be. Modernity has been socially 
constructed and so an alternative world could in principle be constructed. The trans-civilizational 
and ecological vision I have advanced represents a partial reimagining in modernity, but not a 
departure from modernity itself. A total reimagining of what an order is and what it means to 
form a polity might be a more effective way to imagine and realize a legitimate world polity, in 
the long run, if such things could be so radically reimagined. 
How might such shifts of social imaginaries occur and what might they usher in? In 
approaching this question, it needs to be recognized that “seeing” beyond modernity is 
epistemically questionable. The activity wanders in the realm of futurology and science fiction. 
What an alternative epoch could be or how it would arise is unclear and wildly speculative. 
Bruno Latour’s position that we were never modern, because modernity is imaginary, 
phenomenological, has some merits, if we accept his materialist premises, but, regardless, it is 
not so easy to stop being modern.505 A speech act of declaring “not modern”, is not powerful 
enough and must be followed by an answer of what we are, if not modern. Major shifts are 
needed to ground new answers, unavoidable transformations of fundamental outlooks, of the 	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kind made by Galileo and Darwin, for instance, transforming who, when, what, and why, we are. 
A working theory of consciousness, for instance, might have a transformative effect on modern 
culture. Depending on what a working theory of consciousness reveals about human beings and 
collective life, it might illuminate new conceptions of humankind and order. Ecological crisis, 
perhaps most forcefully, is enabling a post-human imaginary, where nature and culture are 
indistinct, where ecological wellbeing and social wellbeing are indistinct. Yet, the modern 
conception of order and wellbeing is not entirely transformed by these post-human outlooks, 
only reshaped, beyond its anthropocentric conception, giving things agency too, not overcoming 
the vision of order as a collaboration of agents. There are also changes in the time/spatial 
dimensions in which modernity is imagined, although not to an extent that transforms modernity 
itself. We might look to quantum cosmology, but that is really only a working through of 
Einstein’s cosmos, deepening down, to unexpected and novel results of entanglement, but still a 
working through, not really a break or transition. Astronomy is also expanding human horizons 
of spatial imagination. The spherical globe has preoccupied the stage of the modern spatial 
imagination since at least the 19th century, and the planetary image of orbital and atmospheric 
horizons took the stage in the 20th, but the 21st century is finding more and more inter-planetary 
and inter-stellar horizons, in Martian colonization, and identification of thousands of Earth-like 
planets, however distant. There are only technological obstacles to the inter-planetary and inter-
stellar expansion of humankind. This still impossible possibility is nonetheless having a 
significant effect on imagined possibilities of human polities. This expansion of spatial horizons 
however does not really transform when and who is collaborating in imagined orders, only 
where. The identification of an advanced alien civilization would likely reshape and revise 
modern assumptions in crucial respects, opening up unimaginable vistas of what an order is and 
can become. The implications of that event are unpredictable, but likely transformative. 
The fusion of human beings and technology, with genetic engineering and digital 
consciousness, may be producing a variant of modernity, especially if it enables new forms of 
collective consciousness, but it would be a variant, a continuation, shaped by and shaping the 
collaborative modern picture into new technologically enabled dimensions. There are increasing 
notions of a “smart planet”, as well, where everything and everyone is integrated into “smart” 
technology. In connection to this, in the rise of artificial intelligence, there is a possibility of a 
significant shift, where human participation in order is less self-directed, and guided by the 
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greater intelligences of machines, potentially self-conscious machines. The basic pictures of 
what an order is and how it is made would shift, depending on the powers unleashed by AI 
governance. The modern picture of order would be settled, in the sediment of history, where a 
variety of new pictures would take the stage. The variety of modernities would not incorporate 
AI governance in a single way, because different modern cultural traditions would marshal 
different reasons and ambitions for adopting AI governance. Modernity is not uniform or 
universal, neither is it unchanging, but candidates for its replacement or displacement are still 
barely evident. The keys and doors out of the iron cage of modernity are not entirely apparent. 
The collapse of modernity, perhaps in a thermonuclear war, would be an invalidation of 
modernity, creating the basis for the formulation of new horizons. Anything that followed 
modernity, however, would be constructed out of the rubble of modernity, never making a 
perfect break from the cultural horizons of modernity.  
The major problem with the question of a world polity beyond modernity is that it is a 
modern question, contingent on modern temporalities. If the world beyond modernity is beyond 
modern imagination, being itself a modern question, then waiting for such a world would be 
costly and unnecessary if we can imagine a realizable world polity within modern horizons. I do 
not mean to be overly alarmist, and argue the world polity must be achieved or humankind is 
doomed. The international system might survive by the skin of its teeth, as it were, by greening 
and muddling through diplomatically, avoiding general war, and stabilizing the global economy. 
But, there are genuine existential threats and systemic injustices raised by the technologically 
advanced system of states that could be alleviated with the formation of a world polity beyond 
hegemony and anarchy. The aims of stability and prosperity could be far more powerfully 
achieved by a unified world. Most people I discuss these questions with seem to scarcely be able 
to conceive how limited our international world is, hardly grasping the degrees of human 
potential that a united world represents. Yet, as difficult as it is to imagine, the vision of a trans-
civilizational planetary polity represents a better modernity than the international instantiation of 
modernity. There may be technological fixes to our technologically enabled but modernly shaped 
global problems, climate silver bullets and unlimited energy supply perhaps, which might make 
an alternative world order proposal unnecessary, although I have my doubts. Technological fixes 
may likely produce new problems and moreover there are new technological problems on the 
horizon. Artificial intelligence, A.I., if weaponized in a state-centric world order, would in the 
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long term pose a further threat to humankind, for instance, unless carefully regulated against its 
military application. The modern international imaginary underpinning the modern state-centric 
world order matters to humankind, enabling the imagination of collective lives in a pluralistic 
multi-national world order, but it also corrupts humankind, morally, socially, culturally, and 
technologically, estranging citizens from foreigners and warping science around war powers. 
Attempts to overcome these corruptions by re-ordering international society form a graveyard. 
Mazzini’s internationalist dream is largely relegated to the ruins of the calamities and failed 
world order schemes of the 20th and early 21st centuries. The vision of Kant’s democratic 
federation of nations is finding its practical limits in neo-imperial democratic regime change, 
where a “separate peace” arms against zones of war. The modern international imaginary, is, to a 
great extent, behind this persistent disorder and contributes to the absence of a world polity 
today. Yet, a practically achievable world polity is not impossible, or entirely unimaginable; it is 
only unlikely, largely because it is a difficult to imagine and difficult to achieve ambition, within 
the horizons of a late modern context. 
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Epilogue. 
Sketching a “Sociological International Political Theory” 
 
This thesis has an amphibious character. It moves between international sociology and 
international political theory. Several IR scholars have produced similarly amphibious-like texts, 
crossing between the sociology of norms and normative evaluation of social norms. I have in 
mind such scholars as Stanley Hoffman and Hedley Bull, amongst others in earlier generations, 
as well as a good number more in the current context.506 This species of approach is distinct from 
purely normative work, Charles Bietz’s Political Theory and International Relations, for 
instance. That purely normative kind of text aims at clarifying legitimate international norms, in 
spite of what international norms exist empirically. The purely “theoretical” text (think Kenneth 
Waltz Theory of International Politics), is different as well, sticking to the sociological theory of 
international structures and processes, sometimes venturing into prescription based on insights 
into patterns of change and outcomes, but not normative evaluation as such. It can be suggested 
that what makes the amphibious texts possible is the position that the history of ideas matters for 
practice, and that, therefore, the ideas of IR scholars matter for practice, when ideas from 
practice are refined in theory, or ideas developed in theory, find their way to practice. An 
underlying notion here is that the idea refined or developed in theory can clarify what norms and 
institutional orders are possible in a sociological context, viz. a clarified understanding of their 
range of interpretation and implications for practice in that context. 
When Martin Wight wrote his essay, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, he meant 
why is there no international political theory, why is the question of the good society of states 
lacking the systematic study afforded to the good state?507 Yet, in that earlier period of IR 
scholarship, Wight could have just as easily asked why there is no sociology of international 
society equivalent to the sociology of society? International theory was under developed in 
general at the time, being a growing mix of contributions from international law, geography, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506 Stanley Hoffman, ‘International Relations: The Long Road to Theory’, World Politics, 11:3 (1959), pp. 346-377; 
Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach’, World Politics, 18:3 (1966), pp. 361-377. 
507 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.) 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1966), pp. 17-34. 
	   203 
history, and other relevant disciplinary sources.508 Today, the literature is much different.509 
Normative international political theory has become a large literature and sociological 
approaches are gaining speed.510 But, what of the amphibious variety? Recent generations of 
“English School” scholars continue to produce these kinds of studies. At least one Constructivist, 
Richard Price, has explicitly called for more connection between the study of norms and 
normative theory. Price has argued that Constructivism is particularly well placed to explore the 
normative dilemmas and implications that arise from and are involved in constructing changes to 
norms.511 Feminist, Post-Colonial, Critical, and Post-Structuralist theory, steadily advancing 
since the 1980s, has the largest literature and widest ranging number of studies imbricating 
sociological and normative analysis.512 These different lines of research, while being distinct 
strains of IR literature, nonetheless form a common front and potential grand alliance against 
those with narrowly positivist assumptions about theory vs. practice and those that too rigidly 
categorize normative theory apart from the theory of norms and vice versa. 
I do not want to explore the precise relation between theory and practice. What I want to 
do here is to consider the way forward and offer a sketch of a “Sociological International 
Political Theory” (SIPT). How can the various trends and literatures I identified above be 
cohered and advanced as a common front, a general movement, or meta-approach? A common 
feature of the currents of amphibious-like IR research is that it they commonly bring norms 
under normative evaluation and bring normative evaluation under the empirical study of norms. 
Robert Nozick once claimed ‘Normative sociology’ is, ‘the study of what the causes of problems 
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University Press, 1972), pp.3-29. 
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ought to be.’513 This is not quite accurate, however, with respect to what I am sketching. It is 
better to say that it is the study of how the normative purposes of international norms are best 
understood and practiced. It is sociological because it explores the social relations that norms are 
applied to, and it is normative, because it explores the normative implications of the different 
ways those norms are understood and practiced. Cohering the English School, Constructivist, 
and C/critical literatures noted above into a general agenda means recognizing that they are 
commonly raising these kinds of questions about how the normative purposes of international 
norms are best understood and practiced. Advancing this common front means exploring what 
insights can be developed from its kind of study in general. 
 A small but potentially helpful step towards the growth of a sociological international 
political theory is a new Aristotelian taxonomy of international systems. IR has developed decent 
taxonomies. Sociological taxonomies are based on hierarchies. Martin Wight made the 
distinction between sovereign and suzerain systems.514 The language of anarchy and hierarchy 
provided by Kenneth Waltz matches onto it, with suzerain systems being hierarchical and 
sovereign systems being anarchical, analytically speaking.515 Another taxonomy, also first 
developed by Martin Wight, distinguishes international systems based on the outlook and 
behaviour of the participants, ranging in a spectrum from a Hobbesian international system, 
shaped by an outlook of fear and insecurity, to a Lockean or Grotian international society with a 
cooperative outlook, and onto a Kantian world society systemic outlook.516 However, these two 
kinds of taxonomic criteria, structure and outlook/behaviour, have not been properly combined 
yet. In this respect, I want to suggest that to advance the general insights of what I am calling 
“sociological international political theory”, an Aristotelian style taxonomy of international 
systems can illuminate a universe of cases for study. Aristotle’s Politics Book III provided the 
classic taxonomy of governments for political science, based on the number of rulers and whose 
interests the polity was governed for, which clarified the distinction between kings and tyrants, 
aristocracies and oligarchies, etc.. A comparable table for IR would be based on degrees of 
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hierarchy and whose interests the international system was ordered for. The table below exhibits 
this logic: 
 
 
 
 
Benefiting Interests: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degrees of Hierarchy: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working off of the old distinction emphasized by Hedley Bull, between a “society of states” and 
a “system of states”, the former is ordered in the common interests of the states in general and 
the latter, a “system of states”, is ordered for the benefit of the individual states, but not the states 
in general.517 One degree of hierarchy up, “a concert of powers”, is an international system 
ordered for the benefits of the system in general, but through great power management. What I 
have dubbed an “oligopoly of powers”, is a system ordered for the benefits of the great powers, 
via their shared dominance of it. “Hegemony”, connecting to but not necessarily following the 
literature of hegemonic stability theory, means a system ordered for the benefit of the system in 
general, where an “imperium” is a system ordered for the benefits of a unipolar power. At the 
highest degree of hierarchy, is a world government contrasted with a world empire, ordered, 
again, for the benefit of the system or the ruling portion of it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 The English School pluralist solidarist distinction could potentially be applied here, because it conveys a similar 
distinction, although it has been applied to the society of states category and not reconciled with the system of states 
category. I am avoiding the pluralist solidarist language because it is overly complicated and is losing its utility as a 
distinction in the English School literature because the two terms are less and less able to be distinguished and are 
increasingly becoming constellations of distinctions, with substantial overlap, rather one neat and simple distinction. 
See, Barry Buzan An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach (London: 
Sage, 2014), Part III. 
 
World Government 
 
World Empire 
 
Hegemony 
 
Imperium 
 
Concert of Powers 
 
Oligopoly of Powers 
 
Society of States 
 
System of States 
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No reality matches the categories of a taxonomy perfectly, but with this simple table a 
universe of cases is illuminated for analysis with a sociological international political theory 
approach that can analyze the normative purposes and normatively best practice of different 
international orders. The world polity, as I have envisioned it in the above thesis, occupies the 
top left of the table, the “world government”, with a maximal hierarchy ordered for the benefit of 
all the units in the system. We can also see how one of the most interesting questions for the 
contemporary system for instance, has been the question of its “imperium” versus “hegemonic” 
character. With a relative decline of US power, however, to what extent is the system sliding 
towards a “concert of great powers”, or more towards an “oligopolistic system”, a new 
“hegemony”, perhaps all the way down to the general insecurity and self-help of a “system of 
states”, or is it moving towards a mix of these categories? How are the shifts in the normative 
purposes of shifting international norms best understood and practiced? And, if power is 
diffusing in the system, and if a world government is highly unlikely and practically difficult to 
achieve in a modern context, as the present thesis has argued, then what are the socially 
constructed but also normative dimensions of hegemonic transition? It is exploring these kinds of 
questions, about how the normative purposes of international norms are best understood and 
practiced, which are opened up by the amphibious species of study we might like to call 
“sociological international political theory”. 
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Appendix I: Predominant Visions in the Contemporary World Polity Debate 
 
 
 
Traditions 
 
Liberal 
Cosmopolitan 
 
 
Critical Theory 
 
Global 
Civil Society 
 
Space Ship Gaia 
 
Outlook 
 
 
Neo-Kantian 
 
Post-Marxist 
 
Weberian 
Neo-Liberal  
 
 
Planetary 
Ecological 
 
Sub-
traditions 
 
 
Moral 
Universalist 
 
Cultural 
Pluralist 
 
 
Critical 
 
critical 
 
- 
 
Ecological 
Scientific 
 
Ecological 
Post-Human 
 
World 
Order 
Problem 
 
Democratic 
Rights, 
Poverty, and  
Indignity 
 
Conflicting 
Cultural 
Identities 
and 
Practices 
 
 
 
Oppression and 
Exploitation 
 
 
War and 
Political 
Oppression 
 
 
Ecological Crisis 
 
World 
Order 
Purpose 
 
 
Global 
Democracy, 
Distributive 
Justice 
 
 
Tolerance 
and 
Coexistence 
 
 
Emancipation 
 
Global Liberties 
and 
Rights 
Solidarities 
 
Environmental 
Management 
 
Environmental 
Harmony 
 
Sources of 
a World 
Polity 
 
Common Moral Background 
of Rights and Duties 
 
 
Global Socio-Economic 
Structures 
 
 
Modern Trans-
National 
Rationalities 
 
 
Common 
Planetary Habitat 
 
Thinkers 
 
Nussbaum 
Pogge 
Beitz 
B. Barry 
Brock 
Risse 
Caney 
Held 
Archibugi 
Cabrera 
 
Singer 
 
 
Appiah 
Waldron 
G.W. Brown 
 
 
Linklater 
Habermas 
Fraser 
Agamben 
Hardt and 
Negri 
 
 
Gilroy 
Mbembe 
Shani 
Ling and 
Agathangelou 
 
 
 
Kaldor 
Keane 
Benhabib 
Frost 
 
Ward 
Sagan 
Boulding 
Lovelock 
Falk 
 
 
Latour 
Connolly 
 
Bartelson 
Chakrabarty 
 
World 
Order 
Proposal 
 
Cosmopolitan 
Global Democracy 
 
Post-Westphalian 
World Polity 
 
Global 
Governance 
Global Polity 
 
 
Scientific 
Planetary 
Polity 
 
 
Planetary 
Parliament of 
Things 
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Appendix II: Key Terminology 
 
 
World Polity: A supra-polity of all humankind, with a collective identity legitimating a united 
and authoritative structure having the ability to organize and distribute resources. 
 
World System: The social, political, and economic relations of humankind on a worldwide scale. 
 
Belonging: The shared embodied sense of “fitting in”, with a “weness” feeling accompanying a 
sense of being understood as a part of a polity, which imparts common sympathies and solidarity 
across a population. 
 
Collective-Self-Narrative: The historically specific discursive contents of a sense of belonging 
that has a narrative structure applied to a population. 
 
Collective Identity: The combination of a discursive collective-self-narrative and an embodied 
sense of belonging across a population. 
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